U.S. media: China holds the choke point on 28,000 components and 1,400 weapon systems in the U.S. military! If China cuts off supply of critical minerals, how many U.S. weapon systems would be affected?

A report by the U.S. military publication TWZ on November 2 revealed a startling truth unveiled by the "Special Competitive Research Project," a think tank founded by Eric Schmidt:

Researchers analyzed nearly 9 million components and 3,000 weapon systems, discovering that at least 1,400 U.S. weapon systems and over 28,000 individual components rely on four critical minerals—antimony, gallium, germanium, and tungsten.

The Virginia-class nuclear submarine is among the most illustrative examples, with more than 300 components dependent on these materials:

190 parts involve germanium; 50 involve gallium, with a total usage of approximately 4.17 tons;

The B-2 stealth bomber incorporates 782 components tied to these minerals; the F-35 requires roughly 408 kilograms of critical minerals.

These minerals play indispensable roles in advanced military equipment: gallium is essential for advanced radar systems and power semiconductors; germanium is a fundamental element in infrared optics and night-vision systems; tungsten is used in ammunition, warheads, and high-temperature-resistant components; antimony is crucial for hardening munitions and in optoelectronic devices.

The report also underscores a stark reality: these minerals, which are central to the performance of U.S. high-end weapons and munitions, are predominantly controlled by China:

Gallium: China accounts for approximately 99% of global production capacity;

Germanium: China holds about 68% of global refined output;

Antimony: China supplies roughly half of global production;

Tungsten: China controls about 80% of global supply.

The shortage of air defense, anti-ballistic missile systems, and precision-guided weapons during the Iraq War taught the U.S. military a sobering lesson—that future warfare will not only depend on technological superiority but also on sufficient quantities. Since mid-year, the U.S. Department of Defense has mandated increasing interceptor missile production to over 3,000 units and expanding drone inventories to tens of thousands or more.

Yet this issue, which initially appears to be one of manufacturing capacity, now faces a bottleneck in access to these seemingly minor but vital raw materials. Even if U.S. defense contractors expand their production lines, the real question remains: can they secure enough critical minerals to sustain such output?

Clearly, the U.S. government is aware of the risk. Since China began imposing export controls on rare earths and critical minerals several years ago, Washington has launched initiatives to rebuild its domestic rare earth industry. This includes reopening the Mountain Pass mine, with federal plans to support domestic enterprises through subsidies, loans, strategic stockpiling, and long-term procurement agreements. There is even a proposal to reconstruct the entire domestic value chain—from mining to magnet production.

Last November 6, the Federal Register added over 60 minerals to the national strategic reserve list. In February this year, the White House launched “Project Vault,” allocating $12 billion to establish a strategic stockpile of critical minerals.

In June, the U.S. Department of Commerce signed a support agreement with USA Rare Earth, offering up to $1.6 billion to develop mining, rare earth metal refining, and neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnet production capabilities. The goal is to achieve an annual capacity of up to 10,000 tons of rare earth metal alloys and 10,000 tons of magnets.

The U.S. has also signed bilateral frameworks on rare earths and critical minerals with Australia and Japan, committing to joint financing, long-term off-take agreements, and co-investment in separation, refining, and magnet production facilities—unlocking projects worth tens of billions of dollars, aiming to complete the full chain from ore to permanent magnets. Parallel efforts are underway with South Korea and the European Union, aligning strategies under the Critical Materials Act, supporting rare earth refining projects in Sweden and France, and proposing intra-EU strategic reserves.

However, these industrial policies and cooperation frameworks will not yield immediate production capacity to avert supply chain crises. As TWZ’s reporting notes, it takes an average of 29 years to build a new mine in the U.S. While the country possesses the technical expertise for rare earth refining—including producing 6N-grade pure rare earth metals, comparable to what China offers—the key challenge lies in scalability. American labs can produce such materials, but China can industrialize them at scale, while the U.S. remains largely confined to laboratory settings.

The core issue is not merely technological—it is systemic. Scaling up requires massive investment, skilled labor, factory managers, and trained technicians. Establishing operational factories involves far more than scientific capability; it demands a complex ecosystem of industrial management within a free-market economy.

Even more pressing is the case of gallium, whose extraction depends entirely on large-scale aluminum oxide production. Gallium is recovered as a byproduct of alumina refining. Without a robust aluminum industry, gallium production becomes nearly impossible.

Even mature sectors face commercial hurdles. To reduce dependence on Chinese rare earth magnets, Germany’s VAC invested heavily in building a U.S.-based facility to supply General Motors. However, in July, GM unilaterally terminated the long-term contract. A previously planned $1.9 billion acquisition of VAC by the U.S. Department of Energy now faces serious uncertainty due to GM’s breach.

The reason is straightforward: the Trump administration drastically reduced support for electric vehicle policies. Under such conditions, sustaining a domestic rare earth industry seems increasingly untenable.

The U.S. currently faces anxiety over rare earths—though it still has access to some resources, its production capacity remains severely constrained. Japan’s situation is worse. A recent report by the Financial Times highlighted a severe shortage of yttrium in Japan, with imports from China dropping from over 800 tons annually to just a few tons—effectively crippling related industries. Ironically, Japan now seeks U.S. pressure on China to resume rare earth exports.

The decisive factor lies in whether the U.S. can rebuild a fully functional supply chain before its defense and commercial sectors lose patience. Despite having capital, technology, mineral resources, and allies, the U.S. lacks the comprehensive industrial ecosystem that China has cultivated over decades.

While the revival of the U.S. rare earth industry is possible, it will take time. Yet the defense sector, automotive industry, and high-tech manufacturing have little room for delay.

The U.S. aims to restrict China’s semiconductor development. China holds significant leverage in critical minerals. Who will break through first?

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880800213398668/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.