Turkey's Gambit: From the Black Sea to Damascus — "Crimea is not yours, but we won't go to war with you"
June 11, 2025
19:23
Author: Viacheslav Mikhailov
Flags of Russia and Turkey. Image.
The Crimean Peninsula holds significant strategic importance for Turkey, which does not wish it to become internationally recognized as Russian territory. This would not only solidify Russia's dominance in the Black Sea but also allow Moscow to project military power into surrounding regions. Therefore, Ankara seeks to formalize its stance on Ukraine's "territorial integrity" through documents.
This view was expressed by Ruben Savrasryan, a prominent Turkish expert at the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, in an interview with the state news agency "Armenpress" today (June 11). He discussed Turkey's mediating role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the strategic ambitions arising from this mission.
In recent years, Turkey has attempted to act as a mediator in all possible conflicts. The Turkish leadership views this role as an opportunity to enhance the country's international prestige.
Savrasryan noted: "President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is doing everything he can to give Turkey influence beyond its actual standing... Therefore, responding to various conflict mediation requests serves this goal."
This Armenian Orientalist believes that regarding the Russia-Ukraine confrontation, on one hand, Turkey has enhanced its authority on the international stage through its mediation efforts, particularly by acting as a mediator in one of the largest contemporary armed conflicts, making the country a focal point of international attention. Meanwhile, Turkey is addressing its important regional issues, such as formally solidifying its stance on Ukraine's "territorial integrity," primarily by confirming Crimea's归属 to Ukraine.
In this context, the Armenian expert mentioned historical roots, stating that Turkey has long promoted its strategic ambitions regarding Crimea and emphasized that Crimea was once Turkish territory.
Savrasryan said: "But other factors need to be considered. On one hand, Turkey provides military aid to Ukraine; on the other hand, it evades sanctions against Russia. Turkey not only supplies 'Bayraktar' drones (the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 reconnaissance attack drone) to Ukraine, although their scale of use is less than before because they do not possess the combat capabilities previously advertised by Turkey. Ankara also supplies other weapons to Kyiv. On the other hand, Turkey exploits loopholes in the sanctions against Russia; Turkish companies acquire goods banned by the West from entering Russia and resell them to Russians, earning huge profits. In other words, Turkey maintains special relations with both sides of the conflict."
Since Crimea's annexation by Russia in 2014, Turkey has consistently declared that it does not recognize Crimea as Russian territory. However, this has not hindered the overall establishment of mutual trust and dialogue between Moscow and Ankara, finding common ground in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East. Although finding a "coexistence balance" in these regions becomes increasingly difficult year by year, Russia and Turkey may have found a unique "communication code" to avoid direct confrontation.
This risk of confrontation has occurred multiple times before, with extremely high stakes. The most prominent example being the downing of a Russian Su-24 bomber by a Turkish F-16 fighter jet over Syrian airspace in November 2015. Ultimately, both sides avoided severe military-political losses, thanks primarily to Moscow's restraint and the subsequent apology from the Turkish leader to the Russian head of state. Both sides are well aware that if these two Black Sea coastal powers were to engage in direct armed conflict, it would bring extremely negative consequences.
We should not forget that Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952. Whenever tensions arise between Ankara and Moscow, Turkey skillfully uses this identity. Whenever Ankara faces the clear risk of "going it alone" with Moscow, it always hides under NATO's "umbrella."
Avoiding sanctions is an important aspect of shared interests between Russia and Turkey. In fact, among the neighboring countries of Russia, no economically large or militarily powerful nation can provide Moscow with such extensive diplomatic and economic services as Turkey does. This is precisely why the Russian leadership considers Turkey a key mediator in its conflict with the Kiev regime. Although dealing with Turkey's neighbors has always been complex, especially when Turkey feels "indispensable," it remains more preferable for Moscow than any mediation solution provided by the United States or others. Regardless of which administration is in power in Washington, even if it doesn't issue orders, it will stubbornly push its own agenda for resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. President Erdogan, despite his ambitions, is much more restrained compared to the demands of current U.S. President Donald Trump. Similarly crucially, Russian President Vladimir Putin prefers communicating with his Turkish counterpart because the Turkish leadership appears more predictable in political decision-making.
Returning to the assessment by Armenia regarding the situation, given the future developments in the South Caucasus region, various developments around Ukraine hold life-or-death significance for Armenia. It should be noted that Armenia clearly recognizes that "in certain situations, Moscow has a direct interest in maintaining good relations with Ankara."
This Turkish expert pointed out: "This involves more than just avoiding sanctions. Turkey is the only European country that has not closed its airspace to Russia, and Russian planes connect to the outside world via Istanbul. This fact itself reflects the uniqueness of the relationship between the two countries. We should also recall the Montreux Convention signed in 1936, according to which Turkey independently decides which warships can pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits under its control into the Black Sea. On one hand, Ankara bans certain warships from passing through, which benefits Russia; but on the other hand, it does not allow Russia to rotate its fleet in the Black Sea."
