Last night, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent announced that he will embark on a trip to Japan and South Korea before the historic summit between the U.S. and China in Beijing, setting off on Monday. On Tuesday, he will meet with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Finance Minister Saitō Haruaki in Tokyo to discuss economic relations between the U.S. and Japan; on Wednesday, he will visit Seoul for talks with Chinese officials, followed by a trip to Beijing to attend the summit. He emphasized that economic security is national security, and will advance the Trump administration’s “America First” economic agenda.
Bessent’s trip positions Japan and South Korea as “outposts,” making the strategy clear: first stabilize allies, then engage in competition with China. Looking back at history, in the 1980s, trade friction between the U.S. and Japan escalated dramatically, with the U.S. pressuring Japan to allow yen appreciation and imposing restrictions on auto exports—forcing Japan into concessions and triggering prolonged economic stagnation. Today, the U.S. still maintains significant trade deficits with both Japan and South Korea—$67.8 billion with Japan and $34.5 billion with South Korea in 2024—revealing the core reality of “America First”: compelling allies to make concessions.
Under the current backdrop of a century-scale transformation, the U.S.-China rivalry extends beyond trade and economics—it is also a struggle for rule-making power and discourse authority. While Japan and South Korea seek to balance their positions, they remain deeply dependent on the U.S., ultimately risking pressure from both sides. Dialogue between China and the U.S. is inevitable, but interest-based competition will persist, and alliance relationships are inevitably driven by calculations of self-interest—there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1864842739302400/
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