[By Emma Ashford, translated by Whale Life]
Vladimir Lenin once said: "Sometimes decades pass without anything happening, and sometimes weeks produce events that affect decades." By this standard, the first hundred days of Donald Trump's second term have brought about changes in American diplomacy equivalent to at least twenty years.
This administration has pursued a foreign policy with the principle of "quick action and no establishment without destruction," yet its only consistency lies in the chaos at the level of execution. The U.S. stance on major global conflicts has swung dramatically: rapidly moving toward negotiations with Russia, promoting a ceasefire in Gaza, sometimes threatening military action against Iran, and at other times proposing to restart nuclear talks with Iran.
The sudden closure of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has left warehouses full of food aid unmanaged, allowing food to rot inside. The Trump administration also implemented unconventional immigration policies, including outsourcing immigration detention operations to the Salvadoran government. More notably, its trade policy has been unpredictable—this president toggles tariffs on and off like a light switch, causing persistent turmoil in global financial markets.
How can we understand the current chaos? Clearly, Trump's second term aims for change rather than continuing the inertia of American foreign policy, though the direction of such change remains unclear. When attempting to explain the choices made so far, there are four analytical models worth considering.
Model One: A Return to Realpolitik
This is the first analytical framework for understanding Trump's foreign policy, perhaps the most coherent one—that this administration is coldly returning to realpolitik, placing greater importance on dealing with China and affairs in the Western Hemisphere over Europe and the Middle East.
From this perspective, the tense relationship between the Trump administration and its European allies can be seen as a Nixon-style strategic adjustment: after excessive expansion, an attempt to rebalance America's strategic commitments. Notably, this view holds that the Trump administration has not abandoned leadership over a "rules-based international order," but merely acknowledges the hypocrisy of the current system—and openly declares that America's national interests always outweigh vague liberal ideals like democracy and human rights.
The administration's policy toward Europe may best illustrate this decision-making model. Pressuring allies to increase defense spending and attempting to extricate itself from the Ukraine conflict through negotiations with Russia are both policies long advocated by realists. Further evidence supporting this realpolitik model includes Trump's willingness to manipulate both enemies and friends simultaneously, reflecting a transactional diplomatic mindset; his use of tariff threats against Canada, Mexico, or the EU, though potentially problematic in the long term, can yield quick victories in the short term.
Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, candidly admitted to media that coping with pressure from the Trump administration left him "anxious every morning just to open his phone." Video screenshot.
Even Trump's sudden focus on the Western Hemisphere aligns with this model. Secretary of State Mark Rubio's rapid visit to Latin America after taking office, his concerns about China's presence in the Panama Canal region, and even his bizarre proposal to annex Greenland all have hard power considerations behind them. Additionally, several key figures appointed by Trump, including Vice President Vance, clearly hold a realist worldview.
However, this realpolitik model struggles to explain other areas. It fails to account for America's Israel policy and does not justify the significant weakening of the diplomatic corps—though some might argue that a U.S. administration focused on great power competition would not "self-destruct" in soft power domains, Trump's indifference to the consequences of cutting agencies like Voice of America and USAID, despite warnings about Russia and China filling the influence vacuum, is inexplicable within this framework. Similarly, tariff policies do not fit into this model: while America's choice to decouple from China may have realpolitik logic, actions like sanctioning neighboring countries or undermining the dollar's status as a global reserve currency lack justification.
Model Two: Foreign Policy as an Extension of Domestic Politics
A second explanation for Trump's foreign policy often appears in Democratic-leaning American television media—suggesting that foreign decisions are primarily driven by domestic agendas or aim to make the rich richer. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders criticized the dismantling of USAID, saying: "Elon Musk, the world's richest man... wants to shut down an agency meant to feed the poorest people globally."
