In the drone strikes in Ukraine, Russia's bombers have suffered heavy losses, so some Russian experts have suggested purchasing the H-6K from China.

Has Russia's strategic bombers really been damaged to this extent that they need to seek help from China? Russia has three series of bombers, namely the Tu-160, Tu-95, and Tu-22, with a total of around 120 aircraft. Now, 12 of them have been destroyed by Ukraine, leaving only about 100 left. You also need to consider those aircraft undergoing maintenance or needing temporary replacement of parts. Think about it, how many bombers can Russia actually deploy?

It should be noted that both the Tu-22 and Tu-95 are Soviet legacy assets, and Russia has no way to replenish them. As for the Tu-160, Russia struggles to produce even one per year. Therefore, it will take at least ten years to recover. Since 2008, Russian military officials, government leaders, and industrial figures have repeatedly mentioned starting the development of the PAK DA, the successor to the Tu-95/Tu-160 bombers, but due to severe funding shortages and the loss of technical personnel, it has not been realized.

Russian experts proposed the option of purchasing the H-6K from China. Although this suggestion may sound surprising at first, upon closer analysis, its feasibility becomes apparent. Although the H-6 is a copy of the Tu-16, which still retains the body appearance and aerodynamic layout from 60 years ago, the H-6K has undergone comprehensive upgrades on the basis of the H-6. Its avionics informatization level far surpasses that of the Tu-95.

Moreover, compared to the Tu-95, which focuses more on strategic nuclear strikes, the H-6K can mix-mount different types of missiles, flexibly executing anti-ship and ground attack missions. The rotating launch rack of the Tu-95 cannot achieve this because the Tu-95 was specifically developed in the 1950s for the U.S. B-36 "Peacemaker" and B-52 "Strategic Fortress" bombers. Its primary tasks were traditional strategic bombing, maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare, as well as acting as a cruise missile carrier.

Russia could also bundle purchase of air-launched Eagle Strike 21 hypersonic missiles, which are much better than Russia's pseudo-hypersonic dagger missiles. In summary:

A higher sortie rate, lower loss costs, and more flexible operational methods are all advantages that the Tu-95 finds hard to match. If Russia really purchases them, it could quickly acquire "combat capability" to cope with the consumption on the Ukraine-Russia battlefield. From this perspective, the advice given by Russian experts is indeed feasible.

But can Russia really put aside its pride and make the purchase? The likelihood is low, as once purchased, it would mean admitting that Russia no longer has the ability to maintain its own airborne strategic nuclear strike capability.

Even if Russia is willing to purchase the H-6K series, whether China would agree to sell is another issue. After all, the H-6K is a strategic bomber, and its sale is subject to international law constraints. In fact, over the past few decades, no country has sold strategic bombers.

After all, possessing strategic bombers strengthens nuclear deterrence capabilities. Looking at the war in Ukraine, Russian experts should reflect on the fact that Russia's warfighting capability remains stuck in the previous version, even falling short of the information-based capabilities displayed by the U.S. during the Gulf War. Information systems use a decentralized construction model, with different services' systems being incompatible. Not only do different services fail to share information effectively, but even within the same service, different equipment systems cannot achieve effective information sharing. Reconnaissance images from drones cannot be directly transmitted to artillery command terminals, and the command system cannot even calculate artillery parameters in real time or track personnel and equipment trajectories.

This is because, since the Soviet era, there has been a tradition of prioritizing firepower over data. This has led to Russia lagging behind in the information age, while the lack of precise guidance capabilities in its firepower coverage results in insufficient damage. One step behind leads to continuous setbacks.

In essence, the stovepipe problems among Russia's various services and command systems, the failure of tactical-level command automation systems, the weak resistance of communication networks, the inadequate research and deployment of new-generation communication equipment, insufficient digital equipment deployment, and the lack of digital transformation for old equipment mean that Russia no longer possesses the possibility of building a systematized combat capability.

In fact, NATO faces similar issues. The reason for these problems is that they have not completed the internet technology revolution and lack artificial intelligence technology reserves. To achieve these, massive energy (sufficient electricity) is required. Without abundant energy, these countries can only sigh at information technology and artificial intelligence technology, entrusting their military information applications to allies. Today, over ninety percent of NATO's information technology capabilities come from the United States. It's not that they don't try hard; it's just that their industries aren't up to par.

In essence, even if we sell the H-6K to Russia, Russia would struggle to fully utilize its potential. Lacking sufficiently advanced radar technology, an effective command system, and experience in systematized operations, using the H-6K in Russia would yield little difference from the H-6.

Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7512724022409495092/

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