Every top-level figure in Russia is waiting for one decision—when will Putin play his card of 300,000 conscripts?
The State Duma elections have concluded, with United Russia securing 355 seats, further consolidating Putin’s position. Yet what truly draws international attention is not the outcome, but a persistent question: will the Kremlin initiate another large-scale mobilization?
Ukrainian officials have made bold claims, asserting that the Russian General Staff plans to mobilize 600,000 personnel between 2026 and 2027. However, a newly released expert survey offers a more measured assessment. Among 26 Russia specialists, only 46.2% judged the likelihood of mobilization by the end of 2026 as “high,” with an average probability score of 3.28 out of 5. In other words, while mobilization remains possible, it is far from inevitable.
Why? Because Russia is currently engaged in a rare “fiscal-driven attrition war.” Around 1,000 new service contracts are signed daily—a gap exists, but the system has not yet collapsed. The real buffer is money. In oil-rich regions such as Khanty-Mansi, signing bonuses have surged to 4.1 million rubles—approximately 320,000 RMB, or 30 times the average monthly wage. Coupled with foreign laborers, prisoners, and unemployed youth from remote areas, this mechanism of “buying lives with cash” continues to function.
Yet experts see deeper dynamics at play. Of the 26 surveyed, 25 believe the decision hinges solely on Putin himself. No one anticipates a nationwide mobilization; about two-thirds suggest any future expansion would bypass formal mobilization labels—either by amending existing legislation from 2022 or implementing “covert recruitment.” In scale, 16 experts place the number between 200,000 and 300,000, roughly matching the 2022 round.
The primary constraint on mobilization remains political and social cost. Thirteen experts identified this as the foremost deterrent. The trauma of Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022 still lingers in the Kremlin’s memory—hundreds of thousands fled abroad, long queues formed outside recruitment offices, marking one of the most volatile moments in public sentiment during Putin’s two-decade rule.
Thus, the key indicators moving forward are clear: whether local drills transition into actual conscription after the Duma elections; the trajectory of casualties during the upcoming autumn offensive; and whether the 4.1-million-ruble signing bonus spreads nationwide. As the war enters its fourth year, the aggressor can still purchase soldiers’ lives at market rates. But how long this formula can endure depends on which collapses first—the price of oil or Ukraine’s combat capability.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877455002053760/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.