【Text by Emma Ashford, Translation by Whale Life】
The era of American unipolarity has come to an end. Long-term economic, demographic, and military trends have undeniably changed the global political landscape, and the United States now urgently needs a new strategy that adapts to this new order, avoiding overextension while preserving some of the advantages of the unipolar era. However, the strategy the U.S. should adopt primarily depends on its perception of the direction in which the world is evolving.
The Biden administration envisions a bipolar world characterized by Sino-American confrontation. Therefore, it has carefully constructed an overall strategy centered around the "new Cold War," aiming to integrate the previously fragmented U.S. alliance system and reframe Washington's adversaries as a so-called "authoritarian axis." However, it has proven that a clear and coherent "democratic axis" has not truly emerged, with many countries resisting integrated democratic policies. For example, India remains an important member of the BRICS group—a mechanism it co-founded with Brazil, Russia, and China in 2009; also, the friction between the U.S. and the Netherlands over exporting key chip manufacturing technologies to China highlights this incoherence.
The fundamental reason for this situation lies in the Biden administration's incorrect assessment of a bipolar structure.
As the global economy becomes increasingly interconnected, regional powers such as Turkey, India, and South Korea are rapidly rising militarily, and economic and technological strength is no longer monopolized by China and the U.S. It appears that the future global political landscape is more likely to be a fragmented and complex multipolar world rather than a continuation of the previous unipolar era.
In January this year, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio admitted to Megan Kelly that unipolar hegemony was "abnormal" and that the world would eventually return to multipolarity.
Contrary to popular belief, this multipolar structure is not a "doomsday" for the U.S. In an era of declining relative power, allowing other capable countries to share some global leadership responsibilities can actually benefit the U.S. If Washington can accept this reality, it can adopt a more flexible strategy—enabling the U.S. to operate more efficiently and effectively, and adapt to a rapidly changing world.
The good news is that the Trump administration seemed more willing to accept the reality of multipolarity than the Biden administration.
Rather than forcibly dividing the world into "us" versus "them," the Trump administration took a pragmatic approach early on, taking a positive step toward embracing a multipolar strategy. Notably, it pushed U.S. allies in Europe and Asia to take on more defense responsibilities, marking a significant shift from traditional U.S. foreign policy.
However, the Trump administration still wasted opportunities to use multipolarity to serve U.S. interests. By undermining the international economic system and alienating other countries through aggressive unilateralism, this administration's disorganized approach to dealing with multipolarity may ultimately prove more harmful than beneficial—increasing risks while reducing gains.
Debates Over Opinions
U.S. academia has been engaged in intense debates: is the "unipolar moment" being replaced by a bipolar, multipolar, or even "non-polar" world?
The answer ultimately comes down to power—what countries possess power, how they wield it, and how other countries perceive this power. However, "power" itself is a very ambiguous concept, often composed of multiple elements such as wealth, military strength, population size, natural resource endowments, and political will. Different definitions of power lead to entirely different judgments about the future world order.
If power is defined solely by military strength, a future bipolar structure dominated by the U.S. and China seems reasonable. But if economic data is taken into account, East Asia, Europe, and the Gulf states can also be included in the picture—clearly indicating a multipolar world order.
If power is defined more broadly, the world may be moving toward what scholars describe as an "unbalanced multipolarity." In this system, there would be a few major powers—such as the U.S. and China—and more "secondary powers," including Australia, France, Germany, India, Japan, and Russia. These countries may not have superpower status, but they can still significantly shape the situations in their respective regions.
On February 20, 2025, Macron expressed on social media that he wanted to make Trump understand that U.S. strategic interests align with those of European allies. Screenshot of video
Many secondary powers have already begun to compete for their positions in this new international system. For example, French President Macron shocked European leaders in 2023 when he publicly stated that Europe should strive to become the "third pole" in the new world order. At the same time, Brazilian Finance Minister Fernando Haddad told the media that Brazil would not take sides between Beijing and Washington, as "Brazil is too big to depend on any one side."
