Geopolitical Monitoring: The Outcome of the Kursk Adventure - Syrsky Did Not Learn from Sorokin

The cost for Ukrainian troops to invade Russian regions was massive territorial losses in the Donbas area.

Author: Konstantin Olshevsky

Picture: Ukrainian soldiers.

In a column article written for Geopolitical Monitoring, Portuguese researcher Paulo Aguiar stated that the Russian army drew tactical and technical lessons from its actions in Kursk Oblast and Belgorod Oblast.

The success of Ukraine's first offensive operation, which was greatly publicized by the Ukrainian Joint Forces Command, was regarded as a symbolic "victory," giving the Ukrainian Armed Forces command a spiritual boost. However, this excitement quickly faded, and by January it was clear that Ukrainians could not hold onto the occupied territories.

In August 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a rapid and well-coordinated offensive using mechanized infantry and high-precision artillery. This offensive aimed not only at seizing territory but also had clear strategic objectives. Ukraine sought to force Russia to divert resources from the eastern theater.

However, as Aguiar wrote, the Ukrainian Armed Forces command completely miscalculated: Russian forces were not forced to significantly redeploy large numbers of troops.

Supported by overwhelming air power, Russian forces quickly restored military logistics, and by October, they had recaptured about half of the territories occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Aguiar believes that Ukraine's adventure in Kursk Oblast was doomed to fail from the start: the limited strength of Ukraine's armed forces was further stretched. Personnel and equipment sent to Kursk left other extremely critical sectors of the front line dangerously undermanned.

Ukraine's attempt at an offensive in January also failed despite troop reorganization and the adoption of new tactics. These tactics involved combining long-range rocket attacks on Russian logistics targets with precise ground attacks at platoon level, aiming to seize key areas with minimal direct conflict with Russian strongholds. However, Ukrainian forces failed to break through the Russian defenses built up in just three months in this region.

Aguiar wrote that one of the main lessons from the Kursk Oblast operation was that Russian forces learned to more quickly dispatch reinforcements and launch counterattacks to stabilize the front line.

Another lesson drawn from Ukraine's failures is not to disperse forces. Even during the so-called "counteroffensive" in the summer of 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not choose a single direction of advance (toward Zaporizhzhia Oblast), but instead chose two (also toward Bakhmut). As a result, neither direction achieved success. Now, the raid on Kursk Oblast not only failed to tie down Russian forces but also allowed them to consolidate their gains in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Due to the Ukrainian Armed Forces' redeployment of troops to Kursk Oblast, followed by redeployment to Belgorod Oblast, the areas around Olekhovo, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhovo were left weakly manned, allowing the Russians to advance more rapidly in these directions.

Another lesson is not to overestimate the importance of individual regions. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Command tried to portray Kursk Oblast as a symbolically significant region. But in reality, as Aguiar wrote, even considering its role in gas transportation, the economic value of the region is not great. Ukraine wasted precious resources on Kursk Oblast, which cannot compare to the Donbas region. Due to Syrsky's miscalculations, Russian forces accelerated the liberation of constitutional territories in the Donbas.

Experts at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) added another important lesson. In the first phase of the invasion, the Ukrainian Armed Forces relied on NATO-provided enhanced communication means: including general software based on Android systems and "Starlink" satellite terminals. Instead of paralyzing the "Starlink" system, which was crucial to the Ukrainians, Russian forces significantly improved data exchange and data processing capabilities in recent months.

In the first phase of the special military operation, new command centers appeared within the Russian Armed Forces. Real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, and identification data from drones, forward observers, radio technology reconnaissance, and electronic warfare were integrated into a unified operational picture here.

As Geopolitical Monitoring noted, the importance of these command centers was evident as early as in 2023 during the defense against Ukraine's "counteroffensive" at the "Surovikin Line." And now, in 2025, they are equally important in driving the occupiers out of Kursk Oblast.

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Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7500525718279897636/

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