Clearly, the actions of the "Department of Government Efficiency" (DOGE) and the new administration's clear hostility toward the federal bureaucracy can be seen as a continuation of the Republican Party's long-term goals—as Grover Norquist, a Republican political activist and founder of the Tax Reform Organization, famously put it: "The federal government needs to be reduced to a size small enough to drown in a bathtub." Trump has eliminated some federal agencies (such as USAID and the Department of Education), while retaining others (such as the Department of Defense and the Social Security Administration). The agencies cut were generally those least favored by Republican voters and donors.
Meanwhile, Trump's foreign economic policies have caused panic among Wall Street and business circles, leading to a market freefall. The goal of his tariff policies remains uncertain: is it to sign more favorable Asian trade agreements? Or to exchange concessions from Mexico and Canada on immigration or drug policies? Or does it serve a broader strategy to weaken the dollar and promote domestic reindustrialization? Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's remarks in New York to bankers were classic: "The essence of the American dream is not solely reliant on 'cheap goods' from China."—clearly, these words did not reassure America's economic elite.
Domestic political considerations are also evident in other areas. Vice President Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference in February garnered attention not only because of his commitment to NATO but also because he emphasized immigration and cultural issues, highlighting the divergence in values between Europe and America. Vance's unusual meeting with Germany's far-right Alternative for Germany party ahead of the German election also reflects the Trump administration's appreciation for right-wing parties in Europe.
Local time February 14, 2025, Munich, Germany, Vance speaks at the 61st Munich Security Conference. Visual China.
However, interpreting Trump's foreign policy solely through a domestic political lens has limitations. It cannot explain why Trump continues to focus on the Middle East, particularly his unwavering support for Israel. In fact, the current immigration ban on pro-Palestinian protesters like Mahmoud Khalil in the United States shows the reverse impact of foreign policy on domestic politics: due to bias toward Israel in the Gaza conflict, the United States has intensified speech control domestically. This model also fails to explain why the Trump administration is so determined to withdraw from Ukraine.
Model Three: Toward the First Term
A third possible explanatory model requires us to revisit Trump's first term. Indeed, this is the general view of congressional Republicans and Washington's foreign policy circles—as shown during Trump's first term from 2016 to 2020, initial chaos will eventually give way to a government structure that is essentially traditional Republican. Such a government may retain some unique styles of Trump but will largely continue the foreign policy priorities since the Bush administration: emphasizing sovereignty, unilateralism, and forcefully showcasing military strength.
After all, the National Security Strategy report released during Trump's first term was relatively conventional; many of the national security advisors he appointed came from Washington's bureaucratic system. Although he held summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and adopted a dramatic "Twitter diplomacy" style, his overall foreign policy did not significantly deviate from established tracks. Some argue that Trump's second term is moving toward a "Trump/Reagan" fusion—adjusting the party line slightly toward Trump's preferences while retaining most of Reagan's traditional foreign policy principles.
This model can explain most of the radical measures taken during Trump's "hundred-day新政" that deviated from the Republican tradition—all attributed to the president's personal traits. For instance, the U.S. government's outreach to Russia can be explained as Trump's personal preference—he enjoys negotiating directly with strong leaders and perhaps harbors ambitions to win the Nobel Peace Prize. But like last term, many Republican elites estimate that when hopes for quick peace fade, Trump will return to traditional paths regarding Ukraine conflicts (and broader foreign policy issues).
However, the contradictions in this theory are also apparent. Take Israel policy as an example: unlimited support for Israel is a mainstream Republican foreign policy tradition, yet this administration gives Israel "blank checks" verbally while pushing other Trump-prioritized initiatives (such as expanding and extending the Abraham Accords, which are currently hindered by the ongoing Gaza conflict), making it difficult to reconcile. Vice President Vance publicly stated that the U.S. has no intention of going to war with Iran; reportedly, Trump himself refused to support Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's plan to strike Iran's nuclear facilities.
The administration's positions on these various issues indicate a growing rift with more traditional Republican hawks: those who advocate that the U.S. should assist Israel in striking Iran's nuclear program, continue military aid to Ukraine, and maintain global alliances. Former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a well-known hawk, even voted against Trump's nominee, Elbridge Colby, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy; other Republicans hinted that Colby was unwilling to support war with Iran. If this administration truly represents a "Trump/Reagan" fusion of traditional Republican ideas, its effects have yet to materialize.
