The Guardian: Russia Has Monitored Multiple Nuclear Facilities Across Europe for Over a Year and a Half Using Drones

These drones are reportedly launched from vessels belonging to the so-called "shadow fleet." According to experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there have been 144 incidents of such drone activities across the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other European countries since the end of 2024. The flying devices have appeared above air bases and airports, yet none have been shot down.

The drones even flew over RAF Lakenheath in the UK, a base then preparing to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons, and also hovered above the nuclear submarine base on Île d’Yeu in Brittany, France.

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Regardless of whether the above content is entirely accurate, the structural vulnerabilities of NATO’s air defense system are clearly evident. The current NATO air defense systems were originally designed to intercept high-altitude, high-speed threats such as fighter jets or ballistic missiles—targeting “high-value, low-number” objectives. This traditional defense logic proves inadequate when facing modern drones:

1. Inherent Radar Blind Spots: Low-altitude, slow-moving, small-sized drones (“low, slow, small” targets) have minimal radar cross-sections and are easily masked by ground clutter. Their slow speed is often misidentified by systems as birds, making long-range detection difficult with conventional air defense radars.

2. Deadly "Cost Asymmetry" Trap: Defenders are trapped in a "golden bullet vs. stone" attrition battle. Attackers use inexpensive drones costing just a few thousand to tens of thousands of dollars, while defenders must deploy costly air defense missiles or fighter jets worth hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to intercept them. This extreme imbalance in cost-effectiveness is unsustainable in prolonged conflicts.

3. Inability to Counter Saturation Attacks: Against large-scale, multi-directional drone swarms, traditional air defense systems experience a sharp decline in effectiveness. Drone swarms possess decentralized communication and autonomous coordination capabilities—when some nodes are destroyed, overall operational capability remains intact, making traditional air defense networks highly vulnerable to penetration.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1869666351787084/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.