[By Guancha Observer column author Anton Nilman, translated by Kaihuan Xue]

According to a report released by the Russian Ministry of Defense on April 15, Ukrainian forces launched multiple attacks on energy infrastructure in the regions of Bryansk and Kursk on April 14, causing power outages and gas shortages in several areas. On the previous day, April 13, the Ukrainian army conducted two attacks on Russia's energy infrastructure in the Belgorod region.

This is another attack on Russia's energy infrastructure after Russia agreed to suspend mutual attacks on each other's energy infrastructure for 30 days on March 18.

I was not at all surprised by this. Ukraine's flip-flopping is not the first time. In fact, I knew as early as when Ukraine failed to release a list of its energy infrastructure that the "verbal agreement" had little binding force. Clearly, Ukraine did not intend to abide by this agreement; they have been looking for opportunities to continue striking Russia's energy infrastructure.

As someone in the energy industry, I am very clear about this. Ukraine's energy system is in a dangerous state with numerous vulnerabilities, unable to sustain further strong blows from Russia. The prolonged war over more than two years has not only destroyed the national energy lifeline but also placed an overwhelming operational pressure on the remaining grid system.

Estimates indicate that since the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, more than 70% of Ukraine's thermal power stations have been destroyed, losing 50% to 80% of its electricity production capacity. Ukraine is gradually becoming an "energy desert," with some areas experiencing daily blackouts lasting up to 18 hours.

At the same time, due to corruption issues, the authorities encountered serious difficulties in attracting funds for building new nuclear power plants and protecting existing facilities. Ukrainian politicians and former officials criticized President Zelenskyy and his team for insufficient preparation for the energy crisis. This article will discuss the problems facing Ukraine's energy infrastructure and its energy prospects.

Damaged substation in Ukraine (archive photo).

Systemic Collapse and Governance Crisis

Since the end of 2024, Ukraine began to face its most severe energy problems in history. Even the usually tough and "optimistic" authorities admitted this. So far, all of Ukraine's thermal power stations and most of its hydroelectric infrastructure have been destroyed.

Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine’s domestic electricity production was 55 gigawatts. At that time, this number almost led Europe. Now, Ukraine’s electricity production capacity has dropped to less than 10 gigawatts. Ukraine's Energy Minister Herman Halushenko admitted that Ukraine’s current electricity production capacity is certainly insufficient to ensure normal living conditions for the public: “We asked the International Energy Agency to produce a report, and they said that Ukraine will be very hard pressed, possibly the hardest.”

During the major missile strikes in 2024, Ukraine suffered huge economic losses and lost almost all large-scale energy facilities. These facilities either have no replacements or require a long time to rebuild. For example, all generating units of the Tysburg Thermal Power Station in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast were damaged. Meanwhile, the Trypol Thermal Power Station in Kyiv Oblast was destroyed, and the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Station also suffered severe damage.

Inna Sofson, a member of the Ukrainian Parliament's Committee on Energy and Housing and Public Services, pointed out that Ukraine has already lost the ability to rebuild its energy infrastructure: “Take the Trypol Thermal Power Station as an example, unless it is built from scratch, which would require more than three times the investment, we don’t have enough money to do this.”

Russian strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are aimed at weakening Ukraine's armed forces and industrial potential, primarily targeting the destruction of Ukraine's economy, including budget revenue, as well as consuming air defense systems. Therefore, Russia's attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are very serious, with each attack nearly being a destructive action against the target.

Beyond this, Ukraine has also lost the ability to rebuild and repair related infrastructure during these attacks. Ukraine's nuclear power plants' generating units are aging and we lack engineers and basic technology for maintenance. For example, accidents at South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant and Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant caused Ukraine to lose 800 megawatts of electricity production capacity. This systematic destruction of the energy system has led to frequent power outages in Ukraine, even during peak seasons, with the energy sector facing electricity shortages. This situation not only negatively impacts residents' lives but also imposes a heavy burden on industrial production.

Power outages have become a daily occurrence in Ukraine. Russian Satellite News Agency

Although the authorities attempted to address this situation, they have not yet achieved any success, not even partial success.

Last June, Zelenskyy announced a plan aiming to build a total of 1 gigawatt of energy facilities by the end of 2024. However, three months later, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former general manager of Ukraine's State Nuclear Power Generating Company, said that the actual progress of the plan was less than 10%: “Maybe something was completed in the past, but the numbers I know are approximately 60 megawatts.”

