Editor's Note: Trump's trade war with China has reached a boiling point, and China has become the second major power after Russia to confront American economic coercion and go "all in" against it.
Fedor Lukyanov, academic director of the Valdai Discussion Club and "close associate of Putin," visited the Observer Network's "Thinker's Tea Party" during his visit to East China Normal University for the Valdai Discussion Club Sino-Russian sub-group meeting in early April. He discussed the signs of "normalization" in U.S.-Russia relations at the beginning of 2025, the gains and losses of the three-year-long Ukraine conflict, and new developments in Sino-American and Sino-Russian relations. He delved into the trajectory of Russian thought shifting from embracing the West to strategically distancing itself from it, and also shared how U.S.-Russia relations evolved under Trump's administration and the new thinking among Russian elites.
He reminded that, despite ideological closeness between Russia and Trump, Russia must not be obsessed with a "romantic relationship" with Trump. Before he finished speaking, Trump issued an executive order extending sanctions on Russia for another year.
Although U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations differ significantly, they both exhibit similar trajectories behind them. The following is a transcript of the dialogue for readers to reflect upon.
Fedor Lukyanov Visits Observer Network's "Thinker's Tea Party" | Observer Network
[Interview/Observer Network Gao Yanping]
Trump's ideology may align with Russia's, but it does not mean that Russia and the U.S. will form an alliance.
Observer Network: In your recent article, you mentioned that Moscow finds itself more ideologically aligned with Trump's America than with Europe's liberalism. This seems to explain the normalization of U.S.-Russia relations. How did you discover Moscow's ideological alignment with Trump's America?
Fedor Lukyanov: There are several reasons why Russia is closer to Trump. The primary one is that Russia has always opposed the liberal globalist ideology, which holds universalism and a global perspective, believing that there are universal values and a global model for state governance that all countries should follow according to this Western model. This basic assumption forms the foundation of their ideology.
However, over the years, we have witnessed many negative phenomena. The West (especially the U.S. and Europe) has used force to strengthen this model and promote it globally, compelling other nations to accept the dominance of liberal ideology.
In the case of Russia, this approach was most prominently manifested in NATO's expansion as a European military alliance: NATO immediately initiated its eastward expansion process after the end of the Cold War, gradually approaching Russia's borders, with the essential purpose of pushing Russia out of its traditional sphere of influence. Ultimately, this series of actions evolved into the tragic situation of the Ukrainian war. The ideological framework behind this conflict (rather than purely military factors) was the promotion of the idea that "countries around Russia have the right to join Western liberal alliances." This situation continued until Donald Trump came to power.
Trump is different. He is not a liberal globalist; his ideas are unique. What he pursues is American global hegemony and dominance, but in a form starkly different from the past. Unlike abstract concepts, Trump focuses on American national interests, making him an "ultra-nationalist." The president is essentially driven by interests—both commercial and political.
Although the United States, as the most powerful country in the world, pursues its own interests with an aggressive posture, this stance at least exhibits a certain rationality. Because when both sides act based on national interests, there is room for negotiation, and attempts can be made to seek common ground, achieve mutually beneficial compromises or deals. When dealing with liberal globalists in the past, such possibilities were nonexistent—they believed their ideology and interests were the only correct path and demanded unconditional acceptance from all nations.
From this perspective, Trump's way of thinking is closer to Russia—we can understand his preferences and strategic intentions. However, this does not mean that Russia and the U.S. will become close allies or form a strategic alliance. It is not like that at all. Their relationship may take on a more complex form, a difficult interactive mode based on realist considerations, which is very different from the past. This interaction is no longer drawn along ideological lines but is based on some rational balancing.
Every time Russia intervenes in internal Western affairs, it faces severe consequences.
Observer Network: Your explanation is very interesting. In that article, you also warned that too close cooperation with the U.S. carries risks. The U.S.'s turmoil is unrelated to Russia; it is Americans' identity crisis; Moscow must proceed cautiously to avoid becoming a pawn in Washington's infighting. Not long after, Trump issued an executive order extending sanctions on Russia for another year. Can you explain this risk?
