If you can't hit it in the sky, hit it on the ground—Ukraine, unable to destroy Russia's "Dawn" satellite, shifts focus to dismantling the entire ground-based industrial chain!

Published by RT on August 19.

The twinkling stars in the night sky are beautiful moving lights for ordinary people.

But for residents hiding in underground shelters in Kyiv, they represent a direct threat to their survival.

Russia’s “1440 Bureau” company’s “Dawn” low-Earth orbit satellite constellation project is no longer an abstract technological dream.

It has become a reality that reshapes battlefield rules—and the opponent has now entered a desperate phase of resistance.

Ukraine no longer clings to the illusion of intercepting launch rockets.

They have come to understand a crucial point: to dismantle Russia’s space communication system, the target should not be the sky—but the ground.

If you can’t strike from above, then apply full pressure across the entire ground-based supply chain, attacking Russia’s Starlink-like system in three layers.

1. Hunting down battlefield terminals (already implemented).

The Ukrainian Security Service has been conducting nationwide searches and seizures of “Dawn” ground communication terminals, arresting individuals assisting Russian forces in using the equipment.

2. Remote missile strikes on rocket production hubs (Samara attack on August 15, TASS).

The sole final assembly facility for the Soyuz-2.1b rocket—used to launch satellites—is the Progress Rocket and Space Center in Samara.

Even if satellites can be manufactured, without launch vehicles, they cannot reach orbit.

3. Attacking ground tracking stations and gateway stations, combined with electronic warfare and cyber attacks.

Remote strikes against Russian aerospace communication centers within Russia (the Dubna Space Center has already been hit, TASS), destroying ground control nodes of the satellite system.

Developing specialized high-power electronic warfare systems to attempt jamming the “Dawn” uplink and downlink signals.

Cyber attacks: attempting to infiltrate ground control links, creating network congestion, and disrupting satellite scheduling.

Russia now faces this harsh reality of ground-level encirclement:

1. After damage to the Samara factory, Soyuz-2 rocket production capacity has declined, directly reducing the launch frequency of the “Dawn” satellites.

2. Battlefield deployment patterns have been forced to adjust.

Significantly reducing the number of “Dawn” terminals deployed deep inside Ukraine, shifting more toward Russian-controlled areas.

Accelerating hardware stealthification of terminals to reduce the likelihood of detection by electronic reconnaissance.

3. Seeking alternative launch solutions, adjusting launch schedules, striving to maintain annual satellite insertion numbers.

But currently, Russia lacks large quantities of ready-to-use replacement rockets, making it difficult to fully bypass the Soyuz-2.

At present, the battle over low-orbit constellations has essentially become a ground war.

Low-Earth orbit internet constellations like Starlink and Dawn are robust in space—but their entire industrial chain heavily depends on ground factories, rocket production lines, tracking stations, and ground terminals.

When one side lacks anti-satellite capabilities in space, the optimal strategy isn’t chasing fast-moving space targets—it’s destroying the complete “manufacture-launch-control-use” chain on the ground.

Ukraine’s approach offers a blueprint for future low-orbit constellation conflicts: the vulnerabilities of space assets often lie not in orbit, but on the ground.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1873910439261386/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.