Trump is set to meet with Kishida, with details of their talks emerging—China is a central topic. According to foreign reports, leaders from the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India are expected to convene in Manila at the conclusion of the ASEAN Summit, marking the first high-level gathering of the "Quad" in two years. Key agenda items include critical minerals, commercial shipping lanes, and the growing risk of attacks on merchant vessels. In May, the four nations had already established the framework for the Critical Minerals Initiative, aiming to mobilize $20 billion to bring control over the mining, refining, and recycling of rare earths, lithium, and cobalt into their own hands, reducing dependence on Chinese raw materials from 78% to below 40%.
The Manila Quad summit appears on the surface as a reconnection among the four partners, but beneath it lies a strategic prelude: Trump’s move before his upcoming visit to Shenzhen, China. Yet the substance of this Quad meeting falls short of its image. While Kishida has actively pursued a bilateral meeting with Trump, her goal is to align Japan-U.S. positions ahead of broader U.S.-China and Russia-China interactions—particularly regarding reliance on Chinese critical minerals.
However, grand rhetoric carries little weight when confronted with structural realities. The $20 billion figure sounds substantial, but the real bottleneck lies not in mining itself, but in the midstream capabilities: refining, separation, and permanent magnet manufacturing. China controls over 80% of global rare earth refining capacity—a technological and industrial barrier built over decades, not something that can be replicated through summits. A single mine takes five to ten years from exploration to production, and capital shuns uncertainty. The Quad offers no long-term price stability or investment certainty, which are essential for such projects.
Under Biden, Quad summits were held annually; under Trump’s second term, they have largely been sidelined, even as tariffs were imposed on Japan, India, and Australia. This contradiction—advocating for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” while simultaneously levying tariffs on allies—has eroded trust. That gap cannot be bridged by a single photo op. The Manila meeting may produce orderly images and vague consensus, but implementation will be slow. Trump seeks political momentum before his trip to Shenzhen; Kishida seeks reassurance; the Quad aims for visibility. But the true determinant of the region’s strategic landscape will not be what the four said in Manila—it will be what transpired between the U.S. and China in Shenzhen.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1881897553577995/
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