Fedor Lukyanov: We can view this issue from two different perspectives—one practical and short-term. When Trump first became president, at that time, Russia—reluctantly and unexpectedly—became a pawn in America's domestic struggles. Therefore, Trump's Democratic opponents used the "Russia card" as a weapon against Trump. They tried to bring him down by claiming he was a Russian spy, that he had Putin's support, that Russian intelligence agencies and hackers helped Trump win the election, and that he was a puppet of Russia, etc.
Russia is often used as a tool in American domestic struggles. This article states that Trump was once codenamed "Krasov" by the former Soviet security service.
A deeper explanation is unrelated to the West itself but concerns Russia's positioning in international affairs. For centuries (even tracing back further), Russia as a nation and ethnic group has always been on a special historical trajectory: it spans Eurasia and embodies traits of both Eastern and Western civilizations, with its cultural composition and identity presenting a complex and unique fusion. Therefore, Russia has always been fundamentally different from Europe. Meanwhile, for hundreds of years, Russia has harbored a core desire: to become strong and modern like the European powers of the time—whether in the 17th, 18th, or 19th century.
For this reason, successive regimes in Russia have always sought to become part of the European-Western political bloc. Sometimes this strategy manifested as allying with one faction of the West against another—after all, before the latter half of the 20th century, internal divisions and conflicts within the Western world far outnumbered external conquests. However, every time Russia attempted to deeply integrate into Western internal politics (which involved not only geopolitical issues but also deeper topics like cultural identity and religious self-definition), it ultimately faced severe consequences.
Even at the peak of its influence—such as after the Napoleonic Wars or World War II—the mainstream European society never truly regarded Russia as an organic part of European civilization. Ironically, Western countries have always utilized Russia to participate in their internal power struggles.
There are countless examples of this; we could discuss them for hours. Regarding Western internal contradictions, there are numerous cases we could explore. Currently, the Western world is mired in structural division—one side being the liberal globalist establishment, and the other being nationalist political forces represented by Donald Trump, as well as nationalist political forces in almost all European countries like France, Germany, Romania, and the Netherlands. This social division stems from widespread public dissatisfaction with the status quo. During this process, Russia shows a preference for nationalist forces. The reason for this (as shown in the Trump case) is that these forces appear more rational from Russia's perspective and do not inherently carry ideological biases like globalists do.
However, it must be clear: Russia remains in a specific position or sympathizes with one side in these struggles, but this does not mean Russia should deeply intervene in Western internal politics. Returning to the article you mentioned, my core point is that if Russia attempts substantive intervention in Western internal disputes, it will lose more than it gains. Even if the various factions in the West eventually reach a compromise or part ways, Russia cannot benefit from it.
Therefore, my proposition is: we must closely monitor developments, pragmatically support forces friendly to Russia, but more importantly, refrain from getting entangled in Western internal transformation processes—historical experience shows that getting involved in such murky waters will never yield strategic returns.
Observer Network: Is your viewpoint a minority opinion within Russian elites, or is it a widely accepted consensus?
Fedor Lukyanov: I don't think this has yet become a consensus—there are diverse views within academia. Some scholars and thinkers advocate deep involvement in the Western social transformation process, but others, including myself, insist that Russia must maintain strategic distance. We must clearly recognize: although Russia has close historical ties and cultural bonds with Europe, this does not mean we should fully integrate into the Western development model.
Especially in the two and a half years since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, Russian society has formed a basic consensus—that attempting to integrate into the Western international system through pragmatic strategies is no longer possible. Even if there are partial cooperative spaces, strategically, Russia must remain independent. As a great power spanning Eurasia, Russia possesses unique geopolitical advantages, such as having already established a close strategic partnership with China. Therefore, we do not need to expend all our energy on Western affairs.
Both realistic cooperation and clear-headedness—this is the strategic wisdom of a great power.
Observer Network: You said that Moscow must walk its own path and resist the pull towards a "new romance" with Washington. So, in your view, what is Russia's own path, and surely it is not the stereotypical longing for Western recognition? What role does Russia play globally?
Fedor Lukyanov: First, my core point is: Russia should not be deceived by any "romantic relationship" with Trump or any other Western figure.
