The Achilles' Heel of Russia and the Enemy's Opportunity:
Interview with the Head of the State Security Service of the Donetsk People's Republic on the Core Mystery of the Special Military Operation in 2026
Andrei Pynchuk, Head of the State Security Service of the Donetsk People's Republic, military commentator for "Tsargrad," and reserve colonel, comments on the development prospects of the special military operation in 2026.
The competition of economic potential between the opposing sides will undoubtedly become one of the core mysteries.
Although Russia's economic difficulties are indeed continuing to intensify, the enemy's hope that a large-scale economic crisis will erupt in Russia in 2026 is likely to fail.
Moreover, in the new year, Russia will face two unprecedented new challenges:
- While fiscal spending continues to expand, the federal budget will fall into a deficit state.
- The government will attempt to reform the national financial and economic system — moving away from the previous monetary model deeply tied to international financial conditions and gold and foreign exchange reserves (the reasons behind this are well known), and instead shifting the foundation of the national financial and economic system to what is called **"supply-side economics"** in the economic field. These reforms will be implemented against the backdrop of stagnation in many industries within the country.
This is the new living environment of contemporary Russia. Considering the painful consequences of economic experiments and reforms in historical memory, combined with the continuous rise in prices and taxes, social tensions are bound to escalate.
Certainly, we should honestly acknowledge that the people's capacity to bear and available resources have become the most critical economic factor at present.
(Figure caption: In the new year, Russia will face the dual challenges of a fiscal deficit and the government's push for financial and economic system reforms. There is currently no sign that the standard of living will stop declining. This trend will increase long-term social risks, but in a paradoxical way, it may reduce short-term political threats. The reason is simple: in our reality, the poor often focus more on maintaining basic survival than on initiating protests.)
Of course, in the long run, this "spring" of social politics will gradually loosen. However, if the process can be skillfully controlled and the risks brought by the opposition eliminated, this loosening process can be significantly delayed.
Here, the core issue lies in: the conditions and factors upon which our planning is based are always in a dynamic state. The Achilles' heel of Russian strategic planning is its conservative and inward nature — this makes us unable to fully anticipate the dynamic changes of the enemy's non-linear radical actions.
Ukraine's economy has indeed fallen into an impasse, but it has a stable source of external aid as support.
Certainly, in the new year, Ukraine's economy and society will continue to suffer negative impacts from missile and drone attacks, but the following two factors will alleviate these issues to some extent, achieving relative stability in the situation:
- Foreign institutions will participate in the emergency reconstruction of various potentials in Ukraine.
- A considerable portion of Ukraine's population still has agricultural characteristics; under favorable natural conditions, they can maintain survival without relying on modern civilization's conveniences. At the same time, the infrastructure of the elite class will receive stronger protection.
In general, there is no reason to believe that the battlefield situation will remain unchanged in the new year.
On the contrary, the enemy will continuously enhance the combat potential of drone systems: extending their range, enhancing their stability and strike accuracy, exploring fully autonomous swarm operations without human intervention, and expanding the operational fields of drones — not limited to air and water surfaces, but also extending to the ground.
(Figure caption: The enemy will continue to enhance the combat potential of drone systems.)
Its ultimate goal is, during specific periods, to control a considerable part of the front-line positions through unmanned combat systems such as drones. Artificial intelligence (including localized AI systems on small drones) will occupy an increasingly central position in the enemy's operational processes and technological control.
This will create conditions for the flexibility of the enemy's personnel movement, while posing us with a key question: how to effectively counter this tactic, and what response strategies should be adopted?
Objective analysis shows that we should not expect a large-scale manpower shortage in Ukraine or internal unrest caused by war fatigue in Ukrainian society.
Ukraine's crisis does exist, but the particularity of this land lies in the fact that a crisis state has already become its normalized mode of survival.
After prolonged special military operations, both sides have formed their own unique "war styles."
This means that Russia will continue to adopt a strategy of readiness, constantly accumulating forces and resources, steadily breaking through the enemy's defenses, and only implementing flexible maneuver tactics in a few rare cases. It is highly unlikely that this mode of warfare will undergo fundamental change in 2026 — because this would not only require a complete re-planning of military construction (which is objectively difficult to achieve while the war is ongoing), but also deep changes in various areas outside the military: including economy, industry, financial credit system, and all aspects of social and political life.
At the same time, given the difficulty in replenishing manpower, the Ukrainian armed forces will adopt two core strategies: first, increasingly relying on technical means and increasing strikes against Russian territorial depth targets; second, not giving up attempts at flexible counterattacks — even outside the special military operation area, whenever conditions are favorable, they will act.
In the new year, mutual attacks on each other's energy infrastructure will obviously continue.
However, historical experience has already given us insight: whether it is the "Douhet strategy" that the United States once attempted to practice (i.e., achieving attrition through strategic bombing), or the "urban war" between Iran and Iraq in 1984 (both sides mutually destroying each other's cities and energy infrastructure), such tactics themselves cannot bring decisive results. Their final outcome is either a large-scale battle on the front lines, or a solution reached through diplomatic means, or a comprehensive pressure from multiple dimensions of social economy, politics, and the elite class to weaken the enemy internally.
