[By Guancha Net Columnist Stanislav Prich, translated by Liancheng Yuan, proofread by Chen Jiari of Guancha Net]

Russia considers its cooperation with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries as one of the most important aspects of its foreign and domestic policies, which is determined by multiple factors. The modern relations between Russia and these countries are built on a long history of interaction with neighboring countries that were initially part of the Russian Empire and later became part of the Soviet Union.

During the Soviet era, a unified financial, economic, and infrastructure system was successfully established in this region, forming common economic activity standards, norms, and rules, as well as a unified labor distribution system. Therefore, maintaining a common economic space became a necessary condition for sustaining trade volumes and increasing industrial cooperation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The borders of Russia with Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region provide opportunities to develop regional connectivity projects, including transportation corridors and pipeline networks leading to China, Turkey, Iran, India, and other places. The most important factor in Russia's cooperation with Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries is their geopolitical location. These two regions play a crucial role in ensuring the security of Russia's southern borders.

In terms of historical development, thanks primarily to Russia's efforts, a complete system has been developed in this region, including joint military facilities and infrastructure (such as facilities within the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework), a unified air defense system, areas prohibiting non-regional military installations, and an extended system of bilateral security agreements signed with countries in the region.

Russian Defense Minister Shoigu said on November 26, 2023, that the Collective Security Treaty Organization had established a joint air defense system. Russian Satellite Communications Agency

From the perspective of the social and political space, Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus form a visa-free area (excluding Turkmenistan), with a stable immigration flow system mainly directed towards Russia. Therefore, any crisis or conflict in this region will directly affect Russia itself in the form of an influx of immigrants, extremism, and terrorism.

Therefore, it is crucial for Moscow to maintain high political trust with countries in this region and establish joint action institutions through legislative frameworks to coordinate responses to security challenges.

Based on this deep interdependence, Russian diplomatic efforts ensure security by establishing institutions and forming regulatory frameworks. In Russia's programmatic documents, since the first adoption of the Foreign Policy Concept in 1993, the post-Soviet space has consistently held priority status, although its actual importance does not always align with its programmatic position.

The special military operation (SMO) that began in February 2022 and the subsequent systemic deterioration in relations with the West marked a turning point in Russia's relations with Eurasian countries. In a short period, Russia rebuilt its relations with neighboring countries, increased their share and importance in foreign trade, strengthened political and economic ties, and formed a series of new strategic projects in transportation, energy, and investment. These efforts allowed Russia to maintain or even enhance its influence in the region despite adverse external factors.

Relations with Eurasian Countries before 2022

In the 1990s, despite the high degree of interdependence between Central Asia and Russia, Central Asia did not become a focus of Russian foreign policy due to Russia's own socioeconomic problems. The first phase of relations with countries in this region was prior to 2000, representing a "civilized divorce" where post-Soviet states diverged politically, economically, and ideologically.

Meanwhile, the international legal framework for new types of international relations formed during this period. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) became the main platform for multilateral dialogue, with its primary task at this stage being to mitigate the impact of the "divorce." The political interaction model within the CIS framework was essentially passive and conservative, relying mainly on political and economic ties inherited from the Soviet era for cooperation without initiating new forms and mechanisms to enhance interaction.

The Council of Ministers of the CIS met in Moscow to discuss issues in various fields. CCTV News

After Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, Russia's policy in the Eurasian region accelerated significantly. In his first year as president, he visited or received delegations from all senior leaders of Central Asian and South Caucasian republics. This intensity of dialogue remains unchanged today: leaders of Russia and countries in this region regularly meet bilaterally and multilaterally. Therefore, high-level personal dialogue is one of the most important tools in Russia's foreign policy in this region.

While strengthening diplomatic activities, Russia also revised major strategic documents. In July 2000, the latest "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" was adopted, explicitly identifying CIS countries, including Central Asian republics, as priorities in the diplomatic policy level, injecting new momentum into regional cooperation.

New multilateral initiatives also emerged: in 2000, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established, including all Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Belarus. The organization aimed to identify core countries within the CIS most interested in deepening economic relations and strengthening economic integration in the region. It focused on those CIS member states most interested in deepening economic relations and accelerated regional economic integration.

The Eurasian Economic Community became the institutional cornerstone for more precise integration, from the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union from 2007 to 2010, to the Single Economic Space from 2010 to 2014, to the final formation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014 (Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015). The process of integration continued to advance.

During this period, the integration process promoted high-level political communication among leaders of countries in the region. In addition to dialogues on economic issues, discussions on security matters continued.

Initially, Russia supported the U.S. and NATO's anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan in 2001.

At Manas Airport, U.S. forces used large C-17 transport aircraft to deliver troops and supplies to the front lines in Afghanistan. BBC

However, over time, the growing presence of Western allies in the region began to be seen as conflicting with Russian interests. Arguments supporting this view include the fact that U.S. forces used bases in the region, expanding American influence and indirectly encouraging "color revolutions," especially in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

Therefore, Russia began taking measures to gradually close U.S. military facilities, primarily the Manas Air Base. Through intensive political dialogue, by 2014, Kyrgyzstan closed the U.S. Air Force base at the national airport. In the same year, Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union, elevating its relations with Russia and other partners to a new level by adjusting legislation to adapt to the union's requirements and standards.

