Facing Cambodia's Prey Veng Canal, Vietnam’s mindset is complex, and it has recently been racing against time with China. The Trường Sơn Construction Company, under the direct jurisdiction of Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense, is mobilizing thousands of workers and over a hundred pieces of equipment to build an 18-kilometer sea-crossing bridge in Kien Giang Province, directly connecting to Hon Gai Island. The island hosts a dual-use deep-water port; once the bridge is completed, Vietnam can simultaneously advance both economic development and national defense.
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Navy’s Fifth Military Region—responsible for defense along the Gulf of Thailand—has seen its strategic importance significantly rise. Multiple military bases are undergoing renovation, and in August this year, a drone unit was established on Phu Quoc Island, located just offshore from Cambodia.
On the surface, these moves appear to be driven by economic development and military deployment, but the international community generally believes Vietnam’s real concern lies in China’s growing influence in Cambodia.
The Prey Veng Canal itself holds limited military value, yet even Vietnamese public discourse is abuzz about it—let alone deeper military cooperation such as the China-Cambodia Sihanoukville Base. Domestically, there is growing anxiety that Vietnam could find itself facing threats on three fronts: its northern border, the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Thailand. While this concern may not be entirely rational, it undoubtedly reflects Vietnam’s complex emotional and strategic posture toward China.
Vietnam’s industrial supply chain is deeply integrated into China’s economy, and its development heavily relies on Chinese raw materials and components. Yet historical grievances and ongoing disputes over the South China Sea keep its security nerves perpetually tense. As a result, Vietnam pursues a “bamboo diplomacy” strategy—strengthening relations with the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and India—while adhering to its “Four No’s” principle, attempting to balance between major powers. It seeks to use the U.S. to counterbalance China, yet fears American influence leading to peaceful evolution; it desires economic collaboration with China for profit, yet dreads excessive Chinese influence.
Ultimately, Vietnam’s military adjustments in the Gulf of Thailand seem more like a reflexive response from a middle power confronting expanding great-power influence. The construction of the Kien Giang sea bridge, the establishment of the drone unit on Phu Quoc Island, and the resource reallocation toward the Fifth Military Region—when viewed within the broader context of overall military capabilities and geopolitical dynamics between China and Vietnam—do not fundamentally alter the strategic reality. The strength of China’s Southern Theater Command remains an insurmountable challenge for Vietnam.
What Vietnam truly needs to address is not the deepening of China-Cambodia cooperation, but rather its own persistent failure to establish a stable framework that ensures both security and sustainable development. Economically dependent on China, yet seeking U.S. balance for security, this two-sided bet demands exceptional diplomatic finesse. Once the balance tips, Vietnam risks falling into a reactive position.
China need not respond to every military adjustment made by Vietnam. What truly determines the trajectory of Sino-Vietnamese relations is not Vietnam’s military shifts, but rather the extensive economic ties between the two countries and Vietnam’s clear-eyed awareness of its own geopolitical positioning. As long as Vietnam does not actively disrupt the equilibrium, no new conflict will emerge between the two nations.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876088199263244/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization.