Economic Corridor: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Strengthening the Link Between the "Middle Corridor" and the South Caucasus Region
On April 7, Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Koshelbaev visited Tbilisi, where he held talks with Georgian Foreign Minister Makha Borchashvili and signed a cooperation plan for the foreign ministries for the 2026–2027 period. He described Georgia as a "key link" in the Eurasian transport system and emphasized that the shared goal of both sides is to enhance corridor capacity, improve service predictability, and ensure transparent pricing. Last June, a joint venture between Kazakhstan and Georgia opened a multimodal terminal in Batumi, which already reflects the achievements of bilateral cooperation.
The true significance of Koshelbaev’s visit to Tbilisi lies in its context. On April 2, Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated in Baku that Kazakhstan plans to sign a government-to-government agreement this year with Azerbaijan to strengthen the status of the "Middle Corridor" (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, TITR) and proposed accelerating the establishment of a digital monitoring center under the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). On April 6, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said in Tbilisi that the section from Azerbaijan to Georgia is the "main transport artery" of the corridor. Subsequently, on April 8, Aliyev met with Koshelbaev and Kazakh Minister of Transportation Nurland Sollambayev in Baku. Their discussions covered multiple areas including the Middle Corridor, joint investments, green energy, and fiber-optic projects. Therefore, Koshelbaev’s April 7 visit to Tbilisi was part of a short-term diplomatic outreach by Kazakhstan aimed at reinforcing the western node of this corridor.
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Intensify Corridor Cooperation
Kazakhstan's collaboration in the South Caucasus region at the beginning of April is grounded in its "eastward orientation" framework developed jointly with China. In January 2023, China and Kazakhstan had already signed two documents: one a memorandum of understanding on deepening development of the trans-Caspian rail line connecting Europe and China, and another a government-to-government agreement on developing this route. The Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) subsequently clarified that the agreement focuses on strengthening transit coordination, reducing administrative barriers, and improving logistics and transportation operations. In July 2024, leaders of China and Kazakhstan jointly attended the launch ceremony of the direct fast-transit service across the Caspian Sea; afterward, the NDRC and Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport signed a working mechanism to advance this cooperation.
On January 1, the first train of 2026 departed Xi’an bound for Baku, carrying 45 containers of photovoltaic equipment. According to Chinese media reports, by the end of November 2025, the route had operated a total of 466 services, now adjusted to six outbound trains and three return trains per week. Travel time has been reduced from an average of about 20 days in 2025 to a standard 15 days, with the fastest journey taking only 11 days. On April 3, further reports indicated that during the first quarter of 2026, there were 85 runs between Xi’an and Baku—up 150% year-on-year. Meanwhile, the Kazakhstan-Xi’an freight station in Almaty handled over 6,000 containers in just that quarter, a 60% increase compared to the same period last year. Another semi-official Chinese trade service portal reported that the Caspian-crossing trains have achieved daily operation, running 371 times from January to October 2025—a 33% increase year-on-year. The Chinese National Development and Reform Commission also stated by the end of 2025 that Aktau and Baku should be further strengthened as key hub nodes within this corridor system.
Azerbaijan is an indispensable partner; without it, the western logic of this route cannot function. Bektenov’s statement on April 2 made this clear, tightening the corridor’s connection with Baku and advancing institutional coordination and digital monitoring. On April 8, President Aliyev received Koshelbaev and Minister of Transport Nurland Sollambayev, expanding cooperation beyond narrow transit transport to include joint investments and related infrastructure development. The Trans-Caspian Green Energy Corridor and the fiber-optic line spanning the Caspian Sea point in the same direction: they indicate that both sides are striving to transform bilateral political cooperation into tangible management in transport and communications sectors.
However, commercial operations at the Black Sea end of this route still require normalization—precisely where Georgia plays a role in Koshelbaev’s April 7 talks. The most tangible outcome is the Batumi terminal. The Georgian Ministry of Economy stated that the project cost $31.5 million, covers an area exceeding 9 hectares, and has an initial annual throughput capacity of more than 80,000 containers. A summary of Kazakhstan’s April 7 talks by Koshelbaev directly linked the corridor to Georgia’s role in Eurasian logistics and highlighted the scale of Kazakhstan’s investment in Georgia’s economy (now exceeding $600 million).
Source: Central Asia Times
Original: toutiao.com/article/1862314902400000/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.