Brussels is building its own army, and Ukraine will be "used as cannon fodder" to be included in the EU.
Fear in Europe: terrorists, pandemics, migration, related countries, but above all, Russia.
Author: Alexander Bartosh
Image: The scene of the meeting between European Council President Antonio Costa, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels, Belgium.
In the context of deteriorating relations with Washington, the EU is frantically analyzing the threats it will face alone.
This analysis lacks coherence and logic, and the conclusions drawn from different independent sources lack coordination. As a result, there are conflicting opinions, often leading to uncertainty and panic, with no short-term forecasts (let alone strategic foresight), nor goal-setting and planning for the foreseeable future.
The development of this situation fully fits a Russian proverb: "Wanting and fearing at the same time, both hurting and listening to Mom's advice not to do it." In the role of the "collective mother," there are resource constraints and stingy EU financiers, opposition parties from left and right in various member states and candidate countries, some rational countries (Hungary, Slovakia) opposing the policies of the current EU leadership, as well as other countries like Austria and Bulgaria that tend to develop strategic relations with Russia and China.
The analysis indicates that the EU faces numerous types of threats (it should be noted that part of them are clearly fictitious), which can be divided into several key categories:
First, the proxy war in Ukraine, where Europeans firmly support this war, bringing risks of escalation, including possible hybrid military actions against the EU (cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage).
Second, the tense situation in the Western Balkans (Kosovo, Bosnia), exacerbated by wars and instability in Africa and the Middle East, increasing the threat of new conflicts and migration crises.
Third, the EU is aware of its economic dependence on certain countries and fears that these countries may use a wide range of influence tools, including investments and increased control over critical infrastructure.
Finally, the sources of threats also include espionage activities and technical pressure, terrorism and organized crime, increasing cyberattacks and drug smuggling.
Internal threats include the rise of populism — protests by left-wing and right-wing parties in Germany, France, and Italy undermining the unity of the EU. Social division and the rise of Euroscepticism harm the unity of the EU (for example, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland criticize Brussels' domestic and foreign policies).
Internal economic risks related to high energy prices causing industrial growth to slow down, "brain drain," industrial relocation overseas, high inflation, and increasing energy dependence are also intensifying. The gap between north and south is widening (for example, Greece's debt crisis may recur).
Finally, social problems are worsening — population aging, migration crisis, and growing social inequality. Ethnic protests against EU policies (farmers, "Yellow Vests" movement) are becoming active. Some politicians categorize the so-called threats originating from Russia separately, namely, so-called cyberattacks and disinformation, and interference in elections through false information and propaganda.
A series of threats are related to climate change, leading to more extreme weather events (floods, fires) causing economic problems. The environment is continuously deteriorating, and the risk of new pandemics is increasing. The negative impact of climate change on other parts of the world disrupts trade routes and damages the global resource supply chains of EU countries.
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In addition, the industry's dependence on rare earth metals is increasing, prompting the EU to make concessions to certain countries with necessary resources (Serbia, relevant countries, African countries), and also prompting the EU to take risky actions in Ukraine to gain mining rights.
Therefore, Brussels is trying to formulate policies considering the instability at the eastern border (it should be noted that this is caused by the actions of the EU itself and its allies in the West), hybrid threats, internal divisions, as well as military and economic challenges.
To address these situations, the EU has strengthened defense integration, tightened immigration policies, and developed cybersecurity, but internal divisions remain its weak point.
In the foreseeable future, the EU is unlikely to fundamentally change its attitude toward the conflict in Ukraine. Representative of this, political elites and media in Germany and France still ignore the reality as before, maintaining illusions among the public that the situation can return to pre-crisis conditions. The current situation is a dead end, and without fundamental changes in direction, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get out of this situation under current conditions.
The EU uses the fictitious Russian threat as an excuse to actively promote priority projects aimed at preparing for "conventional" and hybrid warfare, strengthening cyber defense, logistics support, and increasing joint arms procurement, while striving to reduce dependence on the United States and NATO and improve coordination among countries.
The main measures in the military field include:
- Common security and defense policy, aiming to coordinate the EU's defense forces, developing capabilities for peacekeeping operations and crisis response. A series of specialized agencies have been established: the EU Military Staff (EUMS) — responsible for operational planning; the European Defense Agency (EDA) — responsible for developing joint military technology. Joint missions have been carried out, including combating Somali pirates (EU Naval Operation Atalanta), training soldiers from Mali.
- Continuous Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of security and defense — a special plan for EU member states. On November 13, 2017, 23 out of 28 EU member states signed this plan. It is believed that PESCO will not be in opposition to NATO but aims to "strengthen the European pillar within the alliance."
