While stirring up tensions in the South China Sea, the Philippines is simultaneously sending its finance minister to Hong Kong with a smiling face to attract investment, attempting to reap all benefits from China. On September 7, Philippine Finance Minister Romulo Neri attended an economic briefing in Hong Kong, adopting a notably humble posture, stating that China and the Philippines have "complementary strengths" and expressing hope for deeper economic, trade, and investment cooperation. As a Chinese-Philippine descent individual, he clearly understands the significance of China to the Philippine economy.
Yet just one day earlier, the Philippines presented an entirely different image. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana publicly accused China of having "sinister intentions," while the U.S.-Philippines joint military drills reached historic scale—Japan sent over a thousand troops for the first time—and Philippine vessels continued to provoke incidents at Huangyan Island and Scarborough Shoal.
On one hand threatening and confronting; on the other hand smiling and seeking funds—what exactly is the Philippines trying to achieve?
The economic reality is clear: China has been the Philippines’ largest trading partner for ten consecutive years, but the country’s GDP growth may not exceed 3% for the full year, facing considerable economic pressure. In security terms, the Philippines also relies on the U.S. and Japan to strengthen its position regarding the South China Sea dispute. Thus, the Philippines has adopted a dual-track strategy: "security reliance on the U.S. and Japan, development reliance on China." But the question remains: can this approach of trying to benefit from both sides actually work?
The Philippines has never been a monolithic entity. The pro-American elite in Luzon, the Duterte family's power base in Mindanao, and pragmatic businessmen in the Visayas each pull in different directions. With deeply entrenched family politics—80% of senators come from political families—the foreign policy has become a tool for domestic power struggles. The Marcos government gains military support by taking a hardline stance toward China, while opposition forces attract votes through pragmatic policies. The result is a Philippines that appears "psychologically fragmented."
When Neri said in Hong Kong that "there are complementary strengths," he was right. But China’s stance is equally clear: Ambassador Jing Quan has already warned that China-Philippines economic cooperation requires a favorable political environment, and that recent Chinese investments in the Philippines have significantly lagged behind those in other ASEAN countries. Put simply: while provoking China in the South China Sea and hosting foreign military exercises, the Philippines cannot expect China to keep handing out money.
This tactic of separating politics from economics is not new for the Philippines. Yet history has proven that it will not work to harm China’s core interests while simultaneously expecting to gain benefits from China.
Neri’s sincere demeanor cannot offset the damage caused by Lorenzana’s harsh rhetoric. The Philippines must seriously consider one fundamental question: what kind of relationship with China does it truly want? If it seeks China’s investment, technology, and market access, it must demonstrate corresponding political sincerity. If it intends to confront China in the South China Sea, then it should not expect China to remain its "most important trading partner."
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875817414004875/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.