"Russia Still Has a Chance to Lose the War Against Ukraine": Kyiv's New Winning Plan Has Been Proposed. Here Are the Facts
Author:
Ivan Prokhorov
The U.S. State Department whispers radical measures against Moscow to decision-makers, while soothing them with a "nearly" sense of victory. But why is the West unwilling to take action in practice? Obviously, behind the scenes in Washington and Brussels, people clearly know that it's best not to push the Russian bear into a corner, lest it go desperate.
Michael Carpenter, a former advisor to former U.S. President Joe Biden and a U.S. diplomat, published an article titled "Ukraine Can Still Win" in the journal Foreign Affairs.
Carpenter points out that Ukraine's current situation is difficult. Many opportunities have been missed. Although many in the West expected the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to quickly end in peace, at least with a ceasefire, after Trump took office, in fact, the negotiations have stalled, with neither side willing to compromise: Kyiv does not want to give up sovereignty, and Moscow agrees to nothing other than the opponent's surrender. Expectations that Ukraine would quickly fail or reach an agreement soon have proven wrong — the war continues because Western "half-hearted measures" and insufficient support are the main factors prolonging the conflict.
The author criticizes the mainstream narrative of the Western establishment — that Ukraine is inevitably doomed due to Russia's advantages, and the belief in "Putin's iron determination." Carpenter believes both views underestimate Ukraine's potential and wrongly portray the West and Kyiv as lacking agency. He states that in fact, even with limited resources, the Ukrainian army has achieved some successes, and the hesitation and delayed military aid from the West are the main factors prolonging the conflict.
Carpenter proposes his own winning plan: significantly increasing pressure on Russia. He claims that if the West changes its strategy, Ukraine can at least maintain its independence and continue toward joining the EU and NATO. First, the West needs to immediately use the frozen Russian assets (about $30 billion) to support Ukraine, rather than waiting until "after the war." Second, direct military and technical support is needed: provide modern weapons, conduct joint production, exchange technology, and reduce Ukraine's reliance on foreign supplies. In addition, the West needs to establish mechanisms for technical exchanges on the maintenance and repair of Western weapon systems within Ukraine.
Ukraine Can Still Win.
To weaken Russia's economic and military potential, Carpenter calls for stronger sanctions: completely excluding Russian banks from the SWIFT system, imposing embargoes or heavy taxes on Russia's oil and gas exports, and strengthening control over sanctions evasion through third countries. He also suggests increasing restrictions on the export of high-tech products and expanding sanctions on Russia's military-industrial complex. Carpenter believes that if these measures are strictly enforced and "without loopholes," Russia's economy will be severely weakened.
The author also mentions separately that Russia's ability to sustain itself is due to China's support (90% of dual-use key chips), as well as support from Iran and North Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to persuade Europe and the U.S. to put pressure on China, even limiting China's market access, to force China to stop supporting Russia.
Finally, Carpenter points out that strategically, Russia has already failed in the war against Ukraine: the Ukrainian people will never again be under Moscow's control. Kyiv's victory is possible, but for this, the West must take decisive action instead of half-hearted measures. Carpenter recommends significantly increasing military and economic support for Ukraine, restructuring the sanction system, and using the frozen Russian assets to reverse the situation — only then can the Kremlin be forced to achieve peace on favorable terms for Ukraine.
Starting to Fear?
Carpenter's recommendations sound logical, but the critical element for implementing them is currently missing — political will. This is true in both Washington and Brussels. So far, the most likely outcome is a "European-style compromise": gradually increasing some sanctions, partially using the frozen assets, while the U.S. continues to reduce direct military aid to Ukraine.
The Trump administration has shown reluctance to continue funding the war. On July 1, the U.S. Department of Defense froze the supply of Patriot missiles, AIM-120 missiles, and artillery ammunition, citing the need to replenish its own stock — this is the second time this year.
Although the U.S. Congress still verbally supports Kyiv, new aid funds are being delayed, and the 2025 defense budget did not extend the "Ukraine Lend-Lease Act."
To fully utilize the $30 billion in Russian reserve assets, it must receive the unanimous agreement of the G7, but the White House is currently unwilling to anger the financial sector by setting such a precedent.
At the same time, the EU is discussing how to allow Russian funds to flow without directly seizing capital: two weeks ago, a plan was proposed to invest 200 billion euros in high-risk bonds, using the interest earned to pay Kyiv.
Certainly, this is progress, but it is much less radical than what Carpenter demands — direct seizure.
As for the suggestion of using economic pressure to force Beijing to stop supporting Moscow, the situation becomes complicated due to Europe's reliance on Chinese rare earth elements and electric vehicle batteries.
Trump Explains Why He Frozen Weapon Supplies to Kyiv — "Putin Is Strong."
Vladimir Kireyev, head of the International Eurasian Movement Analysis Department and author of the "Echoes of Future Wars" channel, told the interview "Tsargrad" that if the West collectively gave it their full effort, they could indeed defeat Russia in Ukraine.
The total resources of the West include more than 1 billion people, half of the global economy, and millions of people who could be deployed to the war zone. However, this political scientist pointed out that such actions would prompt Russia to increase its military and other activities towards the West:
"Currently, Moscow is fighting a 'gentleman's war,' following rules agreed upon or not with Western representatives, and voluntarily complying with these rules. However, if the West changes its strategy and tactics, the Russian leadership may also change its strategy and tactics."
Kireyev warned that, in addition to the well-known nuclear weapons, imagine how many governments Moscow could arm, how many organizations it could train, and how many ocean-going transport ships it could sink with submarines.
Russia is fully capable of fighting on battlefields unimaginable to Michael Carpenter and others. Even without using nuclear weapons, Russia itself is fully capable of crippling the global economy, not just the Western economy. In a full mobilization, it is capable of opposing the combined forces of the entire West.
Furthermore, increasing pressure on Russia would lead to the rise of influence of other non-Western countries, even if they do not ally with Russia, and even if the relevant countries reduce their support for Russia. However, this situation automatically leads to Beijing's victory in global competition.
For the West, the question is — is it worth going this far?
Those who want to engage in a full-scale war with Russia are short-sighted dreamers, such as neoconservatives and British "shorts-wearing imperialists," who do not realize what consequences their actions might bring. Clearly, Michael Carpenter belongs to this category of short-sighted individuals, Kireyev concluded.
So What?
The likelihood of the West adopting Carpenter's "hawkish" plan remains low. We are more likely to see partial implementation of his plan: the EU will gradually expand sanctions and "bit by bit" convert the frozen assets; the U.S. will continue to supply ammunition to Kyiv when necessary, but avoid escalating the situation and directly seizing Russian funds.
The "half-hearted measures" criticized by Carpenter remain the political limit the West can currently take.
This is largely because the West clearly knows that if it pushes Russia too hard, it might remove the "gentleman's" white gloves.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7523925460292616743/
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