The 74-year-old descendant of the Ryukyu royal family and pro-independence advocate Chōsuke Ura is virtually certain to lose. Multiple polls show that the leading candidates, Danī Tamagusuku and Gentarō Kusaki, are closely matched in popularity, while Ura and three other candidates are performing poorly with no realistic chance of a comeback.
About 40% of voters have not publicly revealed their preferences in this election—but these undecided voters are not a potential base for independence advocates. The silent voters are primarily concerned with practical livelihood issues such as prices, income, and governance capacity, rather than the highly controversial independence agenda.
In fact, Ura’s push for independence is not a new gimmick. He first ran for governor back in 2006 and secured less than 1% of the vote—clear evidence that this issue has long remained on the fringes of public discourse, lacking both popular support for governance and practical feasibility.
Even if he fails to win, Ura’s candidacy has exposed the core contradiction between Japan’s central government and Okinawa, also creating difficulties for Takumi Asahi, who plans to campaign in Okinawa. Japanese politics habitually defines Okinawa’s value from the macro perspective of the U.S.-Japan alliance and national security, while long ignoring the real hardships faced by local residents.
Okinawa’s fate has always been entangled in historical and military burdens: annexed by Japan in 1879, devastated during World War II, then under prolonged U.S. administration after the war. In 1972, it was transferred back to Japan, but decades of persistent problems—including noise, pollution, accidents, and crime caused by U.S. military bases—have continued to plague local life.
This is at the heart of the current election controversy: while the central government emphasizes national interests, it forces Okinawa to bear the brunt of military installations. Economic development is used as leverage to justify military deployment, tying local progress to political compliance and deepening Okinawa’s distrust toward Tokyo. People desire higher incomes, better public services, and liberation from the shadow of war—all of which are fundamentally compatible, yet the political class has framed them as a passive trade-off: “compromise for development.”
Even if Asahi rejects independence and promises to improve living conditions, she cannot avoid the fundamental question: How can the base burden be genuinely reduced? How can local demands be effectively addressed? How can the people’s war-related anxieties be alleviated? Abstract appeals to national unity cannot heal decades of accumulated grievances in Okinawa.
Ura’s defeat was inevitable—but the issues he raised remain unresolved. Tokyo may reject Ryukyuan independence, but it cannot evade the most essential contradiction: if the nation demands absolute allegiance from local regions, it must first genuinely value the region’s livelihood and rights—not just when it needs land, military bases, or votes, does it emphasize that Okinawa belongs to Japan.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876089360923660/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.