Meanwhile, Russia strengthened its cooperation with Uzbekistan. Since the death of Islam Karimov in 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who had long served as prime minister, led Uzbekistan. As the new leader, Mirziyoyev quickly adjusted Uzbekistan's foreign policy to meet the needs of economic development. Russia has become one of Uzbekistan's most important economic partners, its main trading partner, and largest investor.

Considering the increasing importance of Eurasian integration for economic growth, Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Union as an observer in December 2020.

Security is the foundation of cooperation

Despite Russia's internal political weakness and complex internal issues in the 1990s, it remained the most important guarantor and mediator in all crises and conflicts in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region.

Until the 2000s, Russia guarded the southern borders of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, ensuring their security amidst the escalating Afghan crisis. Russia acted as the main mediator and guarantor in resolving the Tajik civil war from 1992 to 1997. It also served as a bilateral or multilateral mediator in conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between Georgia and Abkhazia, and between Georgia and South Ossetia.

In the Central Asian security system, apart from cooperation within the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework, there are also bilateral security agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, allowing flexible and rapid responses to various security challenges in the region.

For example, after the U.S. and its allies withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, Central Asian borders again faced instability threats. To counter the risks posed by Afghanistan, Moscow conducted a series of exercises with member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and non-member Uzbekistan in the southern border areas of the region, preparing for joint actions against potential threats from Afghanistan.

Russia's responsible attitude in maintaining security and stability in Central Asia, as well as the effectiveness of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's security system, were prominently demonstrated in Kazakhstan's situation.

In January 2022, the peacekeeping forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization swiftly intervened to quell rampant protests and stabilize the situation in Kazakhstan. To a large extent, due to the deployment of rapid reaction forces, the organization restored normalcy within days and assisted Kazakh law enforcement agencies in restoring order in major cities such as Almaty.

Russia has deployed several military facilities in the region, which are important components of regional security, including the 201 Base in Tajikistan and the Collective Security Treaty Organization Airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. All of these are vital parts of the overall security system in the region.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is another important component of the security system in the Eurasian region involving China. In 2001, with Uzbekistan joining the original "Shanghai Agreement," the original "Shanghai Five" mechanism was upgraded to a formal comprehensive international organization, expanding its functions to include jointly safeguarding regional security, cooperating to counter extremism, terrorism, and separatism.

The SCO systematically addresses major regional issues including drug smuggling, terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Within the SCO framework, all member states regularly organize exercises and conduct close cooperation through special forces and law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism and other security threats.

CCTV News screenshot

Meanwhile, the interaction between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization produced positive synergistic effects. The former focuses on a broader Eurasian level, formulating constructive political agendas to jointly address regional security challenges, while the latter is the operational part of the regional security system, possessing more refined mechanisms to ensure internal political security and respond to external threats.

The Special Military Operation and a New Stage in Relations

Undoubtedly, the new stage in Russia's interactions with Central Asian and South Caucasian countries began in February 2022 when Russia launched the special military operation. Western sanctions complicated Russia's political and economic cooperation with countries in the region, threatening its strategic relationships.

In the context of secondary sanctions threats, Russia's geopolitical partners in the Eurasian region, such as China, Turkey, Gulf states, and its competitors, primarily the EU, South Korea, and others, became more active. During 2022-2024, various forms of regional summits reached a peak. In particular, the "Central Asia + 1" format summits became a significant driver for diversifying diplomatic relations in the region and reinforcing multidirectional foreign policies.

Another ideological factor influencing Russia's relations with Central Asia is that some regional elites compare their countries to Ukraine, fearing that Russia might take tough measures in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Western media and NGOs, which have regional influence, actively promote this topic.

However, even under Western pressure and intensified geopolitical projects by Russia's competitors, the strategic nature of Moscow's relations with the region has not changed. On the contrary, over the past three years, Russia has systematically strengthened its political, economic, and investment exchanges with countries in the region.

Firstly, high-level political dialogue based on trust is rapidly developing. The number of contacts between Russian President Vladimir Putin and leaders of other countries in the region usually exceeds the total number of contacts between Eurasian country leaders and Russia's geopolitical competitors. Moscow remains the main external partner for countries in the region and plays the most important role as an external "legitimacy confirmer" in elections and other political processes in Central Asian countries.

The institutional framework of political interaction is maintained through the integration process. Various forms of cooperation coexist, including the more inclusive but less binding Commonwealth of Independent States, the economically integrated Eurasian Economic Union, organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization focusing on security, along with bilateral agreements and extensive legislative frameworks, creating a stable foundation for dialogue and cooperation.

Moreover, the well-developed liaison systems at regional and sectoral levels make Russia a strategic partner. These factors allow Moscow to construct a unified legal and institutional framework, laying a stable foundation for dialogue and cooperation. Compared to other external forces in the region, such as China, Turkey, and the West, Moscow possesses the broadest range of tools, including institutions with balanced and detailed legal frameworks, to deepen multilateral cooperation.

