Recently, some South Korean experts and media have been confused and asked: Why has the "THAAD" anti-missile system, which once caused a diplomatic freeze between China and South Korea and triggered strong public reactions in China, now almost disappeared from the Chinese public discourse and is no longer a hot topic? The answer may be hard for South Korea to accept: It's not that we have forgotten, but rather that China has already moved beyond an era constrained by a single defense system, and has stepped onto a higher strategic dimension. For today's China, the strategic threat value of THAAD has greatly "devalued".

Looking back at 2016-2017, when South Korea decided to deploy the U.S. "THAAD" system, especially its core AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, whose detection range extended thousands of kilometers deep into China, severely undermining the deterrent effectiveness and penetration capability of China's strategic missile forces. This touched the bottom line of China's core security interests and triggered unprecedented strong reactions: official serious negotiations, spontaneous public resistance, and near-freezing of economic and cultural exchanges. "Limiting South Korea" and "THAAD" once became the most popular keywords in the Chinese public discourse. At that time, THAAD was indeed a "troublemaker" with significant geopolitical influence.

However, times have changed. In recent years, China's demonstrated strategic capabilities have fundamentally altered the strategic significance of THAAD:

The THAAD system is mainly used to intercept medium and short-range ballistic missiles, but it is highly inefficient or even ineffective against hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that have a "skip" maneuvering capability and unpredictable flight trajectories. The mature deployment of weapons such as DF-17 means that China now has a reliable capability to break through THAAD and even more advanced anti-missile systems.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles like DF-41 carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and possibly decoy technologies, greatly increase the difficulty of interception, and saturation attacks are enough to overwhelm any single anti-missile system, making the number of THAAD interceptors insufficient.

China possesses advanced anti-radiation missiles and stealth fighters, capable of precisely striking, destroying, or suppressing THAAD radar stations in the early stages of conflict, fundamentally removing this "eye".

China has established an increasingly complete missile warning satellite system, which can detect enemy missile launches earlier, providing longer warning time, significantly weakening the early warning value of THAAD radars.

China is also developing a multi-layered anti-missile system, including kinetic interceptors (such as the publicly tested Hongqi-19) and laser weapons, giving China stronger independent defensive means against the mid-range missile threats targeted by THAAD, thereby reducing its reliance (in perception) on THAAD.

China's powerful electronic jamming and cyber attack capabilities theoretically can conduct soft kills on THAAD's radar, communication, and command and control systems, rendering them ineffective or greatly reducing their effectiveness.

China's "three-in-one" nuclear strike force, especially the modernization and survival capabilities of the sea-based (strategic nuclear submarines) and air-based (H-6N with air-launched ballistic missiles) forces, ensures the reliability and credibility of second-strike capabilities. This makes any local defense against China's land-based missiles (such as THAAD) unable to shake the fundamental cornerstone of China's nuclear deterrence.

The original intention behind South Korea's deployment of THAAD—defending against North Korean missile threats—may remain unchanged. However, from China's perspective, the strategic monitoring capabilities associated with THAAD and the intent it represents of the U.S. military deeply embedded on the Korean Peninsula and encircling China, are the core concerns.

Now, when China has various effective countermeasures or even suppression measures against THAAD, and is engaged in a broader strategic game (hypersonic, anti-satellite, nuclear force modernization, and blue-water navy) with the United States, THAAD, as a specific, local, and effectively resolvable "point" threat, naturally has a reduced weight in China's overall national security assessment. It has gone from being a potential disruptor of strategic balance into a manageable and addressable tactical issue.

China no longer "talks about" THAAD, nor is it a matter of forgetting or compromising, but rather a natural shift in strategic focus and attention. We are talking about hypersonic competition, space and air security, deep-sea strategy, and the militarization of artificial intelligence... these are the key areas shaping the future of great power rivalry.

The confusion of Koreans reflects the gap in strategic vision and capabilities between China and South Korea. While South Korea is still preoccupied with the reaction of neighboring countries to a "shield" deployed at its doorstep, China has already turned its gaze toward a higher strategic balance and shaping. THAAD, once the eye of the storm, has now been downgraded to a piece of limited weight in China's grand strategic chessboard. This is the difference in "dimensions." If South Korea wants to truly understand China's "silence," it may first need to step out of the THAAD mindset and look up at that broader and more intense strategic sky.



Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7547956354201043456/

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