Russian political thinking has always had an extreme psychological inclination—to either fully oppose the West or fall into the trap of deep embrace of the West. Both extremes are fundamentally irrational.
Over the past 35 years, Russia has experienced two extreme swings: the first began with Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, and continued under Boris Yeltsin after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During that period, Russia genuinely aspired to integrate with the West—not just in terms of psychological identification and political stance but even seeking to join the Western system at the institutional level. I believe this orientation is both abnormal and wrong because Russia has never belonged to the Western civilization circle and will never be able to become part of it in the future.
Now we are moving toward another extreme: completely rejecting all connections with the West, viewing the U.S. and Europe as eternal enemies, and declaring "we are not the West, our culture does not belong to the West." This binary oppositional mindset is also irrational. These two extremes are like the two poles of a pendulum, always coexisting—when one swings to an extreme, the opposite rebound becomes more intense.
The "illusion of Trump" is essentially a manifestation of political immaturity. The facts prove that Trump is not pro-Russian, even if U.S. policies shift, the U.S. is not Russia's friend, and its fundamental national interests still structurally contradict Russia's. But this does not mean the two countries are destined for conflict; we can entirely find a mutually acceptable way under a realist framework—either cooperate or isolate, but without conflict—just like during the Cold War when socialist and capitalist camps coexisted with completely different values, yet they "coexisted peacefully" at the time.
Trump signed an executive order extending sanctions on Russia until 2026.
The current international order has undergone fundamental changes. The so-called "liberal world order" or the "rules-based system" promoted by Americans essentially demands the homogenization of all countries. This hegemonic logic neither aligns with China's stance nor is accepted by countries like Russia. True peaceful coexistence should be built on the clear recognition of mutual differences: neither unrealistic fantasies nor necessary pragmatic cooperation—seizing opportunities when they arise, and avoiding direct confrontation even when consensus cannot be reached. This is the strategic wisdom of a great power.
Anti-Russian sentiment is a tool for Europe to maintain cohesion.
Observer Network: In the past few weeks, I interviewed several European experts to learn about their views on changes in European policy after Trump took office, and how Europe is caught between strategic self-defense and following the U.S. I also noticed that European liberal globalists are still mired in anti-Russian sentiments, believing that Russia wants to revive the old Russian Empire or dreams of restoring Soviet-era territories. The mainstream narrative in Europe still portrays aiding Ukraine as Harry Potter fighting Voldemort or the Shire resisting Mordor. Although the war between Russia and Ukraine has lasted for three years, what is Russia's next goal?
Fedor Lukyanov: Let's focus on the European situation first. The EU is currently mired in multiple crises, and its predicament has structural characteristics. At its core, Europe faces challenges such as economic recession, cultural identity crises, and social fragmentation due to immigration, none of which are fundamentally different from those faced by other countries.
However, it is particularly important to note that the international landscape is undergoing a change dominated by emerging leaders such as Trump, Putin, Modi, and Erdogan—marking the arrival of the "era of national interests." In this new world order, all countries (regardless of size) can independently formulate and implement national strategies that align with their own interests. Even if there are policy deviations (such as limitations in Russia's leadership's perception of future directions or potential strategic misjudgments by China and India), the key trend is irreversible: global politics is returning to a strategic game model centered on national interests.
Because Europe is not a single country, the EU as an alliance is not an entity capable of determining and implementing its national interests. It consists of 27 member states that are vastly different from each other—for example, Latvia versus Portugal or Ireland versus other countries, it is hard to find much common ground.
Beyond that, the EU was founded with the aim of transcending national interests to forever eliminate the contradictions that repeatedly arose in Europe due to national interest conflicts. These conflicts in the first half of the 20th century essentially destroyed Europe's status in world affairs.
This peculiar political entity dates back to the special historical period after World War II. European integration was originally a system innovation designed by great figures, intended to prevent Europe from falling into worse situations under American protection—a significant achievement indeed. However, the core tenet of this concept is: national interests should disappear because they will eventually be replaced—by common interests formed through inter-state dialogues, by common interests formed through mechanisms like European institutions, etc.
