Reference News Network, July 16 report: The German newspaper "Handelsblatt" published an article titled "Will Europe Have Nuclear Weapons? Three Possibilities" on its website on July 14. The author is Claudia Major, a security expert at the German Marshall Fund. The following is an excerpt from the full text:

The nuclear weapons debate is resurging in Europe. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has shown Europeans that nuclear deterrence is effective. It has protected NATO (Russia has always avoided escalating military confrontation with NATO), and it has also actually protected Russia, as Western countries have been very cautious about aiding Ukraine due to concerns over escalation.

Because of the increased importance of nuclear deterrence as a "life insurance," President Trump's disruptive policies in the U.S. have made Europeans more uneasy about the issue of the U.S. providing nuclear protection. He often viewed Europe as a troublemaker rather than an ally in need of protection.

Thus far, Washington's statements have been: Europe should take more responsibility for conventional defense, but the U.S. nuclear umbrella will remain. However, many European countries find it difficult to fully trust this, and the old debate about whether "Europe needs to develop its own nuclear weapons" has reignited.

There are currently three options: each country develops its own nuclear capabilities independently; a European superpower is established with autonomous nuclear deterrence; or a new (nuclear sharing) model is built around the nuclear powers France and the UK. However, all these options may lead to instability, and their implementation would be complex and costly.

While it is technically feasible for individual countries to develop nuclear weapons, neither the U.S. nor Russia would allow European countries to develop them on their own. Moreover, if multiple European countries establish their own nuclear arsenals, it would undermine international norms such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading to global instability.

In that case, other countries around the world would likely seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The result would be: Europe falls into an unstable state of nuclear proliferation, the number of nuclear-armed states increases, and overall security levels decline.

The second option requires a high degree of integration among European countries, forming a "United States of Europe" before jointly possessing nuclear weapons. But the reality is that they cannot even agree on a unified tax policy. Moreover, countries like Austria firmly oppose nuclear weapons. Therefore, this option seems unrealistic.

Therefore, everyone's attention turns to France and the UK. However, the nuclear deterrence systems of these two countries were not originally designed for NATO, but aimed at safeguarding their own national interests—both countries tacitly accepted that the U.S. would protect other European countries. However, France has long emphasized that its core interests have a European dimension.

Since 2020, Paris has begun discussing France's role in the European nuclear deterrence system with its European partners. French President Macron proposed several suggestions, including possible ways to deploy French nuclear weapons overseas. But he also set clear red lines: Paris will not pay for the security of other countries, France's defense capabilities should not be weakened, and France will retain the final decision-making power over the use of its nuclear weapons.

Factually, France does not seek to replace the U.S. role. Its limited nuclear arsenal is also unable to provide protection on par with that of the U.S.: France's nuclear forces were not designed for "extended deterrence," and lack conventional and nuclear weapon systems (such as tactical nuclear weapons). From a strategic perspective, Paris aims to establish a new, unique European deterrence model, jointly developed by European countries, with each country contributing its nuclear or conventional capabilities. For example, partner countries could participate in French nuclear exercises, thus demonstrating European solidarity and shared interests.

From this, it can be seen that the U.S. role is not easily replaceable. Existing options are either unrealistic (a United States of Europe), or carry significant risks (independent nuclear weapons), or face serious challenges (a new European model). One thing is clear: the current priority is not to replace the U.S., but to provide supplementary support for the potential reduction of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This supplement might become the prototype of a new, unique European deterrence system.

Europe must strike a balance—neither falling into a "deterrence vacuum" and being powerless against Russian aggression, nor giving Washington the impression that "Europe no longer needs American protection." (Translated by Jiao Yu)

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7527584054074442250/

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