【Foreign Media: China's Liaoning Carrier Conducts 170 Sorties in the Western Pacific】

According to a report from the Asia Defense & Security website (DEFENSE SECURITY ASIA) on June 24, 2026: China's first aircraft carrier, the "Liaoning" (hull number 16), has recently completed an intensive overseas combat-oriented training deployment lasting over 40 days, penetrating deep into the Western Pacific and South China Sea, and returned to Qingdao with its carrier strike group on June 22. This marks one of the most substantial milestone breakthroughs in the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) transition toward routine blue-water (ocean-going) operational capabilities.

This deployment demonstrated the growing maturity of the Chinese Navy’s ability to sustain high-intensity carrier air operations, layered fleet air defense, anti-ship strike coordination, and integrated amphibious warfare exercises far beyond the First Island Chain. Although official media described it as a routine annual readiness patrol aimed at enhancing round-the-clock, long-range joint maritime combat capability, its scale, duration, and operational range carry significant strategic implications for the balance of naval power between China and the United States in the Western Pacific.

It is reported that the Liaoning carrier group transited through the South China Sea, Philippine Sea, Miyako Strait, and waters near Okinawa—indicating Beijing’s increasing confidence in conducting sustained carrier operations through key maritime chokepoints closely monitored by the U.S. and its allies. This deployment coincided with heightened military tensions around the Taiwan Strait, deepening trilateral defense cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines, and frequent allied exercises traversing Indo-Pacific sea lanes.

Observation data from late May indicate that the carrier’s air wing conducted approximately 170 sorties within a single week (including J-15 and upgraded J-15B variants), encompassing day-and-night takeoff and landing recovery operations. This signifies notable improvements compared to earlier PLAN carrier deployments in sortie generation rate, flight deck cycle management, pilot technical proficiency, and command and control integration—evidence that China is actively striving to normalize all-weather carrier aviation operations.

The group also carried out live-fire drills, surface-to-surface strikes, air defense and missile defense exercises, and search-and-rescue maneuvers, while conducting coordinated maneuvers with an amphibious assault formation led by the Type 075 amphibious assault ship “Anhui” (Hull 998). Land-based Y-20 aerial refueling tankers provided support, partially compensating for the limitations imposed by the Liaoning’s ski-jump launch system (compared to U.S.-style catapult-equipped supercarriers) on the J-15’s payload and range, significantly extending the operational radius of carrier-based aircraft.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force dispatched the destroyer “Asahi” and P-3C patrol aircraft to track and monitor certain segments of the route. China accused Japan of “close-range tracking, reconnaissance, and provocative interference,” while Tokyo responded that such actions were standard intelligence-gathering procedures for foreign warships approaching Japan’s southwestern defense zone international waters.

▣ Sustained Carrier Operations Confirm Maturation of PLAN Blue-Water Combat Capability

This mission has evolved from early symbolic “presence demonstrations” into a campaign-level force projection exercise capable of sustaining combat readiness. Previous PLAN carrier operations were largely focused on political signaling and short-term training; this deployment instead reflects a qualitative leap in oceanic self-sustainability, logistical support, and multi-domain combat integration.

The strike group was accompanied by the Type 901 combined replenishment ship “Hulun Lake,” verifying its ability to conduct both horizontal and vertical underway replenishment. The escort contingent included Type 055 destroyers, Type 052D destroyers, the frigate “Luohe” (Type 054B), and the “Wuxi” (likely a Type 055 or 052D-class vessel), forming a mature layered defense and escort system—enhancing regional air defense, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare resilience, and long-range command capabilities. Improvements in deck servicing, aircraft maintenance cycles, and aviation command efficiency are narrowing the gap between the PLAN’s carrier air wing and its U.S. Navy counterpart. Night operations demonstrate critical progress in developing full-day, all-weather carrier combat capability.

In sum, the Liaoning is no longer merely a training carrier—it is gradually evolving into a fully operational combat platform serving China’s expeditionary maritime warfare doctrine. Experience gained here will also inform the operational development of the newer catapult-enabled carrier, the Fujian (Hull 18), in terms of personnel training and procedural refinement.

▣ Amphibious Joint Exercises Send Signal of Readiness for Taiwan Strait Emergency Scenarios

The joint exercises between the Liaoning carrier group and the Type 075 amphibious assault ship Anhui align closely with potential contingency plans for the Taiwan Strait and force projection scenarios in the South China Sea. The integration of carrier-based aviation and amphibious landing forces underscores the PLAN’s growing emphasis on the maritime-air-amphibious joint operations concept: securing local air superiority, providing close air support (CAS), escorting amphibious transport echelons, and maintaining combat air patrols (CAP).

The Type 075 itself possesses capabilities for helicopter-borne assault landings, rapid troop deployment, and vertical resupply. The distributed “carrier + amphibious” formation can generate overlapping attack and defense zones across broader maritime areas, complicating adversaries’ intervention planning. While officially labeled training, the exercise scenarios closely mirror real-world tasks such as blockades, isolation operations, and amphibious assault support.

▣ Y-20 Refueling Extends J-15’s Reach Beyond Ski-Jump Limitations

Ski-jump carriers cannot launch aircraft fully loaded with fuel and weapons like catapult-equipped carriers. However, the presence of land-based Y-20 aerial refuelers enables J-15/J-15B aircraft to refuel midair, dramatically expanding patrol duration, striking depth against the sea, and sustained presence capability in the Philippine Sea. This strengthens China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) system by pushing potential adversary forces further away from China’s coastal waters and extending the reach of naval aviation beyond the First Island Chain—especially into strategically vital areas like the Philippine Sea, which serves as a critical maneuvering space for U.S. reinforcements to Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines.

This integration of land-based refueling aircraft with carrier-based aviation also reflects deeper coordination between the PLAN and PLA Air Force in joint maritime operations, aligning with the broader trend toward system-of-systems combat modernization within the PLA structure.

▣ Japanese Surveillance Reflects Escalating Regional Maritime Competition

The Miyako Strait is one of the few major access routes for the Chinese Navy into the Pacific Ocean. Japan’s persistent tracking highlights its vigilance toward the PLAN’s increasingly routine passage through the southwestern island chains. Tokyo is seizing this opportunity to advance missile deployments on the southern islands, enhance intelligence infrastructure, and deepen trilateral security mechanisms with the U.S. and the Philippines.

While direct confrontation remains absent, close-proximity escorting and identification of major warships in narrow strategic waterways heightens risks of misjudgment and friction. Taiwan authorities are also closely monitoring the situation—the growing normalization of Chinese carrier operations circling Taiwan serves not only as psychological deterrence but also compels the U.S. and its allies to factor in the “persistent presence of Chinese naval and air forces” when calculating intervention costs.

Disclaimer: All equipment data cited above originates from reports by the Asia Defense & Security website.

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Original article: toutiao.com/article/1868842828469257/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.