As I previously mentioned, the European integration model was a tremendous success in the 20th century. Entering the 21st century, it began to face more challenges, but it still functions effectively in the era of globalization, where people generally believe the world is moving toward the eradication of national differences, crossing borders, and迈向完全共通的空间方向。在这种认知下，欧盟几乎成为典范，甚至是理想的模板。
但如今时移世易，这套逻辑已难以为继。我们重新回到了国家利益主导的世界格局，而其他国家（如俄罗斯、中国、美国等）都能适应这种转变。欧洲却陷入特殊困境：当全世界都在“回归本位”时，它该如何自处？这正是核心矛盾所在。我认为厘清这一点至关重要。
针对您提出的问题，反俄情绪目前已成为欧洲维持团结的粘合剂。假设乌克兰战争能结束，美国与俄罗斯能找到某种共同立场，乌克兰得以幸存并开始重建——届时欧洲将需要新的凝聚力来源。当这一天到来时，各国人民将会质问当局：我们为此付出了多少经济代价？数百万社会福利支出如何保障？核能发展等重大议题如何推进？
国家利益主导的世界，欧盟体系面临挑战。图为欧盟布鲁塞尔总部，工人正在调整旗子。
正因如此，我认为当前的反俄政策实质上是欧洲维持运转的工具——为其行动提供合法性依据，譬如持续军援乌克兰而非改善国内社会福利。
关于第二个问题，即俄罗斯试图重建苏联或俄罗斯帝国的野心，这是无稽之谈。即便存在某些俄罗斯帝国复辟主义者，他们也清楚苏联复辟绝无可能。俄罗斯的军事实力在乌克兰暴露了其局限性，三年多的激烈冲突不仅未能实现所有既定目标，遑论进一步扩张。任何理性分析都表明：这种发展既不可能，亦无必要。
当然，我理解邻国可能存在历史性焦虑——它们不仅遭受过俄罗斯的帝国主义行为影响，还曾受德国、法国、英国等欧洲列强的压迫，因此会从这个角度来解读当前局势。但理性考量应明确：俄罗斯既无意愿也无能力重蹈覆辙。此类臆测实属多余。
关于俄罗斯的战略目标，过去数年间国际社会反复追问的核心问题是：乌克兰问题的终极目标究竟是什么？我认为所有中国朋友及域外观察者必须明确一个关键细节——对俄罗斯而言，乌克兰是一个具有绝对独特性的国家与地缘空间。其不可类比性体现在：既不能简单套用波兰、波罗的海国家或罗马尼亚等国的经验，也无法在其他国家找到相似案例。
This uniqueness arises from the叠加 of multiple factors: historical trajectory, cultural traditions, ethnic composition, religious beliefs, etc., intersecting here. Ukraine, as a sovereign state born after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, though geographically new, has always carried the core memory of Russian civilization within its territory—it is not only the birthplace of the Russian state form but also the baptismal ground of the Russian ethnicity (this process constitutes the most fundamental cultural event in Russian history). Over the following centuries, the struggle over this region essentially revolved around the interpretation of Russian identity, involving geopolitical considerations as well as strategic security layouts. From a military geography perspective, this land has irreplaceable strategic value.
But the key issue lies elsewhere. What is truly important is that Ukraine has always been viewed by many Russians within Russia and by many people within Ukraine itself as part of the Russian civilization space, even considered part of the Russian state itself. This special status is unparalleled among all former Soviet republics: neither Central Asian countries, Baltic states, nor Moldova have ever had such profound connections with the core of Russia.
Therefore, the evolution of the European security landscape and the outbreak of the Ukraine-Russia conflict have a structural correlation—this land contains highly explosive historical potential. It must be clarified that Ukraine is not an ordinary case. If observed solely from the perspective of contemporary international relations (especially since 2022), people tend to fall into simplistic cognition: viewing Russia as an "aggressive great power" and Ukraine as a "small country fighting for independence and freedom," as if replaying an imperial revival script. This view is fundamentally wrong; reality is far more complex.