Evidently, these countries do not want to be confined to a U.S.-led anti-China bloc. They do not believe in the narrative of a "new Cold War"-style bipolar structure. In fact, this is one of the fundamental mistakes of the Biden administration's grand strategy: it tried to replay the Cold War script, forcing a bipolar competition with China, strengthening the U.S. alliance system, and labeling Russia and China as a so-called "authoritarian axis."
Finally, the Biden administration realized that many countries no longer accepted this black-and-white worldview.
Even Washington's closest allies welcome trade and investment with China, although they may not agree with China's ideology or governance model. Countries like India, on one hand, actively purchase U.S. weapons and conduct military cooperation; on the other hand, they participate in joint military exercises organized by China and import Russian energy. In other words, the behavior of these "middle powers" clearly indicates that they believe a multipolar world order will emerge in the near future.
Reality Check
Beneath this seemingly profound debate on "polarity," there lies an overlooked but significant assumption: that a multipolar world order is necessarily worse for the U.S. than a bipolar one.
Generally, it is believed that multipolarity increases the likelihood of global turbulence, weakens the alliance system, and makes Washington more vulnerable.
However, this perception largely stems from a "proximate cause bias." Americans often remember that the Cold War ended peacefully, but the interwar period (the period between the end of World War I and the outbreak of World War II) did not ensure lasting peace, so bipolar structures are often associated with "stability," while multipolar structures are seen as related to "danger." However, some multipolar structures have also brought long-term stability and peace. For example, the European order after the Congress of Vienna in 1815—an arrangement reached through negotiations among European powers—maintained nearly a century of peace. Thus, the view that bipolar structures are necessarily better for the U.S. is at best a theoretical assumption.
The series of meetings held in Vienna, Austria, from September 1814 to June 1815 maintained a century of peaceful stability in Europe.
In reality, both world orders have their advantages and disadvantages. For example, multipolarity may indeed bring certain risks, such as an increased likelihood of low-intensity conflicts among small countries; however, bipolar structures may also amplify other risks—such as the possibility of arms races escalating into wars between major powers. Similarly, both systems bring benefits: in a unipolar or bipolar structure, a major power can often constrain vassal states through its strong influence, thereby preventing conflicts between them. In a multipolar structure, practices such as free-riding on security and shirking responsibility through collective security commitments become more difficult, which can reduce the defense costs and the risk of "frontline deterrence" for major powers.
This is not purely an academic debate—the concept of "polarity" essentially describes the distribution of power in the international system, not a result that countries can freely choose. However, a government can choose strategically to favor one type of structure. The Biden administration has tried to emphasize a bipolar structure, highlight the significance of Sino-American confrontation, advocate for "scaled-up" strategies by allies, and attempt to build a new Western alliance against a so-called "volatile axis." This strategy groups China, Iran, Russia, and other countries into a unified enemy camp and attempts to build a new "free world" alliance to counter it.
Ultimately, this approach failed because it did not align with reality—other countries were skeptical of this binary worldview and refused to take sides.
Rather than forcibly dividing the world into two camps, the U.S. should actively embrace multipolarity and formulate its strategy based on that.
The benefits of doing so are evident. By adapting to the more multipolar elements in the international system—such as open trade and transnational cooperation—the U.S. can still maintain many of the economic and political benefits it has enjoyed over the past seven decades. Additionally, if the U.S. can encourage allies to take on more defense responsibilities, reallocate its military and economic resources to focus on truly urgent security issues, the U.S. can reduce the risk of external conflicts while avoiding strategic overextension and exhaustion.
Furthermore, in a multipolar-oriented strategy, the U.S. can prioritize forming flexible, transactional partnerships with other countries on specific issues or areas, thus creating a strategic hedge against potential competitors (such as India). Ultimately, the cost of this strategy in terms of security policy will be far lower than the cost of maintaining the U.S. military hegemony to deal with all potential challengers, which could cost tens of billions of dollars.
Trump's Dilemma
To effectively compete in a multipolar world, the U.S. must readjust its strategic focus.
