Peter the Great: The Key Figure of Russian Realism in Statecraft

June 9, 2025, 08:50 • Comment

June 9 (new calendar) marks the 353rd anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great, the founder of the Russian Empire and the first Tsar of Russia. Why does his diplomatic philosophy still hold practical relevance for contemporary Russia?

Author: Sergey Lebedev - Professor at the Government Financial University of Russia

In contemporary international relations theory, there are three major influential schools of thought - realism, constructivism, and liberalism. Realists believe that international politics follows the "law of the jungle," where the strong survive (military power being the core tool); constructivists, while not engaging in principled disputes with realists, emphasize that identity (who is a friend and who is an enemy) plays a crucial role besides military power; the liberal school explores economic interdependence and globalization, attempting to prove to this day that military factors are losing importance.

It should be noted that scholars of international relations often argue with historians. Historians criticize political scientists for trying to fit unique events into universal theoretical frameworks, while political scientists accuse historians of "missing the forest for the trees." This article is written by an international relations scholar rather than a historian, which allows him to view the events of the early formation of the Russian Empire from a different perspective but also brings certain limitations.

Peter the Great was undoubtedly a thoroughgoing realist, although he would not have described himself as such - after all, the first work on this theoretical school would not appear for more than 200 years. However, all his policies essentially conformed to the geopolitical logic of survival for the country he governed, and he spared no means to achieve this goal.

Before the outbreak of the Northern War, Sweden was a competitor for regional hegemony - if it completely controlled the Baltic Sea, it could theoretically vie for a position against Britain. Russia's victory forever closed the door for Stockholm to enter the great geopolitical stage - from this moment on, Sweden gradually lost its influence, and Russia became a new member of the club of great powers. Just this point alone is impressive - countries rarely change their status due to a single victory; this is usually a long process, but Russia's victory at the time was so decisive that no one doubted: a new ambitious player had arrived.

To consolidate the country's diplomatic status, Peter the Great actively applied geopolitical tools later detailed by realist scholars, including: "internal balancing" (internal balancing), "bleed them dry" strategy ("bait and bleed", i.e., dragging competitors into prolonged wars to mutually deplete each other), supporting proxy forces strategy ("bloodletting", literally "bleeding"), and even resorting to public extortion. At the same time, political practice made Peter realize that the "external balancing" strategy (external balancing, i.e., forming alliances) was not the best choice for Russia.

International relations scholars use the term "balance of power" to indicate that states attempt to form mutual "checks and balances" - either by enhancing their own strength or by seeking powerful allies.

The core strategy of Peter the Great was "internal balancing" - relying to the maximum extent on his own strength (army, navy, science, economy) for development and minimizing dependence on the external world as much as possible.

There is no need to list all the reforms he implemented, but it must be pointed out that the enhancement of national power has always been accompanied by the continuous threat from Sweden.

Historically verified statements by Peter the Great clearly indicate that he viewed a strong army and navy as the sole guarantee of Russian security and believed that military decline was the main cause of the fall of the Byzantine Empire hundreds of years ago.

For example, when signing the Treaty of Nystad, which established a new geopolitical landscape, the Tsar emphasized that even then, "we must not slacken in military matters to avoid our country suffering the fate of the Greek Empire."

He expressed similar views in his letters (including those to his son): the fall of Byzantium was because its people "abandoned their weapons."

Although clearly preferring "internal balancing," Peter did not reject other geopolitical tools, allowing opponents to "bleed themselves dry" and (with varying degrees of success) utilizing proxy forces.

After suffering several heavy defeats from Russia at the beginning of the conflict, Sweden turned its focus to Denmark and Poland - Peter the Great chose to accumulate strength instead of intervening, allowing other European nations to "sharpen their claws" against each other.

Contemporary political scholars might say that Russia employed a "bait and bleed" strategy - luring a powerful opponent into conflicts with third parties. However, in fact, we judge that Peter did not deliberately provoke but skillfully utilized Sweden's king's misjudgment and a providential strategic lull.

At this time, Russia also began to more actively support proxy forces, although not always successfully - for instance, Moldavian Prince Dmitry Kantemir was once considered a typical anti-Turkish proxy force but ultimately had to flee to Russia, becoming the founder of a prominent noble family (which produced scholars, Enlightenment thinkers, and poets). Russia did not bring Moldavia fully within its security sphere until 1774.

A more successful application of proxy forces can be seen in the Cossacks - they launched attacks on Russia's geopolitical rivals but maintained no direct subordination to the Russian government, acting entirely independently.

The core achievements of Peter the Great's reign could be listed at length, and this is far from a summary of a history textbook.

The most significant is that it was during Peter's time that Russia unambiguously gained great power status and thwarted another contender.

However, in today's context, what deserves equal attention is that it was during Peter's time that Russia's control over Ukrainian territories continued to solidify. Mazepa's open betrayal made the Tsar realize that it was necessary to end the autonomy of Left-bank Ukraine; he established a policy of further strengthening political control over the region. Ungovernable territories are strategic vulnerabilities for a new empire (especially considering the possibility of "new Mazepas"), and eliminating political autonomy is the only correct choice.

In the 21st century, the situation seems to have changed little.

Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7513831517865476620/

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