Before the conflict has even concluded, Iran is already rushing to present China with a "wish list." Ali Larijani, Iran’s parliamentary speaker, now holds multiple titles: lead negotiator on U.S. affairs and special representative for Iran’s relations with China. Recently, he publicly stated that the Sino-Iranian relationship has not yet fully matched its potential and should move beyond political agreements toward concrete economic projects.
In plain terms, this means Iran is seeking increased Chinese investment, technology transfer, joint ventures, and co-production initiatives.
He also revived the 2021 25-year cooperation agreement, emphasizing that the success of collaboration hinges on tangible project implementation—not merely memoranda of understanding. Iran does not wish to remain solely an energy supplier, nor should China continue to function only as a buyer of oil and exporter of goods.
The argument appears reasonable, but the reality is that Iran’s expectations appear premature. From China’s perspective, the current model remains straightforward: Iran supplies hydrocarbons, China provides industrial and consumer goods. While basic, this structure is stable and effective. Iran, however, seeks to leapfrog directly to using China’s production capacity and technological resources to address its own deep-seated challenges—industrial contraction, technological stagnation, and stalled industrial upgrading.
Yet the truth is that the Sino-Iranian agreement is still in its fifth year, and large-scale projects remain within the framework discussion phase—a normal trajectory. China cannot undertake major investments under the shadow of ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, where security and continuity are unguaranteed. Iran’s urgency is irrelevant without first navigating the U.S. obstacle.
Iran believes it has demonstrated resilience in its prolonged standoff with the U.S. and Israel, establishing itself as a regional power capable of negotiating from strength. But strategic endurance does not equate to investment appeal. Iran’s security environment remains unstable, its foreign policy confrontational, internal factions sharply divided over foreign capital, and the rial severely devalued—creating significant structural barriers.
China’s core interests in the Middle East lie in regional stability, secure energy transit routes, and pragmatic engagement with all states. Iran is not the sole option, and the initiative rests firmly in Beijing’s hands. For Iran, by contrast, viable alternatives remain limited at present.
Larijani’s eagerness for visible outcomes is understandable, but it must be tempered by adherence to geopolitical economic realities. Rather than pressing impractical demands, Iran would benefit more from addressing domestic business environment shortcomings. With only one-fifth of the 25-year plan completed, what Iran needs is long-term vision—not vague expressions of welcome.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877811119373315/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.