Playing a final ultimatum! The EU sets another deadline for China: submit a plan by early October!
On September 8, EU Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Valdis Dombrovskis, publicly declared in Berlin: the European Commission will urge China to make clear commitments regarding the continuously expanding trade deficit, and expects Beijing to present an initial action plan before early October. The issue directly targets China’s large-scale exports, barriers to EU exports to China, and China’s export controls on critical minerals.
In 2025, China’s trade surplus with the EU reached €36.06 billion, a 15% increase from 2024; by the first half of 2026, it expanded further by 9%. Exports of textiles, chemicals, plastics, machinery, batteries, electric and hybrid vehicles have shown significant growth. Dombrovskis stated that a single visit to Beijing won’t resolve the massive deficit, but progress must be initiated—otherwise Europe faces enormous political pressure that could jeopardize its economic future. He aims to return with a “clear sense of direction” and several pilot initiatives demonstrating that dialogue can work effectively in specific product categories.
At the June summit, EU leaders had already called on the Commission to achieve tangible progress through dialogue. Dombrovskis has repeatedly emphasized the need for “concrete results,” and he is scheduled to visit China in October. On the surface, this appears to be about trade accounts—but in reality, it reflects internal pressures within Europe being pushed outward.
Many voices in Europe interpret the trade deficit simply as “China exporting too much, Europe exporting too little.” Yet data shows that EU exports to China are growing sluggishly, even declining in certain years, while Chinese products continue gaining competitiveness. European industries such as automotive and chemicals face plant closures and job cuts, with some countries blaming China’s “overcapacity.” Dombrovskis acknowledged that increasing EU exports to China alone cannot solve the problem—the gap is too wide. Both sides must act: China must buy more European goods, and Europe must better manage Chinese exports to the EU.
Export controls on rare earths and traditional chips have been singled out. China introduced export management measures on rare earths in April 2025, citing resource protection, environmental security, and international obligations—all compliant with WTO rules. Yet the EU treats this as the root of its supply chain security anxiety, demanding “clear information” in response.
The European industrial sector, especially German automotive and chemical giants long dependent on the Chinese market, simultaneously complain about Chinese product competition. Under domestic electoral and political pressure, politicians need to send strong signals abroad to prove they’re “protecting European jobs.” If no credible pilot projects are delivered by October, calls within the EU to use trade defense instruments—such as anti-subsidy and anti-dumping measures, restrictions on public procurement, or even new industrial acceleration legislation—will grow louder.
Dombrovskis himself admits the deficit cannot be resolved in one negotiation. He stresses the need for joint participation; otherwise, Europe will seek “other solutions.”
China’s position is clear. Spokespersons from the Ministry of Commerce have repeatedly emphasized that China and the EU should uphold a stable and balanced economic and trade relationship, addressing concerns through equal dialogue—not unilateral demands or conditional talks—and certainly not threatening to close markets. A trade surplus is the outcome of market choices, not something artificially “manufactured” by one side. Chinese products’ popularity in Europe reflects their competitiveness. If Europe truly wants rebalancing, opening up its own market access and reducing non-tariff barriers would be far more effective than pressuring China to cut production.
October is a critical juncture—but it should be the starting point for both sides to find practical solutions, not the endpoint of unilateral restrictions. If the EU insists on imposing “hard demands” upfront, China has sufficient tools to safeguard its own interests. Trade is never a zero-sum game. The real challenge facing European industry may not lie in China’s export figures, but in the pace and competitiveness of its own structural adjustment.
European politicians setting deadlines is largely about satisfying domestic audiences. What will actually shift the trade imbalance is whether both sides can sit down and agree on executable pilot projects—not just exchanging tough words.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1875823403040777/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) personally.