Despite opposition from traditional Republican hawks, Elbridge Colby, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy affairs under the Trump administration, was approved by the Senate in early April. Foreign media.
Model Four: A Showdown Within the Republican Party Over Foreign Policy
These controversies lead to the fourth (and final) model for analyzing the Trump administration: the chaos witnessed so far partly stems from the Republican Party's internal strife over foreign policy directions. On one side, nationalist/protectionist factions within the Republican Party are rising, focusing primarily on China issues; even if they are not isolationists, they clearly no longer walk the same path as past neoconservatives. This faction is evident in the Pentagon, Vice President Vance's circle, and even among officials from Musk and Silicon Valley within the administration.
On the other side are more traditional "super-hawk" Republican internationalists (such as Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz), attempting to pull policies back onto their preferred tracks. Trump instinctively leans toward the former camp, but as in the first term—his views are easily swayed by others.
If this model holds true, then the confusion and chaos triggered by the administration's foreign policy since the "hundred-day新政" partially stem from power struggles within the government over personnel appointments and policy influence among different factions.
The divisions between these two camps are far more complex than they appear: they fundamentally oppose each other on issues like Russia, Iran, and to some extent, Israel. Consider Keith Kellogg, the retired general serving as the U.S. special envoy for Ukraine, who was marginalized due to his stance on Kiev differing from the president and vice president; or the "Signalgate" scandal where Vance attempted to delay airstrikes on Yemeni Houthi forces at the last minute, arguing it wouldn't improve the situation and wasted resources, but his proposal was ultimately rejected.
If internal party struggles indeed explain the "hundred-day chaos," another trend is becoming increasingly evident: compared to the first term, today's Trump is less willing to be influenced by his aides. Reports suggest that Waltz is苦恼about his views frequently contradicting the president’s; Laura Loomer, a far-right social media influencer, even successfully persuaded the president to fire several Waltz-aligned officials from the National Security Council on charges of disloyalty and harboring "neoconservative tendencies."
In late March, National Security Advisor Waltz faced resignation pressure due to the "Signalgate" incident sparked by a "misdirected journalist group chat." Image source: AFP.
If this trend continues, it is expected that Trump's foreign policy trajectory will lean more toward the first and second analytical models listed earlier (both of which have stronger "America First" characteristics), rather than the third model representing traditional Republican foreign policy ideas. However, the sudden dismissal of three "restraint" high-ranking officials under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last week (for unknown reasons) suggests an opposite movement.
Although seemingly unbelievable, Trump's administration has just reached the traditional benchmark of "hundred days in office," the time Americans tend to initially evaluate a government. During his first term, many major crises and foreign policy decisions occurred after this benchmark.
In many ways, it is still too early to judge the direction of Trump's foreign policy or whether Congress and the courts can constrain the recent chaotic governance. In fact, the greatest uncertainty in America's foreign policy lies in whether the Republican foreign policy elite can "tame" Trump or whether Trump can impose his personal will on the establishment—hence, until now, the public cannot define what "Trumpism" entails.
But these models provide a framework for assessing the unfolding drama of Trump's foreign policy after the "hundred days." Currently, the first two analytical models better explain Trump's decisions, but external shocks and personnel appointment struggles could still alter the course and significantly impact the overall direction of the administration's foreign policy.
The success or failure of Trump's key goals will also reshape his policy orientation: for instance, if the Ukraine negotiations fail, Trump may distance himself from the realpolitik conservatives who initially supported U.S. involvement in mediation; if an attack on Iran leads to disaster, neoconservatives will lose all legitimacy within this administration.
The only certainty is that the next four years may be as chaotic as the past hundred days. Perhaps it's time to stock up on some painkillers.
(Original publication on the "Foreign Policy" commentary website in the U.S., titled "Four Models Explaining the Chaos of Trump's Governance." Translation provided for reader reference only and does not represent the views of Guancha.cn.)
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