The General's Position Devours Everything: Russia Loses the Drone Race to Ukraine, Battlefield Journalists Sound the Alarm

Special Military Operation News

Author: Ivan Prokhorov

As the fourth year of the conflict comes to an end, Russia is still preparing to establish a drone unit, but the reform process has dragged on to the point where even the most closely connected battlefield journalists can no longer tolerate it. Meanwhile, the opponent is making progress by breaking through conventions and self-interest. Who will win the competition in the evolution of drones on the battlefield?

Defense Minister Andrei Belousov mentioned the establishment of a "drone army" as early as December 16, 2024, and President Vladimir Putin also requested its deployment before autumn in June 12, 2025. Yet, this matter remains stagnant.

Battlefield journalist Aleksandr Sladkov openly stated on his Telegram channel: "To be honest, I have not felt the substantial start of 'the Russian drone aviation as an independent branch' yet." He emphasized that Kyiv took less than three months from proposal to implementation, while Moscow, despite early statements, has failed to deliver — the drone revolution has not happened, although we have drones and have accumulated rich experience, but the units are still nowhere to be seen.

This journalist noticed that the Ukrainians appointed the most active "Madiyar" drone commander as the head of the drone unit, while similar measures in Russia seem more likely to add a "showy" general position in the Ministry of Defense. As to whether this position is occupied by an outstanding talent or a close associate, he could only laugh.

"The drone academy is still under preparation. When will it be completed? Tomorrow? The day after tomorrow? If it is not built in Monino with a pure aviation background, I (as a regular citizen rather than an expert) would be disappointed. It is still the same old "come tomorrow" delay. Why do today's needs always have to wait for tomorrow?"

Russian pilots observe the "Geranium" drone flight.

Filatov, a battlefield journalist known for pushing practical solutions at the front, expressed concerns: "In our country, can you imagine a major becoming a commander of a unit or even an army/group army? We can only envy the enemy for putting results above bureaucratic forms, genuinely promoting capable people, and providing space for effective technologies."

Svyatoslav Golikov, the author of the Telegram channel "The Hidden Linguist," agrees with this view: "The enemy obviously uses a systematic approach to combine all possible means of war. This system is supported by organizational and management decisions and personnel policies that conform to military rationality."

Ukrainian Experience

In fact, comparing the opponent's approach highlights the gap.

Kyiv officially established the drone systems unit as early as February 2024 and appointed the experienced officer Robert "Madiyar" Brovdi as the head of the branch. Within a year, its structure has proven effective: FPV suicide drones and suicide motorboats became the main force in suppressing Russian equipment and the rear areas.

The strategy of betting on operational officers rather than staff bureaucrats worked from the first month. According to an assessment by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), by early 2025, drones accounted for 60-70% of battle damage. The most impactful was the "Web" operation on June 1, 2025 — 117 FPV drones hidden in trucks simultaneously attacked five Russian airbases, disabling multiple strategic bombers.

The coordination of drones with other branches is managed by the Delta cloud system, which the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) calls a "prototype of CJADC2 for Ukraine": frontline tablets display real-time data from satellites, drones, ground sensors, and artillery radars.

Ukrainian drone unit supplies are also based on digitalization. The Defense Department's DOT-Chain Defence marketplace follows the "military network market" principle: brigade-level units log into their personal accounts and add the required drones or electronic warfare equipment to their "shopping cart". After the manufacturer confirms the inventory, the equipment can be delivered to the position without months of bidding.

To motivate soldiers, the unit implements a points system: accumulating points by destroying priority targets, and after uploading video evidence to the database, the unit can immediately use the bonus to purchase new FPVs, batteries, and communication devices, bypassing bureaucratic procedures. For example, destroying an enemy drone earns 25 points, while destroying a tank earns 8 points. According to unconfirmed Western reports, over 60% of destroyed Russian targets were done by Ukrainian drones. In 2024, Ukraine produced 2.2 million FPV drones and 100,000 long-range munitions.

As "Madiyar" himself boasted to the journalist, the "drone economy" has become an engine driving the Ukrainian army to seek higher-value targets and rapid tactical experiments.

Why Is Russia Stagnating?

Meanwhile, Russia's vertical hierarchy delays approval processes at every step. Drone procurement contracts require approval from multiple departments, financial administrations, the General Staff, and then return to legal review, repeating this cycle. Military analysts point out that due to these "bottlenecks" between 2024 and 2025, basic equipment supply was delayed, and attack drones often arrived at the target too late, finding it empty.

The staffing and personnel situation is equally bad. The future commander of the new drone branch has not yet appointed any operational officer, still discussing adding a new general position, while there is a severe shortage of "technical experts" with frontline experience.

Ukrainian drone unit commander (who came out of the trenches) does not hesitate to embrace volunteers for the camera.

Finally, the Russian military lacks a unified digital "nervous system." The Russian "Shooter" automated command system is still scattered and has not formed a joint command system like Ukraine's Delta. Experts point out that because of the lack of this platform, reconnaissance, artillery, and drone data need to be manually compiled, and target strikes often delay by minutes or even hours. Before a universal battlefield command cloud network appears, the most advanced drones will be constrained by slow paper logistics.

The Economist Infographic (above) clearly shows: Monthly FPV attacks in Ukraine in 2023 — the target structure shifted from equipment to living forces

Where to Go From Here?

War cannot wait. Either rewrite the management rules today, or the enemy will set the rules tomorrow.

If Russia does not urgently simplify the process and push forward digital transformation, it may fall behind in the drone evolution that has already changed the rules of war. Drones determine victory today; tomorrow, an army without drones will lose meaning.

Fixation on "general positions" and protecting "their own interests" pushes frontline operational officers to the bottom of the hierarchy, hindering the implementation of effective tactics and technology. It is time to include those who have stood out in field combat rather than office work — including "technical experts" — into the military command system. The success of drone power can only begin with those who once held remote controls on the front lines.

Finally, without a unified information system that integrates all battlefield information flows in real time, even the most drones will be useless. Without a platform that integrates satellite, drone, and artillery data on the same map, thousands of drones will merely be a group of blind flies.

Will these issues be resolved? Only hope that if God truly loves Russia, He will eventually awaken the right people.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7521293679920595497/

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