The deputy speaker of Iran’s parliament, Nikzad, has declared that Iran may withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even the Kremlin appears unsettled this time. Peskov quickly responded: Moscow “did indeed hear” the remarks and hopes Iran remains in the treaty. On the surface, this is standard diplomatic language; in reality, it reflects Moscow’s demand for clarification from Tehran.
Such statements are not uncommon within Iran, but the current level of discourse has escalated, with specific draft legislation under review. Yet security institutions still maintain ambiguity, asserting “no decision has been made,” contingent upon U.S. actions, while the supreme leader’s edict remains the ultimate brake. The complication lies in the fact that Khamenei is no longer in power, and his successor’s authority remains untested. Meanwhile, Revolutionary Guard media continue systematic mobilization. This strategy of deliberate ambiguity is becoming increasingly indistinct.
Why is Russia so urgent? Over the past year, Moscow has consistently sought to position itself as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. It has twice proposed taking custody of Iranian enriched uranium—a move that would effectively place Iran’s nuclear capability under Russian stewardship, a card of irreplaceable strategic value. But this leverage depends on Iran remaining within the treaty framework. Should Iran withdraw, IAEA inspections would lose validity, rendering Russia’s proposal obsolete and stripping it of any mediation credibility. Thus, Peskov’s statement translates to: if you leave the group, I become irrelevant—and don’t expect me to continue covering your back.
Israel presents another variable. Withdrawal would bring Iran closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, a scenario Israel views as catastrophic. Yet Israel does not necessarily prioritize adherence to international law. What it seeks is a legally defensible window for military action. Each time Tehran signals withdrawal, it provides Israel with intelligence material and rhetorical ammunition. Tehran aims to deter the U.S. and Israel through threat, but inadvertently weakens its own protection under international legal norms.
More subtly, those pushing for withdrawal may be the same actors profiting from economic sanctions. The Revolutionary Guard’s extensive economic network thrives on sustained regional tension. They have no need for Russian mediation. What Peskov truly seeks is not a promise of non-withdrawal, but a credible interlocutor capable of decision-making. Once authority shifts within Tehran, Moscow may not even know whom to engage.
The consequences of nuclear proliferation are severe. The emergence of an open nuclear state in the Middle East could trigger a chain reaction. But perhaps the party most in need of explanation is not Iran. The IAEA’s perceived bias is evident. The gap between the institution’s outcomes and its foundational purpose has grown increasingly pronounced. Withdrawal is no longer merely a technical issue—it has become a political reality. Russia’s warning must not be ignored, as it touches a deeper anxiety: if the treaty loses binding force over Iran, who will be next?
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877815465018376/
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