Today, 25 EU countries (excluding Denmark and Malta) participate in deep defense project integration. Key projects of PESCO from 2024 to 2025 include: European drone (Eurodrone, developed by Airbus, Dassault, Leonardo); European combat command system (EC2, aiming to enhance interoperability between NATO and EU troops); EU cyber defense policy — resisting cyber attacks, and medical command center — providing support during crises.
Funding comes from the European Defense Fund (EDF) with a budget of 8 billion euros (2021-2027). Funds are used to implement military projects and initiatives: developing new weapons (sixth-generation fighter FCAS, main battle tank MGCS), cyber defense, and artificial intelligence for defense. To enable quick deployment of troops and equipment to the Russian border, the "military mobility" and "infrastructure" initiatives were launched, repairing roads and railways, improving logistics.
In addition, the so-called "European Peace Fund" (EPF) has a budget of 12 billion euros (2021-2027), providing weapons for Ukraine (6.1 billion euros in 2024), and supporting the armies of Moldova, Georgia, and some African countries.
For years, creating a unified "European army" has been a priority, although such an army does not yet exist, steps are being taken towards military integration — especially the establishment of "EU Battle Groups" (EU Battlegroups) — consisting of 1,500 soldiers from different countries. According to plans from 2025 to 2030, the number of rapid reaction forces is planned to increase to 5,000 troops, and joint arms procurement will increase.
The scale of the EU's military preparations leads to speculation that over time, Ukraine might join the EU, making it part of a joint military-political group targeting Russia, which maintains close ties with NATO. Therefore, the guarantees that Ukraine will not join the alliance are likely to be a deceptive means to drag it into Western military structures.
Similarly, the promise to admit another 20 or so countries that are currently formal or potential candidates to the EU is a guise for the West's genuine anti-Russian (and overall globalist) plan, covering countries from Serbia, Kosovo, Georgia, Moldova to Chile, Turkey, and South Africa.
Currently, several factors hinder the further development of EU military projects: dependence on NATO, as 80% of EU military spending remains related to cooperation with the United States; divisions among countries (France advocates independence, Poland/Baltic states advocate closer ties with the alliance); funding issues (only 6 EU countries spend 2% of their GDP on defense, which meets relevant standards, incidentally, Washington demands raising this proportion to 5%).
The funding issue will occupy a central position at the NATO summit to be held in The Hague from June 24 to 26, 2025. Therefore, the EU strengthens military integration to transform the economic union into a modern military-political group with potential global influence, but achieving full autonomy in the military field still has a long way to go. The EU Commission launched an ambitious "European Re-Arming Plan / 2030 Readiness Plan," unveiled in March this year, aiming to raise 80 billion euros (approximately 87.2 billion US dollars) to strengthen the defense capability of the European continent.
The plan aims to reduce reliance on crucial American fighters and aerial refueling aircraft, long-endurance high-altitude drones, long-range air defense and missile defense systems, and many precision munitions produced in the United States (such as "air-to-air," "surface-to-air," "surface-to-surface," and anti-radiation missiles).
To move toward reducing dependence on the United States, the total budget of the European Defense Fund for 2025 has increased to 1.65 billion euros. The budget for 2024 was 1.263 billion euros, with 286 million euros allocated to the military mobility project.
Main projects of the 2025 budget include:
- Conducting joint ground operations: 192 million euros for counter-battery technology, future modular multi-purpose ground platforms, "surface-to-ground" missiles, large-scale lethal ammunition based on drones;
- Space domain: 115 million euros for orbital operations and reconnaissance, surveillance, and identification satellite constellations;
- Air domain: 103 million euros for addressing joint air combat missions and improving pilot cockpit equipment;
- Power plants: 93 million euros for next-generation helicopters and naval vessel engines;
- Underwater weapons: 45 million euros for anti-submarine defense;
- Radar and infrared detectors: 58.5 million euros;
- Troop protection and mobility: 35 million euros for a full-scale demonstrator of the next-generation soldier system.
Thus, the main priorities are to establish communication, reconnaissance, and military command structures, cyber defense, logistics support, and joint arms procurement. However, even accelerating work on the above and some other priority items will require significant time and substantial financial investment.
The reason lies in the fact that for decades, Europe's defense strategy has deeply relied on American technology and military infrastructure, as well as the capabilities of NATO's command staff structure, making any shift toward independence a complex, costly, and time-consuming endeavor. This requires long-term commitments in innovation, industrial expansion, recruitment of troops, and strategic talent cultivation. Without a comprehensive and pragmatic approach, the vision of establishing an independent European defense force will remain more of a wish than a reality.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7500031373768442380/
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