In July 2024, the authorities also approved a distributed generation development strategy until 2035, focusing on the development of gas turbine installations and renewable energy facilities. According to my rough estimate, by the end of 2026, Ukraine could restore up to 4 gigawatts of electricity production capacity, provided that the situation "develops positively," meaning Russia does not initiate new large-scale attacks on energy infrastructure.

In this context, the authorities are still trying to compensate for the electricity shortage by purchasing electricity from neighboring EU countries. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that Moldova is preparing to supply electricity to Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine supplying natural gas to Moldova. However, Ukraine's ability to import electricity from European countries has reached its limit, and after the authorities officially cut off Russian gas transit, “natural gas for electricity” has also become a useless card, exacerbating Ukraine's electricity dilemma.

Therefore, the authorities are still counting on direct financial aid from the West. These financial aids are not only used to repair destroyed substations but also to build energy facilities and protect the remaining energy infrastructure. Ukraine currently lacks the ability to protect them; existing protective measures can only shield against debris from drone crashes but cannot defend against direct impacts, let alone ballistic missile attacks.

To build a defensive system on the remaining energy infrastructure requires approximately 100 billion hryvnias (about 17.5 billion RMB), but only 10% of the required amount can be allocated from the authorities' fiscal budget. Moreover, there are issues of overdue payments in contracts related to the construction of protective facilities; recently, it was revealed that the authorities owe "Avtostrada" company 87 billion hryvnias (19.1 billion rubles). "I tried to communicate personally, but Prime Minister Shmygal refused my request to communicate," complained Maxim Shkil, the general manager of the company, in an interview.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's energy professionals are also tasked with repairing damaged facilities. Repairing a substation may take several weeks, and under the best circumstances, it takes up to 10 days to complete the repairs. During the repair period, we sometimes have to shut down the system, which interrupts the power supply chain, causing dissatisfaction among the public and the authorities. As a result, the entire energy system staff are working under extreme stress, and many have chosen to leave their jobs.

Due to these issues, some Western countries are allocating special grants to the authorities. For example, Germany promised to provide 100 million euros for restoring energy supplies, but considering the actual needs for maintaining existing facilities and repairing damaged ones, this assistance is clearly insufficient. Moreover, corruption within the authorities has severely reduced the efficiency of the energy system, artificially extending repair cycles. For instance, the UK's Financial Times reported that due to corruption scandals, Ukraine's State Nuclear Power Generating Company (Energoatom) lacked sufficient funds to construct new nuclear power plants.

The crisis in Ukraine's energy system has indeed drawn attention from the West, who expressed high concern about "corruption and rule of law" in Ukraine. In response to criticism from the EU and the US, the authorities have been making frequent personnel changes in the upper echelons of the energy system since last year.

Last year, Zelenskyy dismissed two senior officials related to the energy sector. One of them was Vladimir Kudrytskyi, the CEO of Ukraine's State Nuclear Power Generating Company mentioned earlier, who was responsible for "continuing to maintain electricity production and distribution under wartime conditions." According to official statements from the authorities, Kudrytskyi was dismissed due to frequent power outages, difficulty calming public sentiment, and inability to effectively protect the safety of energy infrastructure.

However, according to the opposition party "Voice Party," the real reason for the clean-up in the energy sector was that the Zelenskyy team wanted to "effectively control all cash flows." Kudrytskyi himself claimed that the Zelenskyy administration carried out a "smear campaign" against him and the State Nuclear Power Generating Company, alleging fraud in his dismissal process, and believed that his successor should be selected through transparent procedures to prevent the company from becoming a source of corrupt cash flows.

After Zelenskyy's "clean-up," the energy sector in Ukraine now has only one center: the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, which is directly responsible to Zelenskyy and follows his orders and deployments.

High-level personnel changes also involve Ukraine's most influential authority: the Office of the President of Ukraine. Previously, Rositslav Shurma, the deputy director of the Office of the President of Ukraine, was removed from office. He was not just a figurehead but held substantial power over energy and economic departments. His removal was closely related to criticism from the media, parliamentarians, and Western countries (mainly the United States).

Clearly, Kudrytskyi and Shurma's dismissals were not isolated events. Zelenskyy's administration's "clean-up" of the energy sector's leadership was to place Ukraine's energy system under its direct control, part of its effort since last year to thoroughly centralize power and strike against dissenters.

