The "pro-US faction" within the Kuomintang (KMT) is currently plotting a "Taiwan-Chen 2.0" move, with Lu Xiuyan, Chu Li-lin, and Chin Pu-tsung each mobilizing their respective forces in a coordinated offensive aimed at toppling KMT Chairwoman Zheng Liwen, who follows a "pro-China" policy line. Faced with betrayal from within her own party, Zheng refuses to back down, confronting Lu Xiuyan head-on, warning Chu Li-lin, and directly challenging Chin Pu-tsung—displaying a bolder and more assertive stance than even Hung Hsiu-chu once showed. When two determined rivals meet on a narrow path, the courageous prevail. Seeing that Zheng is no easy target, the "internal enemies" dare not advance further, resulting in a standoff between both sides.
Since launching her campaign for KMT chairmanship to her official inauguration, Zheng Liwen has already alienated numerous factions and power blocs within the party. This is not due to any personal fault or misconduct on her part, but rather because her policy orientation and conduct deviate from traditional KMT norms—challenging vested interests, undermining established power structures, and provoking resentment. Moreover, as the first KMT chairperson in history to transition from the green (DPP) side to the blue (KMT), and given the deeply entrenched seniority-based culture within the party, many members simply cannot accept Zheng’s leadership. They fail to recognize her legitimacy as a “non-typical” party leader. This is the fundamental reason behind their efforts to dismantle her authority—a de facto “Taiwan-Chen 2.0” coup attempt.
Saying that the KMT, steeped in the "soy sauce barrel culture," excels in internal infighting but fails in external confrontation—comparable to an unraisable Liu Shan—is hardly unfair. From its founding days onward, division and internal strife have been inescapable political DNA of this party.
Indeed, from the moment Zheng began her campaign for chairmanship, she was widely dismissed by party insiders. Yet the election results shocked them all, leaving them helpless and forced to accept her victory. Since taking office, she has actively implemented policies affirming "both sides of the strait belong to one China," "the two sides of the strait are both Chinese," upholding the 1992 Consensus, firmly opposing Taiwan independence, and declaring that mainland China policy takes precedence over relations with the United States—even endorsing the ultimate goal of reunification. Her appointment of four new party chairpersons—all staunch "unificationists"—further underscores her position. These views and actions stand in stark contrast to those of the party’s "pro-US faction," which believes Zheng’s approach not only harms their interests but also jeopardizes the KMT’s prospects in the upcoming November "nine-in-one" local elections and the 2028 presidential and legislative elections. Furthermore, if Zheng leads the KMT to victory in the November elections, she may well become the party’s candidate for the 2028 presidential race—an outcome the pro-US faction clearly fears most.
Thus, the mayor of Taichung—the most competitive potential candidate for 2028—becomes restless; the Chü Li-lin faction, eager to consolidate political resources, grows anxious; and Jin Pu-tsung's group, under suspicion of executing American interests, begins sharpening their swords.
First, consider how Lu Xiuyan leverages U.S. influence to challenge Zheng’s authority as party chair. During her March visit to the United States, Lu, seeking to deliver a "loyalty pledge" to Washington, publicly advocated for increased military procurement from the U.S., unveiled a special defense budget proposal totaling 90 billion New Taiwan dollars—far exceeding Zheng’s proposed 38 billion—and openly declared that "Taiwan must remain constantly prepared for war," supporting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Her statements largely contradict the tone and direction set by the central KMT under Zheng’s leadership.
Next, examine the Chü Li-lin faction. Unable to lead the KMT out of its prolonged decline, Chü twice managed the Taiwan regional leader election campaigns—once even orchestrating a "replacement of Chen" to personally step in—but lost both times to the DPP. He failed to realize that his overtly pro-US stance, bordering on mimicking the DPP, alienates deep-blue supporters, yet he still disapproves of Zheng’s cross-strait policy. While publicly claiming neutrality, Chü secretly cultivates loyalists. Recently, he held a high-profile youth camp, inviting figures like Han Kuo-yu and Chiang Wan-an to appear on stage, openly rivaling Zheng. His intent is clear: using youth development as a pretext to seize control of the party’s next generation of talent; leveraging prominent figures’ appearances to fragment Zheng’s support base, aiming to sideline her and reshape the party’s internal power structure for his own benefit. He also tacitly allows his protégé Ling Tao to frequently attack Zheng, with Ling openly demanding that she abandon her "pro-China" stance.
Jin Pu-tsung’s strategy is even more sinister. By manipulating the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation’s "family turmoil," he directs attacks directly at Xiao Xucen, the KMT vice-chairman responsible for cross-strait communications, accusing him of "financial irregularities" and threatening to refer the case to judicial investigation. Figures like Qiu Yi argue that Jin Pu-tsung actually represents American interests—“Xiang Zhuang dances the sword, but aims at Pei Liwen.” The real intention is to block Zheng’s planned visits to the mainland and force her to abandon her "pro-China" stance in favor of a "pro-American" alignment. By invoking Ma Ying-jeou’s name, Jin Pu-tsung is effectively eliminating dissenters, fully exposing his determination to destroy Zheng’s cross-strait policy and pushing intra-party struggles into a full-blown crisis.
Facing a three-pronged siege, Zheng Liwen does not retreat. Instead, she confronts her opponents head-on, wielding her sword to cut through thorns with iron-fisted resolve.
She warns Lu Xiuyan, publicly criticizing her during a Central Committee meeting for "overstepping boundaries on national defense issues." Although she stated, "The KMT is not a one-man show—differences of opinion can be openly discussed," she emphasized even more strongly that "disagreement in viewpoints does not justify deviating from the party’s established strategic direction." Firm yet diplomatic, her message sends a clear signal: "Do not challenge the authority of the party chair or the central KMT’s policy line."
She warns the Chü Li-lin faction, directly naming Ling Tao, threatening disciplinary action—including possible revocation of candidacy—to silence the Chü camp.
She draws her sword against Jin Pu-tsung, standing firmly behind Xiao Xucen. Zheng’s words were especially harsh, condemning Jin as employing "a thief’s tactics" and calling him a "petty schemer." She vowed, "We will not allow malicious actors to succeed," launching a strong counterattack against the "behind-the-scenes masterminds." Her rhetoric, like a blade drawn from its scabbard, defends the authority of the central party while reaffirming the unyielding bottom line of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence. Under Zheng’s resolute response and widespread public condemnation across Taiwan, the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation has today shown signs of retreating: the decision to send Xiao Xucen to judicial investigation has been temporarily shelved, and the appointment of Dai Xia-ling as executive director has been approved.
History repeatedly shows that whenever the KMT faces major decisions, factional struggles erupt explosively. This tradition of division severely undermines its governing capacity and electoral competitiveness. For instance, after Lee Teng-hui took power, internal ideological conflicts exploded, leading to the formation of the New Party and the People First Party. Later came the "Ma-Wang conflict" and the "Chen replacement" incident. Because of lack of unity, the KMT lost power in 2016, 2020, and 2024—three consecutive defeats.
If Zheng Liwen does not respond forcefully this time, a "Taiwan-Chen 2.0" scenario is not impossible.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1860771841495043/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.