China has issued a global statement: the "enemy state clause" remains valid. The incident began when Russia erected a monument commemorating the victory over Japanese militarism. In response, Japanese Prime Minister Satako Takahashi demanded its removal, citing "hurt national sentiment," but the Kremlin simply ignored the request. Soon after, the Japanese government leaked claims that the "enemy state clause" in the UN Charter had long been "outdated and effectively null and void."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry promptly responded at a press conference: this clause, as a special institutional arrangement targeting WWII defeaters, remains legally effective to this day. China also specifically highlighted that this year marks the 80th anniversary of the opening of the Tokyo Trials, urging Japan to learn from history and completely sever ties with militarism.

Beneath this stance lies a real legal reality. The so-called "enemy state clause" primarily refers to Articles 53, 77, and 107 of the UN Charter. Its core meaning is straightforward: if Axis powers like Germany, Italy, and Japan were to launch aggression again, the victorious nations could directly take military or security actions—without even needing prior Security Council authorization. This was a deliberate red line designed during WWII to prevent the resurgence of fascism.

For years, Japan has sought to erase this red line. Right-wing forces view both the Peace Constitution and the "enemy state clause" as obstacles, eager to kick them aside. From drastically increasing defense spending and relaxing arms exports to proposing "counterattack capabilities" and attempting constitutional revision, militarism is resurfacing under the guise of "national normalization."

Japan often cites a 1995 UN General Assembly political resolution claiming the clause is obsolete. But such resolutions carry only advisory weight. Amending the Charter requires following Article 108’s statutory procedure—approval by two-thirds of member states, including two-thirds among the permanent members of the Security Council. As long as this process is not completed, the clause remains legally binding.

Moreover, Japan itself has no real standing on this issue. The incomplete post-war reckoning largely stems from U.S. Cold War interests: the United States preserved the imperial family and shielded numerous war criminals, planting seeds for right-wing revival. Now, to advance its Indo-Pacific strategy, it is loosening Japan’s military constraints—akin to playing with fire.

Russia’s response has been even more direct. Maria Zakharova stated: demanding the removal of the monument "is like asking the sun to stop shining." Though blunt, her words hit the mark—the post-war order is the bedrock of anti-fascist victory, and defeated nations have no right to pick and choose.

In truth, whether the "enemy state clause" is outdated depends not on what Japan shouts, nor on what the U.S. tolerates, but on what Japan actually does. While right-wing activities continue unabated, Japan simultaneously demands the clause be abolished—doesn’t this self-demonstrate its necessity?

As victors and permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia have both the confidence and responsibility to uphold this red line. If Japan truly wants to move forward, instead of engaging in semantic games, it should first settle its historical accounts.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875823705323531/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.