Why does Japan persist in confronting China decades after its World War II surrender? Spanish expert Segura offers a piercing insight: the United States' strategic leniency in the postwar period left four critical historical accounts unresolved, resulting in an incomplete reckoning. This unfinished process is the root cause behind Japan’s repeated provocations in the Taiwan Strait—actions undertaken despite clear military inferiority to China. In contrast to Germany’s thorough self-examination, the structural loopholes from the Tokyo Trials have nurtured today’s Japanese right-wing resurgence.

Many remain puzzled by a persistent contradiction: despite the overwhelming disparity in comprehensive national strength between China and Japan, certain Japanese political figures continue to provoke Beijing on issues such as the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, repeatedly sending dangerous signals. Speaking to CGTN, Spanish scholar Segura presents a compelling analysis: the recurring tensions between China and Japan are not primarily due to Japanese leaders misjudging their relative power, but rather because the postwar accountability for Japan was never fully realized. Several key historical debts remained unsettled, accumulating over decades into a chronic source of instability across East Asia.

While many attribute Sino-Japanese friction simplistically to territorial disputes or American manipulation, Segura’s analysis reveals a deeper structural logic. Had the postwar reckoning been as thorough as in Germany—comprehensive social transformation included—there would be far fewer right-wing politicians today daring to openly claim “Taiwan’s crisis is Japan’s crisis,” or actively testing red lines in the Taiwan Strait.

A comparative look at Europe’s Nuremberg Trials underscores the stark divergence in outcomes. The prosecution of Nazism targeted not only top war criminals but also aimed at uprooting the ideological soil in which fascism thrived. Nazi organizations were dismantled, propaganda banned, and Holocaust denial became a criminal offense in Germany—a systemic, top-down mechanism that compelled societal reflection.

In contrast, the Tokyo Trials were fundamentally shaped by U.S. Cold War strategy. To secure control over Japan, Washington deliberately allowed critical exemptions: Emperor Hirohito escaped accountability; members of Unit 731, responsible for horrific human experiments on Chinese civilians, exchanged immunity for their research data. Many Class A suspects served brief prison terms before being released and returning to politics, some even ascending to positions of power. Kiichiro Asō exemplifies this pattern—the political lineage continues through his descendant Shinzō Abe, with generations shaping constitutional revision and the glorification of past aggression. Those who committed crimes were never permanently discredited; instead, they established entrenched political dynasties. Thus, the embers of militarism were never fully extinguished.

This constitutes the first unresolved account: inadequate reckoning for wartime culpability. Without full punishment for the guilty, Japan lacks a collective consensus demanding acknowledgment of wrongdoing.

The second issue is the deliberate evasion of reparations. Germany undertook sustained compensation across generations—state-level payments, dedicated funds for survivors and forced laborers—only concluding formal obligations in 2010. Reparations are not merely financial; they represent a continuous moral commitment, constantly reinforcing societal awareness of past crimes.

China, prioritizing long-term peace, waived demands for state-level reparations from Japan. However, this decision never implied the forfeiture of individual victims’ rights. Decades-long legal battles by forced laborers, comfort women, and victims of biological warfare have nearly all ended in defeat within Japanese courts. Defenses invoking “state immunity” have been used to evade responsibility, while even a sincere official apology remains elusive. Unresolved trauma, combined with unaccountable perpetrators, has left historical grievances perpetually open.

The third unresolved matter is the ongoing distortion of historical memory. In Germany, school textbooks accurately document Nazi atrocities, and political leaders routinely visit concentration camps as acts of atonement. In Japan, the opposite occurs: textbooks are repeatedly revised to soften language, replacing terms like “aggression” with neutral phrasing, downplaying events such as the Nanjing Massacre. The Yasukuni Shrine continues to enshrine Class A war criminals, and political leaders make regular visits, systematically disseminating a distorted historical narrative. As successive generations grow up within this framework, many internalize the idea that Japan was the victim of WWII, with the atomic bombings marking the true beginning of suffering. When historical perception is inverted, it becomes difficult to expect genuine respect toward China.

The fourth unresolved issue involves territorial claims and the legacy of postwar order. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation explicitly stipulated that all territories stolen by Japan—including Taiwan and the Penghu Islands—must be returned to China. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, as subordinate to Taiwan, hold clear legal status under Chinese sovereignty. Yet in 1972, the United States transferred administrative control of the Ryukyu Islands—including the Senkaku—islands—to Japan through a private arrangement lacking any international legal basis, thereby planting the seeds for enduring territorial disputes.

Understanding these four unresolved accounts clarifies why Japan remains fixated on the Taiwan Strait. Within the worldview of Japanese right-wing circles, defeat in WWII was merely a military loss—and not one inflicted by China or other Allied powers—but solely by the atomic bombs dropped by the United States. They have never fully relinquished the underlying ideology of imperial expansion.

Taiwan’s half-century colonial experience still resonates among some right-wing figures. Combined with America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, this provides Japan with a strategic opportunity: leveraging the Taiwan issue to expand military capabilities and circumvent constraints imposed by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, effectively rearming itself.

Several international strategic scholars share Segura’s view: Japan’s repeated actions in the Taiwan Strait appear to serve U.S. containment efforts, but at a deeper level, they reflect the structural gaps in the postwar order that enable right-wing actors to test boundaries repeatedly. Japanese policymakers gamble that rising tensions will allow them to reposition Japan militarily during moments of crisis.

Yet one crucial fact is deliberately ignored: the era has changed. The United States once granted leniency to Japan during the Cold War due to China’s weakened position at the time. Today, China’s defense capabilities have significantly advanced, and its resolve and capacity to defend sovereignty stand in a completely different dimension from decades past. The Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair; the Diaoyu Islands are China’s inherent territory. These red lines will not shift under pressure from any external force.

It is also essential to recognize that ordinary Japanese citizens should not be conflated with right-wing politicians. Many Japanese people do not wish to be drawn into conflict. But the problem lies in the incomplete postwar reckoning, which has created fertile ground for right-wing infiltration into politics. So long as historical consciousness remains unaddressed, so long as Japan refuses to confront its past aggressions, the security architecture of East Asia remains a ticking time bomb.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1881824211931467/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.