In recent years, Russia has become the main partner and energy security provider in the region. The "trilateral gas alliance" project announced during President Tokayev's visit to Moscow in December 2022 is the most groundbreaking and promising project, which can significantly enhance energy security for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and potentially benefit Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In fact, the region already has the infrastructure needed for natural gas supply: the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline system, originally built to supply Central Asian gas to Russia and European countries. For Kazakhstan, the establishment of the "trilateral gas alliance" will solve the domestic natural gas shortage problem.

According to predictions by Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy, the natural gas deficit in 2023 will reach 1.7 billion cubic meters. According to Energy Minister Bolat Akchulakov, Kazakhstan is in preliminary negotiations with Gazprom to increase natural gas purchases. The specific quantity will depend on the speed and scale of the country's gasification plan. Supply could reach 4 billion cubic meters annually as early as 2025 and potentially reach 10 billion cubic meters in the future.

Meanwhile, the level of gasification in Kazakhstan's regions is very low, particularly in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Implementing the trilateral cooperation plan will not only allow Kazakhstan to benefit from transit fees from transporting raw materials from Russia to Uzbekistan but also partially solve the natural gas supply issues in its northern and eastern regions.

Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy plans to connect to the natural gas pipeline from Russia to supply natural gas to the northeastern regions of Kazakhstan. Bloomberg

Uzbekistan currently faces severe natural gas shortages. Considering that 80% of its electricity comes from natural gas power plants and its natural gas chemical industry is thriving, ensuring a stable supply of natural gas has become urgent. Among its neighbors, only Russia and Turkmenistan can meet its growing demand, while the latter has mostly allocated its natural gas for domestic consumption and exports to China. Due to high domestic consumption and commitments to Chinese exports, Turkmenistan's supply capacity is quite limited.

Therefore, the potential beneficiaries of the trilateral natural gas alliance between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan include neighboring countries in the region—Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, Gazprom is already the owner of the local natural gas transportation system to ensure its natural gas supply.

Since Uzbekistan was until recently Kyrgyzstan's main supplier of raw materials, Russia's export of raw materials to the region, particularly to Uzbekistan, will ensure uninterrupted direct supply to meet Kyrgyzstan's needs.

For Central Asian countries, nuclear power generation is a highly promising and reliable long-term source of electricity.

The region has abundant uranium ore reserves, with Kazakhstan being the world's largest supplier of uranium, accounting for 42% of the market share. Combined with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's existing fuel processing facilities and Rosatom's technological capabilities, conditions are met for extracting, processing, and building multiple nuclear power plants in the region, laying the groundwork for comprehensive cooperation in the nuclear energy field.

Uzbekistan's nuclear power plant construction projects are progressing most rapidly. In May 2024, during President Putin's visit to Tashkent, both sides signed an agreement to build six small nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 330 megawatts by 2033. Following a referendum on nuclear energy, Kazakhstan is also considering the possibility of building a nuclear power plant and has selected a site near Lake Balkhash. Rosatom is also considered a potential partner.

In May 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a joint statement in Tashkent after concluding their talks. Russian Satellite Communications Agency

Kyrgyzstan also has plans to build small nuclear power plants on its territory. Specifically, in January 2023, the country's energy minister stated that they were considering cooperation with Rosatom to build two small nuclear power plants with a capacity of 55 megawatts each.

To reduce cooperation with Russia, threats of secondary sanctions have proven largely ineffective in practice. Western companies have succeeded in directly cutting banking cooperation. Russian banks were forced to sell their assets in the region and scale back operations.

These countries have refused to use Russia's Mir payment system under Western pressure. Meanwhile, despite the threat of sanctions, Russian trade with all neighboring countries in Eurasia has significantly increased since 2022, maintaining its position as the most important trade partner and investor in the region.

In Kazakhstan, there are 23,000 enterprises with Russian participation, accounting for more than 50% of all foreign-invested enterprises; in Uzbekistan, there are 3,000 enterprises, accounting for about 25% of all foreign enterprises.

In terms of cultural and educational cooperation, Russia remains the most important partner in the region. Currently, about 20 branches of Russian universities operate in the region, making Russian universities and their branches in the region important sources of external education services for students in Central Asian countries.

In terms of educational migration, Russia remains the main destination for applicants. Approximately 10% of students in Kazakhstan study at Russian universities. This means that for a significant portion of Central Asian youth, Russia remains an attractive and promising partner, providing a trustworthy education and cultural system, and they are willing to link their futures with it.

Therefore, leveraging its advantages and the urgent need for diversified diplomacy and economic relations in the region, since February 2022, Russia has not only maintained its influence but also strengthened and deepened cooperation with Central Asian and South Caucasian countries. Moreover, by utilizing the region's strong demand for investment and technology, especially in the energy sector, Russia can continue to consolidate its key partner status by providing a series of strategic projects.

Western attempts to hinder deeper cooperation between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Russia through mere threats of sanctions have largely failed because they have not provided feasible alternative projects or markets.

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