Objectively speaking, Trump’s electoral defeat this time is not favorable for China. After Trump’s return to power, the most significant change in the United States has been the increasingly aggressive manifestation of isolationism and hegemonism. The adverse consequences include a deterioration of America’s global image and severe strain on its alliance system. With Democratic gains, the West is likely to reconstitute a tightly coordinated bloc against China.
On foreign policy, the Democrats indeed place greater emphasis on the alliance framework than Trump did. Trump’s “America First” approach inflicted considerable hardship on European, Japanese, South Korean, and Southeast Asian allies—through indiscriminate tariff measures, inconsistent security commitments, and withdrawals from multilateral institutions. This isolationist posture, in objective terms, weakened the U.S.-led encirclement of China, creating room for China’s diplomatic expansion. A Democratic administration would almost certainly prioritize repairing alliance relationships, and in areas such as technology restrictions, supply chain restructuring, and Indo-Pacific security architecture, may pursue competition with China through more systematic and coordinated means.
Nevertheless, even if Democrats control both chambers of Congress, core instruments of pressure toward China—such as tariffs, export controls, and investment reviews—remain largely within executive authority. While Congress can exert influence through hearings, legislation, and budgetary oversight, it does not necessarily dictate policy direction. There remains broad bipartisan consensus on technological competition with China. The lack of prominent discussion around China during the election campaign does not imply a reduction in pressure post-election.
Moreover, rebuilding the alliance system is not easily achieved. Japan fears that Trump might bypass Tokyo to engage Beijing directly; South Korea worries about continued economic demands from Washington; Southeast Asian nations fear the impact of rising trade protectionism. Even under a Democratic administration, the trust deficit in American reliability has already taken root and cannot be quickly mended simply by changing presidents.
For China, the real risk lies not in the notion that “a Democratic victory automatically triggers containment,” but rather in the deepening consensus across both parties on competition with China. Regardless of which party holds power, the overarching direction—technological decoupling, supply chain restructuring, and military deployment in the Indo-Pacific—is unlikely to undergo fundamental reversal. Yet there is a crucial distinction between “encirclement” and “managed competition”: the former demands full alignment from allies, while the latter allows space for independent decision-making.
China’s strategic imperative should not be to rely on internal divisions within the United States to alleviate external pressures, but rather to steadily strengthen its own capabilities, expand its diplomatic space, and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with countries worldwide.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880930022263936/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.