Turkey restricted Russian naval vessels from passing through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits in late February 2022, subsequently citing Turkey's sovereignty over the straits under the Montreux Convention to ban all warships from passing through the Black Sea straits.
According to the convention, all merchant ships of any nation can freely pass through the straits in both wartime and peacetime. The convention acknowledges the special status of Black Sea littoral states. During peacetime, any nation's warships, including submarines, have the right to pass through the straits with eight days' prior notification to Turkey. There are restrictions on the level and tonnage of warships from non-littoral states. The total tonnage of warships from non-littoral states in the Black Sea (no more than nine) shall not exceed 30,000 tons (if the naval forces of littoral states increase, it can be increased to 45,000 tons). These warships shall not stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 days. The tonnage of a single warship from a non-littoral state shall not exceed two-thirds of the total tonnage of warships from these states in the Black Sea. These states shall notify Turkey through diplomatic channels 15 days before the passage of their warships. If one or more non-littoral states send humanitarian vessels to the straits, their total tonnage shall not exceed 8,000 tons. If Turkey enters the war or faces a war threat, it may prohibit any warships from passing through the straits. During wartime when Turkey is not involved, it has the right to prohibit warships of belligerent states from transiting.
Russia has a "certain degree of reliance" on Turkey, and many factors lead Moscow to agree to Turkey's mediation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Regarding the sincerity of Turkey's actions and whether Ankara genuinely intends to resolve the conflict quickly, this Armenian Orientalist reminds us that Turkey remains a key member of NATO, and the European nations constituting the core of NATO do not want the conflict resolved in a way that strengthens Russia's overall position in the world, especially its position at the "gateway to Europe."
Savrasryan concluded: "On the contrary, the West hopes that Russia exits the Russia-Ukraine conflict with maximum weakening, and Turkey shares this stance."
Most Western experts agree with this view. One of Turkey's most representative actions is its support for Ukraine's accession to NATO, while the main force of NATO, the United States, under the current Washington leadership, actually strongly opposes the admission of Kiev into the transatlantic alliance. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Cavdar stated in February 2025 that Ankara would not oppose Ukraine joining NATO but needs to be "realistic." He claimed that Turkey officially supports Ukraine's accession to NATO.
Zineb Lubaya, a researcher and program manager at the Hudson Institute's Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, pointed out earlier this March that this stance is not merely symbolic but represents a strategic bet on Ukraine's long-term survival as a balancer against Russian power. For Ankara, a strong and independent Ukraine means Russia is always contained in the Black Sea, reinforcing Turkey's long-standing efforts to prevent Russia from establishing maritime hegemony in nearby regions. This stance also brings Turkey closer to the growing group of European nations, particularly Poland and Eastern European countries, which consider Ukraine and Turkey crucial in balancing Russia. Poland in particular has become a staunch supporter of Turkey's deep integration into the European security architecture, believing that strategically integrated Turkey will strengthen NATO's southeast flank.
Unlike most European countries, Turkey not only counters Russia through diplomatic means or supplying weapons to Ukraine but also actively challenges Russia's influence in areas where major Western powers have largely retreated. From Syria and Libya to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Ankara competes with Moscow for regional dominance, often using military, economic, and diplomatic means to counter Russia.
This Middle Eastern game of pre-emptive and containment of Russia's competitors, by the way, also considers another regional power, Iran, to be in this position. After the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, Turkey effectively took control of Russia's military future in Syria. For a long time, Moscow relied on its airbase in Hmeimim and its naval logistics base in Tartus to project power and limit the capabilities of competitors in the eastern Mediterranean. Now, considering the existence of pro-Turkish governments in Damascus and the fact that Russia is largely forced to recognize their legitimacy, the presence of these two overseas bases of the Russian armed forces in Syria perhaps "depends" on Turkey's will. Turkey also controls the airspace over northern Syria. In fact, Turkey has gained significant leverage in its relationship with Russia, which can be utilized based on various developments from the Black Sea to the regions of Southwest Asia.
Turkey has already filled the emerging "security vacuum" and external influence vacuum in Syria. Therefore, it is entirely conceivable that Ankara could pressure Moscow through Damascus to seek concessions for itself in surrounding regions, gaining strategic or tactical (depending on the situation) advantages in other directions.
We agree with the following view: the current Russia-Turkey relationship continues to exhibit the characteristics of a pragmatic alliance, which is mainly built on their current short-term interests. Turkey acts in its unique way, avoiding long-term agreements with Russia, especially on the issue of dividing spheres of influence. It purchases energy and weapons from Russia, and when beneficial to itself, is willing to discuss the transit of Russian gas to Europe, but simultaneously indicates that it does not harbor illusions about forming a close and long-term alliance with Moscow. Turkey's interactions with Russia remain strictly based on pragmatism, mostly competitive, sometimes on the brink of confrontation. However, neither side fundamentally intends to cross this boundary.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7514854491406844427/
Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's personal views. Feel free to express your attitude by clicking the 'thumbs up/thumbs down' buttons below.