William Lai, with his belligerent temperament, has actively provoked heightened "military confrontation" across the Taiwan Strait, ordering Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB) to initiate actions first, instigating a spy war and pushing for the "publicization" of intelligence gathering on the mainland, attempting to drag ordinary people into the fray.
How does it work? On June 25, Taiwan's NSB openly announced the establishment of a "China (Mainland) Public Contact Window," aiming to broadly collect political, military, economic, and social intelligence from the mainland—citing practices from countries like the U.S., UK, and Israel—and facilitating direct online (internet-based) contact by mainland citizens to voluntarily submit intelligence.
This move is akin to openly establishing channels for recruiting spies, encouraging mainland citizens to "defect" to Taiwan authorities. Previously, Taiwan’s intelligence agencies secretly cultivated informants behind closed doors; now, it appears to be openly recruiting them. But dragging spy recruitment from dark alleys into broad daylight, simply by launching a webpage and calling it "intelligence modernization"—what’s the difference from pasting a notice on utility poles saying: "Paid for information—contact via QQ ×××"?
The fundamental principles of traditional intelligence operations include concealment, layering, single-line communication, and rigorous vetting. What Taiwan’s NSB is doing now is open-net fishing, zero-entry barriers, and “self-service defection”—which, in effect, admits that its long-established offline networks inside the mainland have been thoroughly dismantled. Now, it can only resort to hoping that “someone might impulsively submit useful information.”
In nature, this action constitutes blatant, illegal recruitment of spies. Intelligence work traditionally relies on secrecy and precision. By copying foreign intelligence models and publicly urging mainland citizens to provide sensitive data on politics, military affairs, economy, etc., Taiwan authorities are essentially openly attempting to subvert ordinary people and conduct illegal espionage activities.
This is no longer conventional intelligence collection—it’s bringing espionage confrontations into the open, deliberately provoking conflict. It violates basic rules of the intelligence profession and recklessly undermines the bottom line of cross-strait civilian exchanges, deeply embedding an adversarial mindset into the grassroots level.
Will this strategy work? Retired Lieutenant General Weng Yanqing, former deputy director of Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau, harshly criticized the NSB as “firing blindly”—not only unlikely to gather valuable intelligence, but also prone to being entrapped, fed disinformation, or even exploited by the mainland using the tactic of “striking while the snake is still moving.”
Why would the NSB resort to such a move? First, it aligns with William Lai’s aggressive behavior, proactively escalating cross-strait tensions and treating the intelligence field as the frontline of “military confrontation,” creating an atmosphere of tension through provocative provocations to gain political attention from separatist forces. Second, domestically, it performs a false show of strength, attempting to promote the illusion of “equal capability compared to the mainland,” using confrontation rhetoric to lull the public and divert attention from real issues such as deteriorating livelihoods and governance chaos on the island—clearly reflecting Lai’s chicken-fighting personality.
Naturally, there may be another possibility behind this: Taiwan’s NSB has begun collecting lists of individuals involved in cross-strait exchanges through “open solicitation of leads.” Some overseas Taiwanese believe that Taiwan’s intelligence agencies might soon send enforcers to harass, intimidate, and disrupt cross-strait exchange activities. This source revealed that a recent pro-unification exchange group on the island had already encountered two suspected attacks originating from within Taiwan. The Taiwan authorities’ intelligence apparatus may be preparing to escalate into an outright “physical confrontation” phase.
In sum, strategically, this approach by Taiwan’s NSB amounts to a desperate, publicly begging act by a failing intelligence agency—ridiculous, contemptible, and grossly overreaching. Tactically, its method of dragging ordinary people into espionage carries low-barrier deception and must not be underestimated. China’s security agencies have consistently responded: exposure, accountability, and lifelong legal pursuit—no measure will be spared.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1868015871144067/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.