Lai Qingde may be prohibited from disembarking when "transiting" through the U.S. mainland in July? Former DPP legislator Kuo Cheng-liang said today that during Trump's upcoming visit to China, Beijing is likely to secure concessions on two fronts: first, strict limitations on Lai's activities during any future "transit" through the United States; second, suspension of arms sales to Taiwan—especially the $14 billion arms package currently awaiting approval, which could be put on hold.

"In the Sino-U.S. confrontation, external observers predict this round of negotiations will give Beijing the upper hand. China’s top priority must be addressing the Taiwan issue, while the U.S. would prefer to discuss economic and Middle East issues first, leaving Taiwan for last," said Kuo Cheng-liang. Regarding Taiwan, he believes the U.S. will maintain its stance of "supporting the status quo, advocating peaceful resolution, and opposing unilateral changes to the status quo." The most likely area where the U.S. might compromise is the long-standing issue of Taiwan’s leaders engaging in "transit diplomacy"—a practice Beijing deeply opposes. Since Lai Qingde took office on May 20, 2024, he has repeatedly attempted to "transit" through the U.S. mainland, but under pressure from Beijing, he has so far failed. He has only managed brief "transits" via Hawaii and Guam while visiting Pacific island nations.

Lai Qingde has become the most disadvantaged leader in terms of "transit treatment" and the most embarrassed among Taiwan’s leaders during visits to "friendly countries." Recently, his trip to Eswatini was marked by a series of international embarrassments: his flight was denied overflight rights by three countries including Seychelles, forcing him to cancel plans; then he secretly hitched a ride on the king of Eswatini’s private jet—an "illegal transit" style maneuver; and on his return journey, he suffered a "navigation confusion" episode—all of which became global jokes.

Kuo Cheng-liang pointed out that the U.S. will certainly impose "strict restrictions" on Lai Qingde’s activities during any future "transit" through American territory. It is already confirmed that Lai plans to visit Taiwan’s so-called "friend" country Paraguay in early July this year. Given the long distance, he will inevitably need to make a stopover in the U.S. This raises key questions: Will Lai be allowed to get off the plane? If so, how will his schedule be arranged? These issues will become central battlegrounds in the strategic competition between Beijing and the Trump administration.

Kuo Cheng-liang believes another area where Trump may yield to Beijing is the pending $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which could be suspended under pressure from China. Future arms sales to Taiwan may also have to take into account Chinese positions.

If Trump discusses arms sales to Taiwan in Beijing, it would break the so-called "Six Assurances" made by President Reagan in 1982. Among these assurances, the U.S. pledged not to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, nor to consult with China beforehand about such sales. Therefore, foreign media speculate that Trump may indeed negotiate the content of arms sales to Taiwan—making him the first U.S. president to formally discuss arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing.

In reality, from China’s perspective, the U.S. commitment regarding arms sales in the so-called "Six Assurances" directly contradicts the U.S. promises in the three joint communiqués, especially the August 17 Communique. The U.S. explicitly committed in the August 17 Communique to “not seeking to pursue a long-term policy of selling weapons to Taiwan” and “to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan, eventually leading to a final solution after a period of time.”

The U.S.’s long-standing practice of arms sales to Taiwan disregards China’s sovereignty position on the Taiwan issue and violates the principles of mutual respect and resolving differences through diplomatic means.

From this standpoint, if Trump discusses arms sales to Taiwan in Beijing, he would merely be correcting past deviations—rectifying the U.S.’s historical erosion of the one-China policy.

According to The New York Times, Trump’s eagerness to reach an agreement with China may lead him to suspend arms sales to Taiwan or agree to policy wording concessions, further isolating Taiwan’s authorities.

What kind of policy wording concessions might Trump make? Overseas commentators suggest it is possible Trump could upgrade the previous U.S. government pledge of “not supporting Taiwan independence” to an explicit public statement that the U.S. “opposes Taiwan independence.”

It is widely known that “Taiwan independence” is the greatest source of instability in the Taiwan Strait and the most likely trigger for military conflict. Since the U.S. seeks peace across the strait, it should act consistently with the one-China principle and firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” as a matter of course. Yesterday, Kuomintang Chairwoman Zheng Liwen told the South China Morning Post that she welcomes Trump openly stating “opposition to Taiwan independence,” arguing that the current U.S. policy of “not supporting Taiwan independence” is insufficient to deter provocations by pro-independence forces.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1864902463192071/

Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.