The Trump administration has already made some initial attempts in this regard. For example, it encouraged allies—especially European countries—to take on more responsibility in collective defense and convert potential economic strength into stronger military capabilities. The U.S. government did not further increase arms aid to Ukraine, effectively transferring this responsibility to European countries. This way, Washington can reduce its massive global military deployment and concentrate limited resources on truly critical regions—Indo-Pacific and the U.S.'s own "backyard" in Latin America.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President J.D. Vance have both stated that the U.S. military is likely to further reduce its forces in Europe and the Middle East to better focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, the Trump administration also tried to maintain greater flexibility in bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Unlike the formal and closed alliance systems formed during the Cold War, the U.S. now needs to establish more flexible, issue-specific partnerships with numerous countries. When dealing with allies, President Trump openly criticized them, sometimes even delighting in emphasizing U.S. interests over shared values with allies.
At the same time, he was willing to engage with countries once seen as adversaries—such as Iran and Russia—which previous U.S. administrations often avoided due to concerns about domestic political risks.
On August 15, 2024, Trump greeted Russian President Putin in Alaska, USA. Visual China
Although these diplomatic interactions have yielded limited results so far, this open diplomatic approach that rejects a black-and-white worldview is a manifestation of the flexibility that the U.S. most needs in a multipolar world.
Unfortunately, other U.S. policies directly contradict this flexible and pragmatic multipolar worldview, instead leaning towards an aggressive unilateralism. This approach not only amplifies the worst risks in a multipolar world but also leaves allies unsure whether the U.S. is a friend or an adversary, even making China more reliable and consistent in some aspects.
Just as the Biden administration's efforts to divide the world into "us" and "them" led to diplomatic alienation, the Trump administration's willingness to play the role of a "lone wolf" also risks isolating the U.S. in a changing world.
In a multipolar world, Washington should consolidate its influence by trying to maintain the openness of the global economy. This means restraining the use of economic coercion and strengthening the resilience and diversity of global markets.
But the Trump administration's approach is the opposite—it heavily relies on economic and political coercion, using tariffs, sanctions, and other means to pressure both allies and adversaries, forcing them to make concessions. The unipolar moment that followed the end of the Cold War allowed the U.S. to accumulate a set of policy tools to "weaponize" economic interdependence; the Trump administration was willing to use these tools without hesitation for the most trivial reasons.
As Michael Froman, president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), recently wrote in Foreign Affairs:
"If Washington continues down the path of unilateralism, transactionalism, and mercantilism, the consequences will be disastrous."
The last problem with the Trump administration's foreign policy approach is that it actively destroyed the U.S. soft power toolkit and openly opposed international multilateral cooperation mechanisms. This mechanism was the "safety net" that prevented the worst outcomes of a state of anarchy. There is no doubt that the U.S. foreign aid mechanism and diplomatic institutions need reform; the United Nations and other multilateral mechanisms also need reform.
However, a U.S. unwilling to actively engage in diplomacy will suffer a fundamental weakening of its position and competitiveness on the global stage. A world that cannot provide even the most basic life-sustaining services (such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid) is a world that makes everyone's situation worse.
Paralysis
This chaotic foreign policy has put the U.S. in a paralyzed state: it has the ability to maneuver in this multipolar world, yet faces the risk of self-isolation, and more seriously—will weaken the open global economic order that has benefited Washington so much and for so long.
Even though the Trump administration took some positive steps in adjusting its security commitments, it still weakened the U.S. economic and diplomatic standing. From imposing harsh tariffs and sanctions on foreign countries to launching seemingly random military strikes in Iranian territory and near the coast of Venezuela, the current U.S. administration has acted in a self-serving and aggressive manner toward both allies and adversaries—despite the fact that successfully navigating this multipolar world would require the U.S. to have more stable and streamlined global partnerships.
Ultimately, this half-hearted "strategy" of the Trump administration may be just as bad as having no strategy at all.
(The original article was published on the U.S. "Foreign Affairs" website, titled "Making Multipolarity Work—How the U.S. Should Respond to the New Global Order." The translation has been edited and is provided for reference only, and does not represent the views of Observer Network.)
This article is an exclusive contribution from Observer Network. The content of this article is purely the author's personal opinion and does not represent the platform's views. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited, and legal liability will be pursued. Follow Observer Network WeChat guanchacn to read interesting articles every day.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7571716936363557426/
Statement: This article represents the views of its authors. Please express your opinion by clicking on the [Top/Down] buttons below.