Returning to the core question: Ukraine is not a template for Russia's subsequent actions. Even if boundaries and security mechanisms are determined through negotiations in the future, Russia can maintain strategic stability. This war is undoubtedly a tragedy of mutual loss—inflicting deep trauma on both Ukrainian civilians and Russian society. However, I firmly believe that when peace finally arrives (and I am hopeful), it will provide humanity with an important lesson: by bearing the cost of war, we might avoid larger-scale conflicts. Therefore, a legally binding stable peace agreement must ultimately be reached.
The danger of the Ukrainian situation has significantly decreased.
Observer Network: You might have been asked this question many times already, but hearing a Russian's response to this is still very moving. Let us discuss peace solutions. Over the past three years, people have found that the previous European security architecture, including NATO, not only failed to guarantee European security but also led to endless wars. Now, the U.S. believes that Europe should take responsibility for its defense. But Europeans themselves feel that the Russia-Ukraine conflict seems endless. So, what kind of European security architecture do you think can permanently resolve the Russia-Ukraine issue?
Fedor: First, I'm not sure whether this conflict can ultimately bring Europe a stable and lasting effective security architecture. Perhaps it can, but perhaps it won't—at least it's not visible at this stage. Future adjustments may continue beyond war, possibly through some political and diplomatic processes. This is far from easy.
In general, we are now in an international environment that no longer seeks long-term stable solutions but has fully entered another phase. The core of this phase lies in temporarily avoiding the worst-case scenarios while creating opportunities for the next steps—whether politically, economically, or militarily. This is not just a problem between Ukraine and Russia but reflects the violent restructuring of the old international system worldwide, even a fatal collapse, while the new system has yet to emerge. Perhaps a new order will eventually come, but I believe it will be difficult to achieve in the short term.
I understand that Chinese people naturally reject uncertainty; you prefer clear frameworks that allow for predictable future trends. Unfortunately, in the coming period, none of us can enjoy this "luxury." For Russia, adapting to this environment might seem easier—it has been accustomed to surviving in such upheavals since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Compared to other countries, Russians psychologically possess greater resilience.
Nevertheless, I must reiterate: I doubt we can establish a long-term stable security architecture. What we can realistically achieve is to lower the threat level. Looking back at the end of the Biden administration, that was indeed an extremely dangerous moment—the U.S., based on (in my opinion) a complete misjudgment of its own interests, continuously exacerbated tensions by supplying more military capabilities to Ukraine. Russia began responding with dangerous rhetoric, such as increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, although these were merely hypothetical declarations. From this perspective, the return of Donald Trump avoided a catastrophic escalation of the situation—if the Biden-Harris team had continued to hold power, the consequences would have been unimaginable. Therefore, compared to six months ago or a year ago, the danger of the current situation has significantly decreased.
The next question is: what kind of solution can make Russia accept it, even if it doesn't satisfy Russia? Frankly speaking, Russia's ideal demand is that Ukraine is no longer a fully sovereign and independently capable nation, but I know this is neither realistic nor feasible. A more feasible option, as President Putin has stated multiple times, is for the international community to officially recognize the territories controlled by the Russian military (accounting for approximately 20% of original Ukrainian territory) as formally incorporated into the Russian Federation, while requiring Ukraine to adopt a neutral stance, renounce membership in military alliances, and impose restrictions on its military development.
However, returning to the fundamental question—how can a new security mechanism be established with Europe and NATO beyond Ukraine? I believe this is temporarily unachievable. Requiring Russia to abandon its existing claims is equally impractical. Moscow is evidently prepared to pay any price to achieve its strategic goals. Donald Trump faces a dilemma: he desires a quick resolution to the Ukraine issue, but this urgency stems from his unwillingness to invest further resources in this issue; whereas for Russia, Ukraine, as a neighboring strategic stronghold, is destined to be a core interest zone that must be managed long-term.
This strategic value discrepancy may lead to two consequences: positively, if the U.S. loses interest in Ukraine while Russia maintains high attention, both sides may engage in interest swaps. Based on my understanding of negotiation logic, Trump's true priority is Middle Eastern affairs—Israeli security, the Iranian nuclear issue, the Syrian situation, especially considering the influence of Jewish Americans in domestic U.S. politics. Russia also values the Middle East, but its strategic weight is clearly lower than Ukraine. Theoretically, there exists exchange space, but actual operations are far more complex than theoretical projections.
