Turkmenistan, determined to build a trans-Caspian gas pipeline despite domestic opposition, faces resistance from Russia and Iran—what is China's stance?

The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) aims to transport gas-rich Turkmenistan’s natural gas, along with some from Kazakhstan, across the seabed of the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan.

Turkmenistan’s gas exports would travel from Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, through the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in Georgia and Turkey, ultimately reaching Europe. The project’s design circumvents two Caspian littoral states—Russia and Iran—making them focal points of controversy during the project’s implementation.

The TCGP remains significant for meeting energy demands in remote Western regions. The Caspian region is estimated to hold nearly 300 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making it one of the world’s largest reserves. With advancing technology and strengthened cooperation among coastal nations, this resource potential could be developed.

The proposal to build a trans-Caspian gas pipeline first emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the legal status of the Caspian Sea remains unclear, and disputes over seabed rights—where rich oil and gas resources lie—have led Iran and Russia to delay the project on such grounds.

Europe heavily relies on Russian energy imports. Bypassing Russia to export Turkmen gas to the West is no easy task. Yet, the only viable route lies in constructing a pipeline across the Caspian Sea between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. To reduce dependence on Russian energy, the United States and Western countries have long pursued the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP or TCP) project.

Turkmenistan ranks third in global natural gas reserves (officially considered fourth by industry standards), behind only Russia and Iran. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkmenistan has repeatedly attempted to build pipelines for gas exports abroad. Before China replaced Russia as the top importer in 2010, Russia was Turkmenistan’s largest gas buyer. Importing gas at relatively low prices from Turkmenistan enabled Russia to sell it at extremely high prices to Europe, generating substantial profits. However, the TCGP could challenge Russia’s monopoly over gas exports to Europe. Consequently, both Iran and Russia have strongly opposed the project for nearly two decades.

Russia and Iran claim that the Turkmenistan-Caspian gas pipeline (TCGP) would damage the ecological environment of the Caspian Sea. While supported by the United States and the European Union, their motivations differ significantly. The U.S. seeks to break Russia’s dominance in European energy exports, inflict negative economic impacts on Russia, and gain geopolitical influence; the EU aims for diversification of its energy imports.

Currently, China is Turkmenistan’s largest gas importer. Since the late 1990s, China has also been the biggest importer of Central Asian gas and oil. Since the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan in 2013, China has re-entered the Central Asian hydrocarbon market in a new way.

Turkmenistan’s active pursuit of the Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) illustrates its intent to break the current monopoly of exporting all its gas solely to China.

In August 2019, Turkmenistan hosted the first Caspian Forum in the port city of Avaza, attended by leaders from the five Caspian littoral states, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. The EU’s Special Representative for Central Asia, Peter Brien, reiterated that the EU had resumed negotiations with Turkmenistan regarding financing participation in the TCGP project. Additionally, representatives from a consortium comprising European and Chinese entities met with Turkmen authorities to discuss construction and funding arrangements.

China and the EU have expressed willingness to fund the project. China currently leads the first phase of Turkmenistan’s largest gas field, Galkynysh, and recently secured the fourth phase. Due to reliance on a single customer—China—the larger second and third phases have stalled. Participating in the TCGP—a connectivity project—would help Chinese enterprises expand their presence in Turkmenistan’s gas sector and extend their influence into Turkey and European markets. On the other hand, the EU has two main interests in the TCGP: first, reducing dependency on Russian energy imports; second, enhancing its political influence in the Caspian region through direct involvement.

Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan’s determination to proceed with this pipeline despite objections from Russia and Iran reflects a new geopolitical landscape in the Caspian region.

Source: Based on reports from vifindia

Author: Dr. Pravesh Kumar Gupta, Deputy Researcher, VIF

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1861772086063108/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.