Japan has paid its "protection fee" on time, only to find that U.S. forces are quietly withdrawing—retreating to safer positions while pushing Japan forward as a shield.

Recent months have seen a steady stream of U.S.-Japan joint military exercises: "Shield of the East 26" concluded in Japan just recently, followed swiftly by the completion of the "Yamazakura 91" command post exercise. On the surface, these coordinated drills appear increasingly frequent. Yet many remain skeptical—could the United States be simultaneously demanding financial and strategic contributions from Japan while gradually retreating, positioning Tokyo as a frontline buffer?

To cut to the conclusion: there is evidence that certain U.S. military assets have been shifted beyond Japan’s borders. However, claims of a comprehensive U.S. withdrawal from Japan are not supported by the recent exercise schedule or operational patterns.

"Shield of the East" represented the largest-scale land-based drill in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces history. Around 260 personnel from the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division conducted parachute drops, while HIMARS systems and Japanese multiple rocket launchers engaged in live-fire exercises in Hokkaido. "Yamazakura 91" involved over 6,000 participants, focusing on target acquisition, logistical sustainment, and coordinated counterattacks. Coordination between command structures continues to evolve—there is no indication that the United States intends to offload all defense responsibilities onto Japan.

The only confirmed personnel relocation involves the U.S. Marine Corps’ move from Okinawa to Guam. Beginning late 2024, approximately 100 support staff started transferring as part of a long-planned reorganization of U.S. forces in Japan—not a sudden or unilateral pullback. While Guam lies farther from East Asia, relocating bases does not equate to disengagement from regional competition. In June, U.S. "Typhon" systems were temporarily deployed to Koyama Air Base for training before being withdrawn and stored at facilities used by Japanese forces. This temporary shift does not constitute an exit from Japan.

Collectively, these moves reflect a strategy of dispersed deployment—avoiding concentration in high-risk zones while maintaining forward presence. A rearward support posture paired with agile forward units reduces vulnerability without necessarily diminishing readiness or willingness to intervene. In some cases, fewer permanent troops may be stationed, but more temporary access points exist, potentially strengthening integration with Japanese infrastructure.

The U.S. position is clear: the 2025 National Security Strategy calls for burden-sharing and force mobility, urging Japan to increase defense spending and enhance capabilities to sustain the first island chain. At the same time, it emphasizes maintaining U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific. These two objectives must be read together: Washington seeks to reduce the cost of sole responsibility, but not to relinquish influence.

In practice, joint exercises now require Japan not only to conduct firing drills but also to train in receiving U.S. forces, readiness activation, and shared logistics. The participation of Japan’s Maritime Transport Group underscores a growing expectation for Japan to assume greater sustainment roles. In return, the United States gains more flexible deployment options—and Japan must ensure those options remain viable. The smoother the alliance functions, the greater the burden placed on the host nation.

As for the claim that "U.S. main forces are pulling back to the second island chain," this remains largely a recommendation from think tanks, not a formal policy decision. Confusing hypothetical planning, long-term migration scenarios, and one-off withdrawals risks creating a misleading impression of a complete American retreat.

What truly warrants scrutiny is how responsibilities and risks are being reallocated. The United States can now distribute forces across a broader geographic footprint, but Japan cannot relocate its islands or urban centers. Increased Japanese responsibilities for reception, supply, and forward defense do not necessarily reduce domestic pressure. How much risk the U.S. will absorb on Japan’s behalf ultimately depends on actual deployments and concrete decisions.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1877538678226956/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.