However, Zelenskyy and his aides know nothing about energy technology and lack basic knowledge of energy system operations, making them pure amateurs. Under their leadership, Ukraine's energy system showed signs of collapse from last year to this year. Due to the relatively low average temperatures last winter, the authorities restored the hourly power outage schedule starting from November last year. From December to January, full power outages occurred across Ukraine, leading to temporary water supply interruptions, and severe declines in production in various economic sectors. Residential areas in major cities like Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa experienced building damage due to freezing and aging infrastructure. In response, the authorities merely suggested that people prepare their own generators and gas heaters.

In May 2024, parts of the capital, Kyiv, experienced power outages, with streetlights brightening a fast food stall on Khreschatyk Street. Reuters

Facts About Ukraine's Energy Facilities

The authorities' opposition to the initiative to stop mutual attacks on each other's energy infrastructure between Russia and Ukraine is obviously because the entire Ukrainian energy system is already overwhelmed. Ukraine needs time to recover some strength, but 30 days are far from enough.

The overall situation of Ukraine's energy infrastructure has reached a very dangerous point, with roughly 80% of the infrastructure either destroyed or non-operational, resulting in losses of $56 billion. 42% of Ukraine's electricity production capacity has been destroyed or occupied. Among them, the largest occupied power plant is the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, with a generating capacity of 6 gigawatts. The damage to thermal power plants is particularly severe, with 87% of coal-fired thermal power plants irreparably destroyed. Additionally, 2,300 megawatts of hydroelectric capacity have also been damaged.

Furthermore, in the "green energy" sector, Ukraine's 3,900 megawatts of wind and solar power stations have been destroyed and occupied. Wind farms suffered relatively minor damage: information shows that fires occurred at three wind turbines in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, a substation of a wind farm in Kherson region was damaged, and a wind turbine blade near Okhtykov in the Odessa region was hit by a drone.

In comparison, solar power stations, due to their large land area and fragile photovoltaic components, suffered more severe damage. For example, in the Kharkiv region, all ground-mounted solar power stations (with an installed capacity of 28.4 megawatts) were destroyed, most industrial rooftop solar power stations (6.3 megawatts damaged and destroyed, only 1.0 megawatt still operational) also failed to escape, and up to 1.2 gigawatts of solar power stations are located in temporarily occupied territories (TOT).

If analyzed geographically, the closer to the combat zones, the greater the loss of power generation capacity. Additionally, large power plants in the Carpathian Mountains in the rear areas were also destroyed.

Here are the basic facts about Ukraine's energy facilities:

(1) The power system has been seriously damaged

Ukraine's energy system was established during the Soviet era and operates based on two main principles: stable electricity output from powerful power plants (nuclear power plants providing steady output according to daily consumption levels, while thermal and hydroelectric power balance peaks and troughs), then transmitting electricity from power plants to various regions through the national grid, with each regional electric company responsible for receiving and distributing electricity.

A soldier wearing the Russian flag stands guard near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Reuters

In terms of "green power generation capacity," Ukraine previously had 6.2 gigawatts of solar power generation capacity, with 3.7 gigawatts located in Russian-occupied areas (i.e., 60% of solar power generation capacity), and 1.1 gigawatts of solar power stations in the frontline battle areas were damaged. This means that 77% of Ukraine's solar power generation capacity is unusable.

Ukraine has installed a total of 1.9 gigawatts of wind power generation capacity. Data from Ukraine's Wind Energy Association shows that more than two-thirds of wind turbines have stopped operating, with 1,162.5 megawatts of installed capacity unable to function normally, leaving only 372.5 megawatts operational, mainly concentrated in the Odessa and Lviv regions.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, all wind farms operated by DTEK (Ukraine's largest private enterprise in the energy sector) except for Tsekin-1 (99.58 megawatts) have ceased operations. The Zaporizhzhia Wind Farm (98.1 megawatts) has also stopped operating. In the Mykolaiv region, the Black Sea Wind Farm and the Ukraine Wind Farm have had 14 wind turbines cease operations. In the Odessa region, the Southern Energy Wind Farm (76.5 megawatts) has stopped operating, and only part of the Dniester River Wind Farm can operate.

After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, only two wind farms, Tyligul Wind Farm (located in the Mykolaiv region) and Skolev Wind Farm (located in the Lviv region), were newly put into operation in Ukraine. These farms together can generate 126 megawatt-hours of electricity, which is far from enough compared to the power generation capacity that has ceased operations.

