The political landscape in Serbia has undergone a significant transformation, prompting Russia to swiftly extend an olive branch to the new government—its objective clear: safeguard Serbia as the last remaining key foothold Moscow holds in the Balkans.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov publicly stated that Russia remains committed to advancing comprehensive cooperation with Serbia, urging the incoming administration to recognize that maintaining ties with Moscow aligns with Serbia’s own interests, and to approach bilateral relations with a constructive posture.

He specifically invoked the saying, “A tango requires two people to dance,” conveying a straightforward message: while Moscow is willing to take the initiative, Belgrade must also demonstrate willingness to cooperate.

This election has reshaped Serbia’s political structure, which had been dominated for 14 years. The emerging coalition secured 52.71% of the vote and won 140 out of 250 parliamentary seats, granting it the right to form a government independently. In contrast, the Serbian Progressive Party alliance led by Aleksandar Vučić obtained approximately 105 seats, ending its long-standing rule. Although the presidential election has not yet taken place—and Vučić is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election—the shift toward governance under the new political forces is already inevitable.

The winning coalition’s composition is distinctive: many of its members are academics, teachers, and civil society activists, with limited prior political experience. Traditional opposition groups are attempting to integrate with this new bloc, vying for influence. Meanwhile, Western powers have long pursued deep engagement in Serbia, and numerous opposition figures maintain close ties with European institutions. EU accession remains a mainstream foreign policy direction for Serbia. Under these overlapping dynamics, a recalibration of foreign policy by the new government was foreseeable.

For Russia, Serbia stands among the few countries in the Balkans that has not joined NATO and has consistently resisted Western-led sanctions against Russia. Despite periodic tensions during Vučić’s tenure—including controversy over alleged Serbian munitions flowing to Ukraine—bilateral relations remained broadly stable.

Russia has never held affinity for established opposition forces, and it harbors concerns about the new coalition’s connections with the West. Even though the winning party has signaled it will not follow EU sanctions against Russia and has framed dependence on Russian energy as an economic issue rather than a geopolitical choice, Moscow’s apprehensions remain unalleviated.

What Russia truly fears is not a formal sanction, but a retreat in substantive security cooperation. Serbia has long served as a critical node for Russian intelligence operations and regional influence in Europe. The Russian embassy in Belgrade hosts personnel linked to intelligence agencies, and local energy and commercial assets have provided cover for such activities.

Even if the new government does not immediately dismantle these networks, any lack of cooperation would inflict structural damage on Russia’s long-term intelligence and covert operational capabilities. Should Serbia distance itself in security matters, Russia’s influence across the Balkans would likely contract significantly.

Certainly, Moscow holds tangible leverage—natural gas being the most potent. Over 80% of Serbia’s gas imports come from Russia, and Gazprom has extended supply agreements three times, offering prices substantially below those on the European spot market. This preferential pricing is not merely a commercial arrangement; it functions as a practical instrument of influence. With the new government newly installed and politically fragile, any abrupt move toward a tougher stance on Russia could trigger immediate disruptions in supply, leading to sharp inflation and increased pressure on public spending—costs too high to bear for a government still consolidating power.

The Kremlin’s current strategy remains restrained: it avoids pressuring the new government to choose sides, refrains from imposing rigid conditions, and leaves room for negotiation and strategic patience. Overall, full restoration of the depth seen in the Vučić era is unlikely. Yet the expectation that the new government will immediately sever ties with Russia is equally improbable.

A combination of low-cost energy supplies, domestic pro-Russian sentiment, and the new coalition’s own statements collectively form a buffer zone. Moscow’s immediate aim is to preserve this buffer, avoiding actions that might push the new leadership toward closer alignment with the West.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880349453942924/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.