Negatively, Trump may underestimate Ukraine's strategic significance to Russia. If he misjudges the situation and attempts to impose compromise solutions in Russia's core interest zones, it will lead to catastrophic consequences—Russia will not retreat on issues concerning national security fundamentals, and such misjudgments will only exacerbate chaos.
Returning to the issue of Ukraine's positioning: as a buffer zone between Russia and the West, its existence itself is not derogatory. This neutrality should manifest as a state not taking sides. In fact, Russia's territorial claims since the 2014 Crimea incident have a special historical context—in Russia's perception, Crimea's return is a correction of historical injustice. As for the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, Russia initially had no territorial claims; the evolving situation was more due to the chain reactions triggered by actions taken by the Ukrainian authorities. The territorial status quo currently formed is an integral part of the geopolitical balance, but what Russia truly seeks is legally binding security guarantees to ensure Ukraine never becomes an anti-Russian bridgehead.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a civilizational subject's identity revolution, signifying farewell to the Soviet legacy.
Observer Network: I remember Putin mentioning that Russia hopes to restore its status as a great power. At the end of 2023, media quoted President Putin as saying that Russia has regained and consolidated its "sovereignty as a world power." After three years of the Russia-Ukraine war, at least in the economic sector, Russia's successful response to sanctions has surprised the Chinese, and perhaps Russia itself is surprised by its success. So how do you evaluate these three years of pain and gain?
Fedor Lukyanov: This question is very critical, but it's hard to give a definitive answer. Let's start with the economy—Russia's economy has shown resilience beyond expectations, even surprising its own citizens. We didn't believe our economic system could withstand unprecedented pressure from a coalition of developed countries, which is indeed a pleasant surprise.
However, the initial performance in the military sector formed a sharp contrast, especially in the first phase of the special military operation, where heavy casualties and tactical failures dealt a double blow—not only in terms of life losses but also in undermining the prestige of what was once the world's second-strongest army.
But as the war progressed, the Russian military began to grasp the laws of modern warfare—this is actually the normal evolution process in military conflicts. To assess whether this war has elevated Russia's international standing, it's premature to draw conclusions now. We have paid a huge price, and ongoing costs are still accumulating. But if it can eventually force Europe and America to acknowledge the fait accompli (even if not all demands are met), Russia's international standing may rise rather than fall, as this stress test proved its survival capability and combat willpower.
This display of strategic resilience holds special significance for post-Soviet space countries. In this geopolitical block, strength is the most effective persuasive tool: when you demonstrate a strong and credible defensive capability, neighboring countries naturally adjust their stance; if any weakness is shown, they will turn to other spheres of influence. From this perspective, Russia may reap long-term geopolitical dividends. But the cost is equally staggering: the enormous sacrifice of the younger generation and the sustained erosion of economic sanctions effects are reshaping the country's future.
In summary, Russia has proven its "invincible" survival traits, which are already a significant strategic asset in today's turbulent world. Of course, we have not achieved the grand goal of rebuilding a "Soviet-style dominant position"—at least there is no sign of it now. But what exactly is true strength? This is another philosophical question that requires further exploration.
Observer Network: In an interview with Grigory Sarkisov in 2022, you mentioned that over the next decade, Russia's development model would transition from a heavily Western-dependent global participant to a relatively independent great power akin to the Soviet era. Three years later today, how do you evaluate Russia's achievements in its transformation away from the West in terms of economy, military, and politics? Is Russia on the right track? How far is it from its goal?