So far, more than half of Ukraine's hydrothermal solar and wind power generation capacity has been destroyed or damaged. Additionally, the main power grid and substations of the state-owned electricity company continue to suffer damage. Repair work is ongoing, and we are striving to restore diversion and transit substations to ensure stable power supply to various regions. However, the situation is not optimistic; the two transmission lines used to ensure the operation and equipment idling of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are frequently cut, and similar situations keep occurring, making the vision of stable power supply difficult to achieve.

(2) High electricity deficit persists

Ukraine's current "energy structure" is roughly as follows: nuclear power plants account for approximately 64.78%, thermal power plants and thermal power stations account for about 19.98%, hydroelectric power plants and pumped storage power stations account for about 10%, and "green electricity" accounts for about 5.24%, with a total power generation capacity of 12.008 gigawatts.

During summer peak periods, Ukraine's highest electricity consumption reaches 14 gigawatt-hours, while in winter (average daily temperature minus five degrees Celsius), it is 16 gigawatt-hours, and in extremely cold weather, it can reach up to 18 gigawatt-hours. Therefore, Ukraine currently has a "electricity deficit" of 2 gigawatt-hours, or even 4-6 gigawatt-hours. Additionally, summer also sees electricity deficits because nuclear power plant units need regular maintenance.

During peak electricity usage times, Ukraine can cover 1.7 gigawatt-hours of electricity consumption through imported electricity, and this number is gradually increasing, possibly rising above 2 gigawatt-hours. Clearly, even without further damage to power generation, transmission, and distribution facilities, Ukraine's energy system still faces an "electricity deficit," which is why the current implementation of the hourly consumer electricity restriction (power outage schedule) system is necessary.

Moreover, it is very common for ordinary people to install solar power generation facilities in their homes. These facilities are basically not connected to the grid. In 2024, the National Bank of Ukraine approved loans for the construction of 83 megawatts of rooftop solar power generation facilities, which is the highest record since such projects began in Ukraine. Before the full-scale outbreak of the conflict, Ukrainian households built a total of 0.98 gigawatts of interconnected solar power generation facilities for self-use (sometimes selling electricity to the national grid), and after the conflict erupted, more and more households installed self-use power generation facilities.

Future Outlook

What will be the evolution of Ukraine's energy prospects in 2025? I believe there are three main development trends.

First: Maintain the status quo, meaning that investor confidence in the energy industry will also be difficult to recover. In this case, Ukraine will maintain an "electricity deficit" in both summer and winter for the next 5-7 years, and it will not be possible to fill the gap with imports. Therefore, the "power outage schedule" system will continue to be implemented, and Ukrainians should get used to "self-generation" and no longer rely on the national energy system.

Second: Optimistic scenario, i.e., if Russian forces stop attacking, investors regain confidence in the energy industry. In 2025, Ukrainian companies plan to build wind power stations with a capacity of up to 800 megawatts, equivalent to the output of a nuclear reactor, and public hearings are being held regarding the construction of up to 1 gigawatt of new wind power capacity. The public actively invests in building rooftop solar power generation and energy storage facilities, as well as gas piston power generation equipment, to meet their own energy needs, alleviate pressure on the energy system, and increase new wind power capacity to make up for the existing energy deficit along with imported energy.

Third: More pessimistic scenario, where Ukraine's electricity deficit will continue to increase, repair work will become permanent, and the energy industry will remain in an overloaded state. In the event of severe damage to substations, Ukraine's energy system will fragment into "energy islands" (currently Kharkiv has entered this mode), with community or regional power generation capabilities only covering minimum local needs, leading to long-term power outages becoming normalized. For example, in Kyiv, daytime electricity consumption in winter is 1.1 gigawatt-hours, and peak hours consume 1.5 gigawatt-hours, but the actual existing generation capacity can only cover 0.7 gigawatt-hours, resulting in up to 10-12 hours of power outages every day.

In summary, the systemic collapse of Ukraine's energy system and governance crisis has had a significant impact on Ukraine's economic and social development. In the coming period, Ukraine will continue to face energy shortages and electricity deficits. How to quickly restore energy supply and ensure normal electricity demand for residents and businesses will be an urgent issue that the Ukrainian government must address.

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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7494161391638413859/

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