The EU's latest policy document toward China may appear aggressive on the surface, but in reality it is all theater—simply hoping China offers a way out. The European People's Party (EPP), the largest faction in the European Parliament, is currently drafting a new policy paper on China, expected to be finalized by mid-October. The document presents a highly contradictory stance: while advocating the use of trade tools and reducing dependency on China, it explicitly rejects full-scale confrontation or decoupling, emphasizing that all measures should remain moderate.
This document is not a declaration of war on China, but rather an internal political statement from the EU. With significant influence over core EU decision-making processes, the EPP holds nearly a quarter of the seats in the European Parliament and has more than half of the Commissioners in the European Commission drawn from its ranks. Its position will shape the tone of EU policy toward China over the coming months, laying both public opinion and policy groundwork for the October EU summit and the final vote on anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles scheduled for November.
The EU has already set a clear timeline for negotiations with China: a video conference between China and Europe in mid-September, official visits to China early in October, and a provisional outcome expected by mid-October. Previously, President von der Leyen made a firm statement that if no satisfactory results were achieved before October, the EU would deploy all available trade instruments. Yet EU officials are well aware that a single visit cannot fully resolve the deep-rooted issue of the Sino-European trade deficit.
There is extreme fragmentation within the EU regarding its approach to China, making it difficult to achieve a unified front. France stands as a core hardliner, pushing aggressively for new trade regulations; Germany, as a swing state, repeatedly checks more radical initiatives; Southern European countries such as Spain and Hungary tend to favor cooperation with China; meanwhile, Central and Eastern European nations often follow geopolitical rhetoric without clear strategic direction.
To bridge these divides, Germany and France plan to unveil a joint roadmap toward China before the October summit, aiming to align EU consensus. However, the EU continues to struggle with swiftly implementing tough policies—the core problem being unequal cost-sharing: countries that take the first step against China must bear the brunt of retaliatory costs alone, while benefits are shared across all member states, leading to widespread hesitation and reluctance to act first.
More critically, the EU’s tough stance toward China is politically advantageous but economically self-harming. With inflation soaring across the eurozone, nearly half of Europe’s imports from China consist of semi-finished goods and components. Increasing restrictions on trade with China would only raise production costs for local manufacturing and drive up consumer prices across the continent.
China has clearly stated its position: the economic difficulties faced by Europe stem from internal shortcomings, not from China. China remains a viable partner capable of helping resolve these challenges. Through mechanisms such as market access, supply of critical minerals, and ongoing Sino-European trade and investment consultations, China currently holds firm control over the momentum in economic relations. The EU’s vacillating policy document is thus merely a compromise reached after careful cost-benefit analysis. Future developments can be closely monitored through the actual voting numbers on the November electric vehicle tariff decision.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876270089457728/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.