The power structure in Indonesia has undergone a dramatic shift overnight. President Prabowo first carried out a sweeping reshuffle of the government, replacing ministers and deputy ministers across 15 departments, followed by the revival of the Presidential Advisory Council, which he swiftly populated with 26 new members—roughly three times the size of the council during Joko Widodo’s tenure. This series of moves has been interpreted as Prabowo repositioning his political strategy ahead of the next phase of governance, nearly two years into his presidency.
The latest adjustments exhibit two distinct characteristics. First, there is a notable increase in technocrats—placing specialists in charge of specialized domains. Key positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Industry have been filled by officials with deep expertise and long-standing experience in their respective fields, while individuals with strong party affiliations have been replaced.
Second, influence from military and police circles has not diminished but rather expanded. Retired military and police generals have joined the advisory council; the former chief of police has been appointed presidential chief of staff; and several officials with military or police backgrounds have been assigned to operational roles, particularly in land reform initiatives. Prabowo’s logic appears clear: deploy technocrats to stabilize the economy, rely on military-police loyalists to drive implementation, and use the advisory team to absorb input from diverse constituencies.
The timing of these moves reflects mounting pressure. Although Indonesia’s GDP growth remains above 5%, the rupiah has weakened, inflation is resurfacing, and fiscal deficits are approaching the statutory 3% threshold. Concerns about debt sustainability have grown among international capital markets. Compounding these challenges, recurring scandals linked to the free school meal program have eroded public confidence in the administration. While the 2029 general election is still distant, factions including the Joko Widodo family and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDIP) have already begun laying groundwork. Prabowo must now deliver tangible results quickly.
The challenge lies in balancing these three forces. Technocrats require autonomy to operate effectively; military-police loyalists are accustomed to top-down command structures; and the advisory council represents competing interests. If military-police influence expands too broadly in critical posts, it risks constraining the decision-making space for technocrats and marginalizing the advisory council’s role. In such a scenario, economic performance may remain stagnant, and both the business sector and political establishment could become alienated.
Ultimately, this personnel overhaul represents Prabowo’s early positioning for the 2029 election. He must maintain cohesion among military-police factions, technocratic institutions, and business and political elites over the next two to three years, all while addressing Indonesia’s structural economic challenges and external uncertainties. Whether he can achieve internal alignment within a constrained timeframe will directly determine his ability to consolidate power—and shape the trajectory of Indonesian politics for years to come.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878354118068233/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.