Fedor Lukyanov: First, it needs to be clear that Russia is not the Soviet Union, nor will it ever become the Soviet Union. This applies not only to territorial scale but also to the accumulation and projection of strength—the Soviet Union was a superpower, and Russia cannot replicate this status. Furthermore, I believe the concept of "superpower" itself is fading; even the U.S. will no longer possess this attribute within the next 15 to 20 years. Russia belongs to the traditional category of great powers, proving its qualification to be among the top players in international politics.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
This positioning is not easy because Russia is acutely aware of its strengths and weaknesses. But looking around today's world, is there any country that dares to claim it has no worries? The U.S. is mired in internal strife, Europe faces integration challenges, China experiences transformational pains, and India and Turkey also face respective challenges. Can Russia find its strategic positioning in international affairs? Observing the current development of the situation, especially the special military operation that began three years ago, this can be seen as a watershed in post-Soviet development—we have finally completely bid farewell to the shadow of the Soviet legacy. Because in 2014 (with Crimea's annexation), even before 2022, Russia has always lived in the aftershocks of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Psychologically, at least for those of us who were born and grew up in the Soviet Union, there is a subconscious sense of the entire Soviet map being our homeland, believing that formal sovereignty divisions are insignificant because we belong to a greater civilization community.
This war will reshape the national consciousness of the younger generation, just as historical processes always change generational memories. For the new generation that did not personally experience the Soviet Union, that country is merely a chapter in textbooks, not the life experience ingrained in our bones for those of us who grew up in the late Soviet era—even though my memory of the Soviet Union was not a rosy utopia, the sense of belonging to a unified civilization body has always lingered. Now, Russia's final boundaries will be defined by the frontline of effective military deployment—this geographical reality means that we have completed an important step in national reconstruction through this war, but it does not imply continuous territorial expansion.
This is essentially a revolution in the identity of a civilizational subject. Who is Russia? Where does its civilizational territory begin and end? These ultimate questions are being answered through blood and iron. Of course, this description is somewhat simplified, because even if the war ends now (though I doubt it will completely terminate), the cost paid for this identity reconstruction has already been excessively tragic. It can be foreseen that there will be little sustained expansionary political will domestically—although other geopolitical players may still harbor different calculations. But I hope the ultimate conclusion is that Russia should ensure its strategic interests in surrounding areas through other means.
The Sino-Russian strategic relationship will determine Russia's development over the next few decades.
Observer Network: Finally, and most importantly, let's talk about Sino-Russian relations. Yesterday at the Wadiyar forum at East China Normal University, scholars discussed China and Russia relations for a long time. I noticed that Russia's "Eastern Turn" strategy has been implemented for many years since its announcement in 2012. In the strategy of Russia's de-Westernization and turning Eastward, what role has China played?
Fedor Lukyanov: Russia's development before 2022 indeed had a pro-Western characteristic. The slogan of the "turn to Asia" strategy was proposed as early as around 2011, and although some actions were taken from 2012 to 2022, it fell far short of the desired intensity. Now, the collective Western sanctions have objectively forced Russia to accelerate its Eastward turn—as Trump commented on Biden's administration: by pressuring both Russia and China simultaneously, the U.S. has inadvertently facilitated a strategic collaboration between the two great powers.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov after talks in Beijing Foreign Ministry
For Russia, regardless of how U.S. politics changes, we must remain clear-headed: we should not abandon current partners due to illusions of repairing relations with the U.S.
Of course, there are always those who reminisce about the past, fantasizing about returning to the "global rules" system of 2019 after the Ukraine conflict ends. But this is impossible. Russia must accept the reality of the old Western-centered order collapsing, even though the contours of the new world are still unclear. The dramatic changes of the past three and a half years are enough to provide enlightenment: our future is not only tied to China (this statement might be overly absolute), but undoubtedly, building new relationships with important neighbors, especially strategic collaboration with China, will determine Russia's national stability, security, and developmental trajectory over the next few decades.
At yesterday's forum, a Chinese scholar quoted a proverb that left a deep impression on me: "Close neighbors are better than distant relatives." This is precisely the true portrayal of Sino-Russian relations—Europe and the U.S. are distant "distant relatives" geographically, while China is a "close neighbor" inseparable from us. Who would harm relations with the largest neighbor due to a country miles away? This obviously defies common sense. Fortunately, despite occasional frictions, Sino-Russian relations as a whole maintain positive and constructive interactions, which is rare in today's international relations.
Regarding the impact of normalized U.S.-Russia relations on Sino-Russian cooperation, my judgment is that if U.S