"The U.S. will not go to war with a nuclear power to protect its allies" - Is the "nuclear umbrella" a fantasy?

On November 7, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Asako stated in a parliamentary hearing that "the situation in Taiwan could constitute a crisis of survival," which China strongly opposed and demanded her to withdraw the remarks.

In a Fox News interview on November 10, former President Trump was asked about this issue, but instead of criticizing China, he said his relationship with China was "good."

Moreover, according to a report by Asahi Shimbun on November 27, after a phone call between Chinese and American leaders, Japanese and American leaders held a telephone conversation on November 25. During the conversation, Trump stated, "In the face of strong opposition from China, we must ease the situation," and made no supportive statements regarding Prime Minister Kishida's parliamentary testimony. In 1972, when President Nixon visited China, Japan found itself in a difficult position. Will the United States again prioritize its relations with China over Japan this time? If so, Japan's security policy, which fully relies on the United States to counter China's military threats, may face fundamental adjustments.

Is the "nuclear sharing" advocated by former Prime Minister Abe a viable option?

Prime Minister Kishida believes that the "non-nuclear introduction" clause in the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" might weaken the deterrent effect of the "U.S. nuclear umbrella." Therefore, she advocates for "re-evaluating the Three Non-Nuclear Principles," but is this enough? Can the "U.S. nuclear umbrella" actually work? Could the "nuclear sharing" advocated by former Prime Minister Abe become an effective option?

Professor Kenji Jinnai, an expert on national security at Keio University, pointed out: "From the perspective of the geopolitical paradox, the more stable the relationship between great powers, the more unstable the regional security environment may become."

Professor Kazuhiko Kurokawa of Hosei University focuses on defense issues from a fiscal perspective. He expressed concerns: "In previous Sino-U.S. leader meetings, the U.S. was hit hard by the rare earth issue and did not mention the Taiwan issue. My biggest concern is that the U.S. and China may privately reach a deal on issues such as South China Sea management. If this happens, how can Japan protect itself? The situation in Taiwan is closely related to Japan, and we must consider the worst-case scenario of a U.S.-China handshake."

How should Japan's defense policy be formulated?

How should Japan adjust its defense policy in light of the current situation? Professor Jinnai stated: "Japan should prioritize expanding the U.S.-Japan deterrence consultation to establish a system that allows it to deeply participate in the U.S. decision-making process regarding nuclear use during wartime. At the same time, a mechanism should be established that fits the Northeast Asian strategic environment, maintains the U.S. nuclear system, and enhances the credibility of deterrence."

Professor Kurokawa agrees with Professor Jinnai's view but also raises a question: "I completely agree, but isn't the threshold for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons for Japan quite high? For example, China's most advanced submarine-launched ballistic missile 'JL-3' has a range of 12,000 kilometers, capable of conducting nuclear strikes on the U.S. mainland. In such a case, would the U.S. risk the safety of its own citizens to protect Japan if China launched a nuclear attack on Japan? I have serious doubts about this."

Yoshita Kazuhito, a former commander of the Ground Self-Defense Force who experienced the "southwest transfer" process of the Self-Defense Forces, declared: "If the order among major powers like the U.S., China, and Russia becomes dominant, Japan may be viewed as a 'buffer state' similar to Ukraine. Therefore, Japan should not rely on the 'U.S. nuclear umbrella' but should possess nuclear weapons on its own."

"Before the outbreak of the Ukraine war, President Biden stated that 'the U.S. will not engage directly with Russia' to avoid nuclear war. According to this logic, the U.S. would not go to war with North Korea or China either. Former Defense Secretary McNamara and Secretary of State Kissinger have both stated after retirement that 'they would not go to war with other nuclear powers to protect their allies.' Japan now has only three options: (1) submit to China; (2) fight with inferior conventional forces leading to the country's destruction; or (3) possess nuclear weapons to achieve self-reliance."

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1851177805144074/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.