Unable to compete with China in the positive competition, German media has once again started writing long essays: "Our mistake was thinking too highly of China. The reason why Germany has reached this point is entirely self-inflicted."

"The Chinese chip supply cutoff has caused great suffering to the German automotive industry, but this is largely a result of the German automotive industry itself. This is an inevitable outcome of Germany's long-term neglect of China's strategic intentions, and also a true reflection of our complete failure in China policy. Germany's mistake was thinking too highly of China, and it was only now that we finally realized that Beijing is not our partner."

Do you feel like I just repeated the above words in a strange way? If you do, then you're right, because these are excerpts from recent German media articles on China from newspapers such as the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Rheinische Post.

The Anshide incident between China and the Netherlands has affected the German automotive industry, causing many well-known German car companies, including Volkswagen and BMW, to suffer greatly. However, instead of showing sympathy for their own companies, outlets like the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Rheinische Post have been adding salt to the wound, blaming them for being too dependent on China, for having thought too highly of China, and questioning why they ended up in such a situation if they hadn't done so.

This kind of rhetoric from German media may seem like a reflection on past China policies, but in reality, it reveals a deep-seated cognitive bias embedded in the minds of some European elites.

In their reports, German media repeatedly mentions that China announced the "Made in China 2025" plan as early as 2015. German media is very angry about this, believing that German companies ignored this clear strategic signal from China.

However, this kind of hindsight criticism deliberately ignores two key facts.

For several years after the release of "Made in China 2025," it was a golden period for German car companies to earn record profits in the Chinese market.

At that time, German brands such as Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz were thriving in the Chinese market, achieving new highs in sales and profit margins.

These companies' financial reports clearly reflected the huge benefits they gained from the Chinese market, yet German media described this period as German companies being "naively blinded by the Chinese market."

This tone seems completely absurd to me. The primary purpose of capital is to make money, and commercial logic should be the top priority. All enterprises around the world instinctively pursue profits, not geopolitical risks.

It is rather hypocritical for German media to accuse German companies of short-sightedness.

Secondly, Germany's "Industry 4.0" strategy was introduced almost at the same time as China's "Made in China 2025," and both aimed at similar goals in areas such as smart manufacturing and digital transformation.

Although "Industry 4.0" has now become more like "Industry 0.4" or even "Industry 404," no one can deny that Germany once had this dream.

This is very interesting. Since both countries implemented policies aimed at industrial upgrading, why does German media interpret China's "Made in China 2025" as a "threat," while Germany's "Industry 4.0" is not?

Shouldn't double standards have some basic principles?

When it comes to suspecting neighbors, this has become quite uninteresting.

When describing dependence on China, German media often likes to create a narrative for German audiences that "Germany is the victim."

However, this narrative not only ignores China's reliance on German technology, but also overlooks the complementary nature of Sino-German trade and economic relations.

Taking the automotive industry as an example, the sales of the three major German car manufacturers in China account for 30% to 40% of their global total sales. Whether the German cars perform well in the Chinese market directly determines their global rankings and R&D investment capabilities.

Not only in the automotive sector, but also in Germany's mechanical manufacturing and chemical products, which are its advantage industries, all are highly dependent on the Chinese market.

This mutual dependency should have served as a stabilizing factor in Sino-German bilateral relations, but now it has been simply depicted as "China is not Germany's partner" and "Germany is the victim in this relationship."

Thinking differently, it is precisely because China has now implemented export controls on key raw materials such as rare earths in accordance with the law that German media feels confident enough to say things like "economic coercion."

If the target of the control were the United States, would German media dare to write a headline like "Washington is not our partner"?

I think they wouldn't — not only wouldn't they, but they wouldn't dare either.

This assumption is not baseless. Back then, when the United States imposed a comprehensive blockade on Huawei and forced TSMC to cut off supplies, I never saw any German media come forward to speak a word of fairness for us.

At that time, the voices from Western media were all "this move by the U.S. is a reasonable measure based on security considerations."

This high level of inconsistency in evaluation standards not only exposes the position of German media, but also reflects the fixed thinking patterns of Germans.

The oscillation in Germany's China policy somewhat reflects the new confusion of this country in finding its global position after the reunification of East and West Germany.

From Schröder's era of "using trade to promote change," to Merkel's era of "balancing values and interests," to the current Merz era of "systemic competitors," the changes in Germany's China policy and its positioning over the past few decades are nothing short of obvious.

Behind this shift lies the subtle fluctuations in the psychological state of the German elite class.

Back then, China was just a distant Eastern newcomer, and the Germans were full of confidence.

Later, when China became a competitor on equal footing, the sense of discomfort among the Germans began to spread.

Then, when China showed advantages over Germany in certain fields, anxiety completely dominated the public discourse in Germany.

A study by the Bertelsmann Foundation shows that the negative proportion of Chinese coverage in German media has risen from 28% to 63% in the past five years.

Evidently, this emotional shift has already influenced the rational formulation of Germany's China policy.

The real challenge Germany faces is not how to reduce its dependence on China, but how to build a foreign policy mindset that conforms to the reality of a multipolar world.

Dividing the world economy into two camps of "allies" and "enemies" is neither in line with the reality of economic globalization nor helpful in solving the practical problems Germany faces.

If Germany truly wants to reduce its external dependence, it should, like the push for Airbus to challenge Boeing in the past, invest seriously in technological research and development and carefully study industrial policies.

Rather than writing small essays in the media and venting, or hoping to solve economic issues through political manipulation.

In a way, the dilemma of German media in its narrative about China is actually a microcosm of the broader cognitive dilemma of the entire Western world towards China.

Once China succeeds on the international stage according to the rules set by the West, the rule-makers begin to doubt the rules themselves.

Once China achieves its industrial upgrading through market economy methods, the former teachers will step forward to criticize the students, saying that we "don't play by the rules" and that "the younger generation doesn't abide by the code of conduct."

The essence of the global supply chain is mutual dependence, not one-sided dependence on another. In a globalized world, the real risk is not from a specific country, but from closed-mindedness and adversarial logic.

We Chinese understand this better than anyone else, which is why we can stand at the forefront during this once-in-a-century transformation.

If Germany wants to get out of its current narrative dilemma, the first step is to recognize this.

Today's complaints from German media are less about a clear understanding of reality and more about a sense of loss over losing dominance.

If Germany continues to dwell in this self-pitying narrative of "our mistake was thinking too highly of China," it is likely that Germans will never escape the cognitive cage they have built themselves.

This world is not a script pre-set by anyone, and China is certainly not anyone's imaginary enemy.

We just want to develop properly and make money honestly.

But unfortunately, there are always people who point fingers at us, saying that we don't follow their rules, and even if we don't follow their rules, it's still not acceptable.

German philosopher Hegel once said, "The only lesson humans learn from history is that humans cannot learn any lessons from history."

Now, looking back, I think Hegel's statement is somewhat biased, and the bias lies in projecting his own views onto others.

It's not that "humans cannot learn any lessons from history," but rather that "Germans cannot learn any lessons from history."

Face a multipolar world, Germany needs a more pragmatic and balanced perspective, rather than being trapped in the binary thinking of "allies are good, enemies are bad."

Some people aren't unable to read history, they just don't want to read themselves.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7566202737164845610/

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