The internal power dynamics in Iran are undergoing a significant realignment. Following the death of Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has rapidly expanded its influence through wartime mobilization and strategic positioning. Now, it is seeking to curtail the authority of Mojtaba Khamenei.

The immediate catalyst is an emergency bill that would eliminate the requirement for the intelligence minister to hold advanced religious jurisprudence qualifications. The measure is set to be placed on the parliamentary agenda next week. Under Iranian practice, the inclusion of sensitive legislation on the agenda typically signals near-certain passage, as key actors have already reached informal consensus. Since the establishment of the Intelligence Ministry in 1984, all its directors have been senior clerics. With Khamenei deceased and the former intelligence chief assassinated, the vacancy remains unfilled. This has provided both the government and the IRGC with an opportunity to jointly erode the Supreme Leader’s control over the intelligence apparatus.

Iran operates under two parallel power structures: the administrative system managed by the government, where presidents and cabinets oversee daily operations in economic, fiscal, and energy domains—typically led by technocrats—and the religious hierarchy centered on the Supreme Leader, who exercises influence over religious interpretation, the military, judiciary, and national security through senior clerics.

The Intelligence Ministry sits at the intersection of these systems. While administratively part of the cabinet and headed by a minister nominated by the president, its functions touch upon national and political security, requiring presidential nominations to be approved by the Supreme Leader. In 2011, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attempted to unilaterally dismiss the intelligence minister, Khamenei directly rejected the move, forcing a retreat.

Historically, the clergy were able to balance power between the government and the IRGC due to Khamenei’s personal authority and political stature. Mojtaba Khamenei, now assuming leadership, lacks the decades-long accumulation of political capital and networks his father once commanded. Since the outbreak of conflict, the IRGC has leveraged its role in military command, wartime mobilization, and national security to consolidate power. Many observers believe that Mojtaba, who has remained largely unseen in public, may already be effectively under the IRGC’s influence.

With diminished ability to exert sway across factions compared to his father, Mojtaba presents a vulnerability that the IRGC is exploiting. If the proposed bill passes, the new intelligence minister will likely be a professional from the security sector. Given the IRGC’s existing independent intelligence network, future appointments may increasingly come from within the IRGC itself.

This shift reflects a broader trend in Iran’s evolving power structure. The Khamenei era presented a façade of “parliamentary governance” and bureaucratic administration, but real authority resided with the Supreme Leader and the privileged clerical class. The IRGC, wielding both military force and vast economic interests, stands as Iran’s largest corporate conglomerate. While outwardly cooperative, the three institutions engage in intense behind-the-scenes competition.

Now, the clerical establishment has suffered significant setbacks. The government, inherently weaker than the financially and militarily powerful IRGC, finds itself further isolated as the parliamentary hardliners refuse to align with the president. The IRGC’s dominance is now overwhelming—were it not for the remaining religious authority acting as a check, the emergence of a de facto military government would not be surprising. Even in U.S.-Iran negotiations, Donald Trump’s frequent complaints about “not knowing who’s in charge” in Iran reveal a deeper understanding: the IRGC holds decisive influence, though its demands remain too high for swift engagement.

For Iran, the loss of certain privileges by the clerical class and increased space for the government and professional technocrats may not necessarily be negative developments. What warrants serious concern, however, is whether the IRGC will evolve from a military institution constrained by religious authority into an unchecked, omnipotent entity.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881705851362505/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.