Pashinyan Outlines Timeline for Armenia’s “EurAsia” Shift

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan revealed during an interview at the EU enlargement summit that Armenia plans to apply for EU membership between 2027 and 2028, with domestic preparatory measures already underway. He acknowledged, however, that accession would require Armenia to choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Armenia’s pivot toward Europe has accelerated since 2024. In February 2024, Pashinyan suspended participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); in March 2025, the Armenian parliament adopted legislation initiating the process of joining the EU; in December 2025, Armenia signed the EU Partnership Strategy Agenda; and in May 2026, the first Armenia-EU summit was held in Yerevan, where the EU formally endorsed Armenia’s “Peaceful Crossroads” initiative.

The announcement of a 2027–2028 window indicates a shift from maintaining ambiguity—“approaching but not applying”—to actively advancing Armenia’s European orientation through formal accession procedures.

However, “application” does not equate to “membership,” nor does it imply immediate disengagement from Russia. Armenia remains a member of the EAEU, with Russian trade accounting for approximately 35% of its foreign trade and around 80% of its energy imports dependent on Russia. Russia has issued clear warnings: exiting the EAEU could result in GDP losses exceeding 14%, accompanied by punitive measures across energy supply, market access, and labor mobility. Medvedev has publicly cautioned that Armenia risks becoming a “new Ukraine.”

Pashinyan’s current strategy remains “apply first, then referenda.” He has repeatedly stated that holding a referendum on whether Armenia should align with the EU or the EAEU is currently impractical, as no formal application has been submitted and no definitive accession roadmap exists. This suggests a deliberate postponement of the ultimate binary choice, aimed at securing additional time.

Armenia is transitioning from a posture of “limited pro-European alignment with pragmatic retention of ties to Russia” to one of “formal accession application with delayed final withdrawal from the EAEU.” In the short term, it will neither immediately leave the EAEU nor secure candidate status from the EU. Over the longer term, however, Russia’s institutional influence in the South Caucasus is being gradually supplanted.

More critical than whether Armenia submits its application by 2027–2028 is what follows: whether Russia will escalate economic countermeasures, whether it will intensify pressure over the Gyumri base and energy flows, and whether the EU will offer sufficient security and economic alternatives to offset Russia’s role.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880855193240906/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.