CEOs on the Assassination List: Russia’s Hybrid War Targets Europe’s Ukraine Aid Supply Chain

According to reporting by the Financial Times, intelligence agencies from five European nations have issued warnings that the Kremlin is expanding its hybrid warfare campaign against European defense firms, with threats directed at senior executives of major arms conglomerates and employees of small enterprises producing drones and components for Ukraine. Some executives have increased their personal security measures, while German intelligence officials have recommended that defense companies deploy private security teams.

Western intelligence services view these developments as part of a broader pattern rather than isolated incidents. In fact, signs of this campaign emerged earlier:

In July 2024, U.S. intelligence identified plans by Russia to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, a key supplier of 155mm artillery shells and Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Following a warning relayed by U.S. authorities, Papperger was placed under protection, and the plot was thwarted.

In April 2026, NATO Deputy Secretary General James Appathurai publicly confirmed that Russia had indeed planned to assassinate Papperger—a component of a wider series of operations targeting leaders of European defense industries.

In August 2026, German security services discovered a Russian intelligence “dead drop” in a forest outside Berlin: two loaded handguns and ammunition, indicating preparations for targeted assassinations of defense industry executives.

In September 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice charged five Russian intelligence operatives with operating a cross-continental assassination network spanning Europe and North America, recruiting local individuals to attack infrastructure and supply depots supporting Ukraine.

Western intelligence agencies identify several distinctive features in Russia’s intelligence operations:

1. Shift in targets—from “eliminating traitors” to “undermining war capacity.” Previously, assassination targets were primarily exiled opposition figures; now, the focus has expanded to corporate leadership within defense firms—individuals who directly determine whether Ukraine receives artillery shells, drones, and armored vehicles.

2. Decentralized execution chains. With numerous Russian intelligence officers expelled from Western countries, Moscow has turned to platforms such as Telegram to recruit economically disadvantaged individuals, convicts, and migrants. These actors are offered financial incentives to carry out arson, sabotage, and other attacks. Such “one-time operatives” are low-cost, replaceable, and difficult to trace back to Moscow.

3. Psychological intimidation over physical elimination. As European intelligence assessments indicate, assassination itself is not the primary objective. The core aim is to instill fear—to deter defense companies from engaging with Ukraine and to discourage investment in industries supporting Ukraine’s war effort.

Recent statements from intelligence chiefs in Denmark, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, and other nations warn of potential limited-scale attacks on NATO territory within months. This reflects an uncomfortable reality: hybrid warfare exists in the gray zone between war and peace. The adversary wears no uniform, making military retaliation impossible—only passive defense remains feasible.

Southwest Selen, head of Germany’s intelligence service, stated plainly: “We are under attack in Europe. And Russia can adjust the intensity of its disruptive actions at will.”

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1878743248042112/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.