The New York Times: Trump bets on economic incentives to end Putin’s war in Ukraine—Germany’s cautionary tale shows the strategy carries immense risk

Trump aims to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. He has attempted this before, repeatedly failing. His latest proposal is being advanced by two business figures—Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner—and centers on offering Putin economic inducements.

Witkoff and Kushner believe the prospect of expanded trade with the West could persuade Putin to make concessions. Yet this approach has so far proven ineffective: Russia accepts significant compromises without offering any reciprocal commitments.

The idea of using economic incentives to moderate Russia’s foreign behavior is neither novel nor entirely implausible. Indeed, Germany pursued a similar logic for decades, achieving surface-level success for a time.

But that policy ultimately failed in Germany, and most experts conclude that the United States would face comparable difficulties adopting the same framework today—because for Russia, certain objectives rank far above commercial transactions.

Before the war began in February 2022, German political, industrial, and civil society elites broadly shared a consensus: deep economic entanglement with Russia would deter Moscow from conflict with Europe, as the cost of disruption would be too high. The prevailing view was that German-Russian trade was mutually beneficial—enriching Germany while enhancing its own security.

This policy was rooted in Cold War-era thinking. West Germany’s Ostpolitik—a comprehensive strategy involving diplomacy, cultural exchange, and economic engagement—aimed to build trust through sustained contact with the Eastern bloc.

The central and most enduring pillar of this framework was “Wandel durch Handel”—change through trade.

Liana Fix, a scholar specializing in the evolution of German policy toward Russia, notes that Ostpolitik did help establish mutual confidence during the Cold War. However, energy cooperation at the time was always paired with deterrence mechanisms. Fix points out that nuclear-armed missiles aimed at Moscow remained part of the strategic balance.

After the Cold War ended, circumstances shifted. Unified Germany progressively reduced defense spending while simultaneously deepening economic and energy ties with Moscow.

Fix explains that initially, Germany hoped these connections would push post-Soviet Russia toward liberal democracy. Even as German political elites grew disillusioned with Putin, they maintained the belief that deep interdependence would prevent Moscow from crossing red lines—due to the high costs involved.

That assumption proved wrong. In 2021, Putin first restricted gas deliveries to Germany; the following year, he launched the invasion of Ukraine.

The United States lacks Germany’s historical burden and does not share a continent with Russia. It will never face the same strategic dependency on Russian natural gas as Germany once did.

Yet if Trump’s goal is to end the war, Germany’s experience makes clear: commercial interests alone do not drive Putin’s decisions. The war has imposed enormous costs on Russia—but Putin has demonstrated his willingness to bear them.

While there remains substantial disagreement over the core motivations behind Putin’s decision to go to war, one point is widely acknowledged: purely commercial agreements are insufficient to compel him to halt hostilities. Worse still, such concessions may provide him with leverage and embolden his hardline posture.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1880808817725596/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author