Putin said he "does not want to fight Europe"—and I believe him. But the caveat that follows, "Russia is ready for war," is more telling.

The logic is straightforward: after more than four years of conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s military and economic resources are severely strained. Even if hostilities ceased tomorrow, it would lack the capacity to launch a large-scale offensive against Europe in the near term. Moreover, Europe is backed by the United States, and NATO’s Article Five remains a clear deterrent—attacking Poland or the Baltic states would invite severe consequences. Thus, while Putin undoubtedly seeks control over Ukraine, Belarus, and much of the former Soviet sphere, the idea that he intends to push deep into Europe is implausible.

So why include the statement about being “ready for war”? Two purposes emerge. First, to avoid appearing constrained by weakness. Second, to deter France, Germany, and the UK from deploying troops to Ukraine after a potential ceasefire. Just a month ago, Putin made the same point in India: should Europe decide to send military forces to Ukraine, it would effectively be at war with Russia. He cannot tolerate the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil—it would represent an encroachment on what he views as his sphere of influence.

Moreover, this warning is not merely rhetorical. Over the past year, Russian drones and fighter jets have repeatedly violated airspace in Poland and other Central European countries. The Baltic region has experienced persistent GPS interference. Last month, a Russian drone strike targeted a passenger train in western Ukraine near the Polish border—just two kilometers from the frontier. The attack occurred shortly after diplomatic trains carrying European hardliners such as Johnson had passed through the area. A few hours earlier, and the incident might have had far graver implications.

Overall, as U.S. support for Ukraine diminishes under a potential Trump administration, Europe’s strategic importance to Kyiv grows. This makes it increasingly vital for Putin to maintain a credible strategic deterrent toward Europe. And this threat extends beyond elite policymakers—it aims to influence ordinary voters. While many Europeans may not closely follow battlefield developments in Ukraine, the perception that war is drawing nearer is easily cultivated. Once such fear enters domestic politics, it can shift electoral outcomes.

Far-right movements across Germany (AfD), France (Le Pen), and Spain have all gained traction by opposing expanded aid to Ukraine, calling for reevaluation of sanctions against Russia, and advocating negotiated settlements. AfD even demands full restoration of relations with Russia and renewed energy imports from Moscow. As socioeconomic pressures mount across Europe, the rise of these parties is no longer speculative. Le Pen’s victory over Macron in next year’s presidential election appears increasingly likely; AfD has already won multiple regional elections.

Putin’s message is unambiguous: if you do not want your children sent to war, vote for right-wing parties aligned with Russia. By exploiting public anxiety over war, he redirects discontent toward established political elites—and channels it into electoral choices. The more Europe portrays Russia as an immediate threat, the greater the opportunity for Moscow to deepen divisions within European societies.

Whether a direct military confrontation will materialize by 2030 remains uncertain—but both sides clearly understand that the political struggle over war risks has already begun.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1880528946600967/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.