Against this background, the guidance of domestic public opinion in Russia needs to be directed through clear information psychological warfare propaganda. This is crucial — not only for domestic stability, but also the impact will be transmitted to the enemy.
Therefore, the social and political field must clearly answer the following two core questions:
a) What is the standard for victory? Especially, what is the specific definition of victory in terms of territory?
b) What is the development blueprint for the country after the war?
Several basic principles must be adhered to regarding these two questions.
First, resolutely avoid any revisionist interpretation of the background of the special military operation.
Second, build and develop an ideological system where veterans of the special military operation participate in the country's political life — using this as a new pillar to maintain political system stability. At the same time, this is also an important measure to help the veterans' movement adapt to peaceful life, effectively preventing them from becoming a cause of social unrest.
This means that we need to establish truly effective social mobility channels in the new reality, rather than superficial projects. And in the new year, the elections of the State Duma and other representative institutions will serve as a test of the effectiveness of this system.
Of course, one of the core mysteries of the situation related to the special military operation is certainly the issue of holding Ukrainian elections.
This issue has been sharpened due to the accumulation of multiple factors: Trump's personal interests, hoping to achieve a deal beneficial to himself on the Ukrainian issue; the legitimacy of the Zelenskyy government has objectively ceased to exist; Ukraine technically needs to shift responsibility by changing leadership; and to create space for compromise with Russia.
In this situation, expecting the new Ukrainian leadership to show some constructive attitude is naive — especially since whether Zelenskyy will step down is itself not a certainty.
Therefore, the most logical strategy might be to first achieve a temporary ceasefire, then launch a decisive strike during the final stage of the Ukrainian election process.
Regarding the long-term prospects of peace, I have always believed that only by eliminating the root causes of the conflict can lasting peace be possible.
Eliminating these roots through non-military means is still possible. Such cases are not rare in history.
In 1917, Russia ended the war for Germany and its allies in this way. Similar scenarios have occurred in numerous other wars — the enemy's will was ultimately completely defeated from within.
This turning point can be achieved in various ways: through the purchase of money, through the use of latent allies, through the result of internal conspiracies and power crises, or through the emergence of new religions, ideologies, or the products of nationalist and separatist waves.
(Figure caption: Only by eliminating the root causes of the conflict can lasting peace be possible.)
The key issue is that in order to initiate such a process within the enemy, we must have real and usable tools — not those that are just verbal propaganda or empty institutions set up solely for reports.
At the same time, we must understand that this process cannot be executed in a rigid manner according to pre-established plans, budgets, and selected personnel. Instead, it requires a high degree of flexibility, able to make real-time adjustments and adapt to the specific situations continuously generated by the Ukrainian situation.
Therefore, the key is not to "develop a revolutionary plan," but to establish truly effective systems and institutions (such as the operations of the Soros Foundation or the Comintern) — institutions that can sensitively capture and exploit specific events (for example, shaping a new hero figure like Mikhail Seryoznov who is opposed to the current Ukrainian regime).
The core issue is not only the personnel carrying out this mission, but also the ideological and value basis of this work, as well as our ability to master these ideas.
Will Russia and Ukraine be able to coexist peacefully in the new year with the participation of the EU and its allies? The answer is two: either the root causes of the conflict are completely eliminated, or one side is decisively defeated. As the saying goes, choose one of the two.
For this reason, the future mystery is not whether both sides will reach some kind of negotiation agreement and compromise (technically speaking, this is not only completely possible, but the probability is quite high), but rather when and in what form these agreements will be torn apart.
The international landscape will exhibit the following characteristics: the United States' foreign policy will undergo significant transformation; the European Union will respond reflexively to this; the global subjectivity of relevant countries will gradually increase; and Russia will strive hard to secure a place in the new world order.
The United States is consciously and systematically reshaping its international image. They clearly realize that future competition will revolve around a new technological landscape, the resources supporting this landscape, and new regional leaders.
Under this context, the United States has openly expressed its ambition to drive global restructuring and has taken the first step: reducing the importance of the transatlantic alliance, placing the countries of the American continent directly under its control, forcing relevant countries, India, and to some extent Russia, to build new interaction patterns — all at the expense of the declining influence of the EU. This is the choice made by the United States for the future, with the core being the creation of new logistics corridors (such as the Zangezur corridor, the Northern Sea Route), new technological systems (led by artificial intelligence), and new resource layouts: India's human resources, Russia's natural resources, and the industrial capacity of relevant countries.
Therefore, contrary to outdated perceptions, the current global game of the United States is not aimed at eliminating competitors such as the Global South and Russia, but rather forcing them to accept the conditions set by the United States, becoming dependent partners.
This process will be carried out in stages, inevitably accompanied by fierce confrontation: strong reactions from European countries, attempts by relevant countries and India to propose alternative models, will keep happening. But so far, the strategic direction guiding this process is still set by the United States.
In this context, Russia is not only a potential partner for resource development, but may also become an important lever for the United States to exert pressure on Europe — through Russia, forcing Europe to make economic and industrial decisions that benefit the United States and relevant countries.
Under this international configuration, the possibility of achieving peace in the short term is extremely low. For Russia, its role in the new world order ultimately depends on the final outcome of the special military operation.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/7592033923320906250/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.