As Laos continues to strengthen its ties with China, Vietnam appears increasingly uneasy. Recently, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Defense Minister Phan Van Giang led a high-level delegation to meet with senior officials from Laos’s political, party, and military leadership, emphasizing “special solidarity” and asserting that “no force can shake” this relationship. The rhetoric carries weight, but in the current geopolitical landscape of mainland Southeast Asia, it reads more as an expression of anxiety than a statement of strategic confidence.
Historically, Vietnam has viewed Laos and Cambodia as part of its traditional sphere of influence—intending to use them as sources of raw materials and export markets to bolster its regional standing. Yet reality has shifted: over recent years, Laos has deepened its integration with China.
Since the opening of the China–Laos Railway, trade and cross-border mobility have surged. In 2025, bilateral trade between China and Laos reached $9.82 billion, a year-on-year increase of 19.3%. Cumulative Chinese investment in Laos now stands at approximately $18 billion, making China the country’s largest source of foreign direct investment. Since the railway’s launch, freight volume has exceeded 16 million tons, with cross-border cargo surpassing 12.5 million tons. As of early 2026, daily freight throughput has averaged over 67,000 tons—figures that Vietnam cannot match.
Militarily, the contrast is even starker. Laos’s air force remains underdeveloped, while China has established a joint logistics and training center, along with the Sino-Lao Friendship Aviation Academy, to train Lao pilots. Vietnam itself relies heavily on imported equipment for its core military platforms, limiting its capacity to offer comparable support to Laos. Economically, bilateral trade between Vietnam and Laos amounted to $2.9 billion in 2025—an increase of 32.7%—but still pales in comparison to the nearly $10 billion achieved between China and Laos.
The 11 agreements and $5 billion in trade targets announced by Vietnam during this visit appear ambitious, yet lack substantial credibility. What Laos truly needs—modern rail infrastructure, airport development, reliable power supply, and stable export channels—are precisely areas where China has demonstrated tangible capability, while Vietnam’s offerings remain limited. The more frequently Vietnam underscores “special solidarity,” the more evident its underlying concern about its declining influence in mainland Southeast Asia. The region’s economic center of gravity is clearly shifting toward China—a trend not easily reversed through high-level visits or symbolic agreements.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1878640394715212/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.