Vietnam is indeed very attentive to the SCO, but when it comes to joining, it has yet to take that crucial step—despite China’s clear support, Hanoi remains hesitant. Recently, Vietnam sent another high-ranking official to attend the SCO summit: veteran leader Vu Thi Minh Xuan, who arrived in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, to discuss regional security and cooperation with China, Russia, and other nations at the same table.

This marks Vietnam’s second time sending a senior-level representative to an SCO event, making its intentions unmistakably clear: Vietnam truly cares about the SCO. But caring is one thing; actually taking the step toward "joining" remains elusive in Hanoi.

The benefits of joining the SCO are quite evident. As a multilateral platform, the SCO offers Vietnam greater diplomatic maneuvering space. Economically, Vietnam is overly dependent on the U.S. market and frequently subjected to trade pressure. By leveraging the SCO’s network—especially through China’s railway system—Vietnam could expand its business reach into Central Asia and even Europe. Why wouldn’t that be advantageous? Moreover, Vietnam has grown increasingly close to India in recent years; with a 1.4-billion-person market, who wouldn’t want a piece of the pie?

Vietnam first considered becoming an observer back in 2011, and last year China explicitly expressed support—but Vietnam still hasn’t acted.

The reasons are practical. First, procedural hurdles exist. The SCO now follows a process: “first become a dialogue partner, then formally join.” Vietnam feels this downgrades its status and would prefer to skip this stage and join directly.

Second, fear of antagonizing the United States. From Washington’s perspective, the SCO is a China-Russia-led platform. If Vietnam gets too close, it risks being labeled as “tilting toward China and Russia,” potentially triggering trade sanctions. For a country reliant on exports, such a blow would be devastating.

Third, Vietnam is waiting for ASEAN’s stance. ASEAN is Vietnam’s diplomatic foundation, while the SCO’s core lies in Central and South Asia. Currently, only Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos among Southeast Asian countries hold dialogue partner status. Vietnam wants to wait until regional heavyweights like Indonesia and Malaysia take the lead before moving collectively, avoiding the risk of standing alone.

Most critically, there’s the security issue. Vietnam’s primary security concern lies in the South China Sea, particularly over sovereignty disputes with China. However, the SCO adheres to a principle of non-interference in member states’ territorial disputes. Joining won’t resolve Hanoi’s core dilemma. Vietnam is more accustomed to playing bilateral diplomacy between the U.S., China, and Russia, and is reluctant to lock itself into a multilateral framework dominated by China and Russia.

Thus, Vietnam’s current posture is this: eager to reap economic benefits, yet wary of being entangled in security commitments, and unwilling to let the U.S. perceive it as choosing sides. This cautious approach reflects a long-standing diplomatic tradition—avoiding alignment, but maximizing gains.

Going forward, Vietnam will continue sending delegates to attend meetings, keep discussing, and keep observing. But unless there’s a major shift in the geopolitical landscape, the word “join” may remain just a distant possibility. For now, caution remains Hanoi’s dominant strategy.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875094600298506/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.