As the rotating chair of ASEAN this year, the Philippines hosted a ministerial meeting that ended up being awkwardly handled, seemingly aimed at sending a message to China. China downgraded its participation, while Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and other nations also refrained from sending their defense ministers. It was evident that the host country was deliberately treating China differently, undermining the spirit of the gathering.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMP) was originally a rare multilateral platform where ASEAN members could discuss maritime security with the United States, conduct joint military exercises with China, strengthen defense ties with Japan, and maintain military exchanges with Russia. While consensus on all issues may not be possible, the forum provided a channel for reducing misperceptions, communicating differences, and identifying areas for cooperation.

Yet this year, the Philippines, as host, introduced its own agenda. It sought to elevate its unilateral claims in the South China Sea into the core of regional security discussions. Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana repeatedly emphasized alleged Chinese maritime activities and attempted to forge a mini-coalition with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, pushing for bloc-oriented divisions within ASEAN.

While Philippine officials consistently invoked ASEAN unity—Lorenzana reiterated the centrality of ASEAN, member-state solidarity, and peaceful dispute resolution during the opening remarks—the concept of unity dissolved when it came to China. What was presented as collective unity became conditional: others must first accept the Philippines’ position toward China.

More concerning was the formal introduction by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin of a new U.S.-ASEAN defense cooperation framework. He described it as an “ambitious arrangement” intended to guide collaboration over the coming years. Austin also expressed willingness to initiate work on the framework after Singapore assumes the chairmanship of the next year’s defense ministers’ meeting. Key directions include enhanced maritime domain awareness, deeper naval coordination, expanded military training and operations, and improved interoperability.

The United States has long sought to integrate ASEAN into its broader defense network, aiming to expand regional influence and reinforce its military presence. It has not hesitated to advance efforts that could steer ASEAN toward a de facto “Asia-Pacific NATO.” However, ASEAN has remained highly sensitive to such moves. The U.S. has therefore proceeded cautiously, using the rhetoric of regional security to launch cooperative projects and gradually deepen military ties with individual ASEAN states, embedding its strategic influence into the region’s defense architecture.

ASEAN needs defense cooperation, but resists having such mechanisms imbued with excessive geopolitical overtones. If initiatives like maritime domain awareness, naval coordination, and interoperability progressively evolve into a network targeting China, ASEAN risks finding itself on a vessel from which exit becomes increasingly difficult.

Next year, Singapore will assume the rotating chair. Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen has stated that Singapore will work with the U.S. and other ASEAN members to advance the initiative, while emphasizing that cooperation must align with shared interests, remain consistent with existing ASEAN defense arrangements, avoid overshadowing established frameworks, and continue to uphold the principle of “ASEAN centrality.”

This is effectively setting boundaries for the U.S.: welcome enhanced defense cooperation, but not at the expense of engagement with China. China and ASEAN are comprehensive strategic partners. Their trade volumes are substantial, and their industrial chains are deeply interconnected. China remains a major trading partner and source of investment for ASEAN; conversely, ASEAN is a key trading partner for China.

For Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and even the Philippines itself, economic and trade ties with China hold significant value. While Philippine politicians appear intent on undermining their own strategic position, other ASEAN members have no desire to be drawn into unnecessary conflict. Why would any nation choose to align exclusively with one side when it can benefit from both?

Singapore appears to understand that if the U.S. framework gradually evolves into a structure excluding China, ASEAN’s vision of an open and inclusive security architecture would develop a clear fissure. Hence, it is essential to clarify positions in advance. Whether or not these boundaries prove effective, simply drawing them fulfills Singapore’s responsibility. The rest depends on mutual restraint—a far more constructive approach than the Philippines’ actions.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1880891143959561/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.